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SUMMARY
My dissertation consists of three essays in international capital markets.
In Chapter I, we examine the herd behavior of U.S. institutional investors trad-
ing around the world. Do investors herd across countries? What are the impacts
of their herding behavior, if any, on local stock market performances? Do countries’
information environments affect the herding behavior? In this chapter, we address
these questions by using a new transaction-level trades database of 531 U.S. insti-
tutional investors trading across 37 countries during the period 2002-2009. We find
robust evidence of intra-period herding (correlated trading) by employing the Lakon-
ishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992) measure and evidence of inter-period herding by
employing the Sias (2004) measure at the monthly frequency. We also find evidence
of return continuations following intra-period buy herding and no evidence of return
reversals following intra-period sell herding. Hence, there is no evidence that trades
by institutions in our sample drive prices away from the fundamental values; rather,
they help to speed the price-adjustment process. Further analysis shows that: (i) in
the buy side, both intra- and inter-period herdings are more pronounced in countries
with weaker information environments; and (ii) in the sell side, intra-period herding
is more pronounced in countries with stronger information environments, whereas
inter-period herding is not significantly related to information environments. The
overall results of the paper suggest that information environments have asymmetric
effects on the buy- and sell-side herdings and are consistent with the view that, in the
buy side, institutions herd as a result of ‘intentionally’ inferring information from each
other’s trades, whereas, in the sell side, correlated signals primarily drive institutions’
‘unintentional’ herding across countries.
xi
In Chapter II, we (i) document that the degree of co-movement between bilateral
USD exchange rates has increased substantially since the introduction of the euro
in 1999 and (ii) investigate what drives the increased co-movement. For each of
our 33 sampled bilateral USD exchange rates, we measure the degree of co-movement
using the R-square from regressing weekly exchange rate changes on the weekly world
exchange rate factor. Our results show that, for the majority of sample exchange rates,
the R-square has increased substantially over the period 1999-2010. Specifically, the
average R-square was 0.15 in 1999, but it increased to 0.47 by more than 200% in 2010.
Further analysis reveals that the rising influence of the euro relative to USD over a
third currency can explain most of the increase in the measured co-movement over
time. Our cross-sectional regression analysis indicates that trade propensity, financial
integration, and inflation have some additional power in explaining the cross-sectional
variation in the measured co-movement. However, our cross-sectional and time-series
regression analysis reveals that once the effect of the influence of the euro relative to
USD over a third currency is controlled for, the other explanatory variables lose most
of their power in explaining the time-series variation in the measured co-movement.
In Chapter III, we examine the level and trend of U.S. domestic market inte-
gration. Investors are known to exhibit home (local) bias even when they invest in
their domestic markets. Since home bias is symptomatic of market segmentation, the
’home bias at home’ phenomenon raises an important question: How well integrated
are domestic financial markets? The answer for this question will have implications
for a wide range of financial decision makings, including the cost of capital estimation,
asset allocation, and performance evaluation. In this chapter, we address this ques-
tion by estimating the level and trend of integration of U.S. domestic stock markets.
Specifically, for each of our sample states, we construct the state (market) portfo-
lio comprising public firms headquartered within the state and compute R-square,
our measure of integration, from regressing state portfolio returns on national stock
xii
market factors. Using weekly returns, we estimate the regression for each year of
our sample period 1963-2008. The key findings are: (i) For the majority of sample
states, the R-square exhibits a statistically significant upward trend, implying that
U.S. domestic stock markets were not fully integrated and have been integrating dur-
ing the sample period; (ii) consistent with the previous result, the explanatory power
of the state factor over individual stock returns has been decreasing for the major-
ity of states; and (iii) the increasing integration of U.S. domestic stock markets is
associated with the decreasing home state bias, suggesting that investors’ pursuit of




HERDING ACROSS COUNTRIES: THE EFFECT OF
INFORMATION ENVIRONMENTS
Do investors herd across countries? What are the impacts of their herding behavior,
if any, on local stock market performances? Do countries’ information environments
affect the herding behavior? In the current paper, we address these questions by using
a new transaction-level trades database of 531 U.S. institutional investors trading
across 37 countries during the period 2002-2009. We find robust evidence of intra-
period herding (correlated trading) by employing the Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny
(1992) measure and evidence of inter-period herding by employing the Sias (2004)
measure at the monthly frequency. We also find evidence of return continuations
following intra-period buy herding and no evidence of return reversals following intra-
period sell herding. Hence, there is no evidence that trades by institutions in our
sample drive prices away from the fundamental values; rather, they help to speed the
price-adjustment process. Further analysis shows that: (i) in the buy side, both intra-
and inter-period herdings are more pronounced in countries with weaker information
environments; and (ii) in the sell side, intra-period herding is more pronounced in
countries with stronger information environments, whereas inter-period herding is
not significantly related to information environments. The overall results of the paper
suggest that information environments have asymmetric effects on the buy- and sell-
side herdings and are consistent with the view that, in the buy side, institutions herd
as a result of ‘intentionally’ inferring information from each other’s trades, whereas,




The role of institutional investors in the world equity markets has grown steadily dur-
ing the past couple of decades. The reduction of explicit barriers to cross-border cap-
ital flows together with the decreasing level of investors’ home bias have helped such
an increasing role of institutional investors (Ahearne, Griever, and Warnock, 2004;
Stulz, 2005). According to 2010 Investment Company Fact Book, U.S.-registered
investment companies managed $12.2 trillion as of the end of 2009; and, including
funds offered in foreign countries, worldwide mutual fund assets are estimated to be
$23.0 trillion. Considering that the world stock market capitalization is estimated
to be $47.8 trillion at the same year-end, the mutual fund industry managed nearly
50% of the world equity shares. Thus, institutional investors’ trading behavior across
the world equity markets and its impacts on local stock market performances de-
serve a close look. Although the existing literature on institutional investors’ herding
behavior and its impacts on stock prices is extensive, most extant studies have fo-
cused on institutional investors trading within a single country, predominantly the
United States (see, e.g., Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1992; Grinblatt, Titman,
and Wermers, 1995; Nofsinger and Sias, 1997; Wermers, 1999; Sias, 2004; Puckett
and Yan, 2008; Choi and Sias, 2009; Christoffersen and Tang, 2010). To our knowl-
edge, no prior studies have yet investigated the existence and impacts of institutional
investors’ herding behavior across countries.1
Do institutional investors herd across countries? What are the impacts of their
herding behavior, if any, on local stock market performances? This paper addresses
these important questions using a new proprietary transaction-level trading database
of 531 U.S. institutional investors trading across 37 countries around the world during
1This may be due to the difficulty of obtaining appropriate data to use. Froot, O’Connell, and
Seasholes (2001) and Froot and Ramadorai (2008) investigate the relation between international
portfolio flows into and out of a country and local stock market performances, but their studies are
conducted only at the aggregate flow level.
2
the period January 2002 to December 2009, which we purchased from Ancerno Ltd.
(formerly the Abel Noser Corporation).2
Apart from examining whether institutional investors herd across countries, we
address another important question: whether and how do cross-country differences in
information environments affect their herding behavior? In the literature on herding
theories, the primary cause of herding behavior is information asymmetry among a
group of decision makers and their sequential decision making process. In theory,
herding results from an intent by some decision makers to copy or mimic the be-
havior of other decision makers when they have imperfect, differential information.3
Consistent with the prediction of herding theories, many studies, including Werm-
ers (1999), find evidence of a higher level of institutional herding in smaller stocks
than in larger stocks and tend to attribute their findings to the fact that informa-
tion asymmetry among institutions is generally larger in smaller stocks than in larger
stocks.4 Information asymmetry among institutions, however, is likely to be much
larger in stocks of foreign countries than in domestic stocks. Intuitively, this is so
because the degree of information disclosure requirements, the quality and compre-
hensiveness of disclosed information, and the timeliness of information disclosures,
etc. vary widely across countries (see, e.g., La Porta, Lopez de-Silanes, Shileifer,
and Vishny, 1998; Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith, 2004; Lakonishok, Shileifer, and
Vishny, 2006; Frost, Gordon, and Hayes, 2006). The cost of collecting information
should also vary to a great extent across countries. Hence, chances are high that some
2Ancerno collects transaction-level trade data from a large sample of U.S. institutional traders
and conducts and provides transaction cost analysis for them.
3Popular theories of herding proposed in the literature include: theory based on decision makers’
reputational concerns of acting differently from others (Scharfstein and Stein, 1990; Trueman, 1994);
theory based on decision makers inferring information from others’ previous decisions (Benerjee,
1992; Bikchchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch, 1992; Welch, 1992); theory based on decision makers
following fads or preferring certain characteristics (Friedman, 1984; Falkenstein, 1996); and theory
based on correlated signals (Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein, 1992).
4Throughout this paper, we use the terms “institutional investors” and simply “institutions”
interchangeably.
3
institutions may be better in accessing and analyzing information about a particular
stock or stocks from a particular country than other institutions. Thus, the effect of
information environments on institutional herding behavior, if it exists, may manifest
itself more clearly in an international setting. Examining herding behavior using data
from institutional investors’ trading across a wide cross-section of countries can add
to our understanding of the relation between information environments and herding
behavior.
To address our research questions, we measure institutional herding at a monthly
horizon and define an institutional investor as a buyer (seller) of a given country
during a given month if the total dollar value of the institution’s position in the
country increased (decreased) over the month (Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1992;
Choi and Sias, 2009). We consider the monthly horizon to be a reasonable time
horizon to measure institutional herding, especially in an international investment
context.5 Next, as measures of herding, we employ two measures: one proposed by
Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992; LSV henceforth), which we refer to as the
LSV measure, and the other proposed by Sias (2004), which we refer to as the Sias
measure. These are the two most popular measures of herding in the literature. The
two herding measures capture different characteristics of trading patterns. The LSV
measure measures cross-sectional herding (correlated trading) over one period, and
the Sias measure measures inter-temporal herding over two adjacent periods.6 To
5Measuring herding at a longer time horizon, a quarterly horizon for example, would not capture
intra-period round-trip transactions and may not identify institutional herding behavior adequately
(LSV, 1992; Puckett and Yan, 2008). Also, measuring herding at a shorter time horizon, a daily or
weekly horizon for example, may not allow institutions to infer information from other institutions’
trades adequately, especially in an international setting. In addition, influential fund rating agencies
such as Morningstar and Barron’s/Lipper report the rating of funds based on funds’ performance
regularly, and one-month horizon is the shortest time horizon they consider. Hence, if any kind
of market disciplinary mechanism affects institutional investors’ trading behavior, we expect that
institutional trading behavior is likely to manifest itself clearly at a monthly horizon.
6As Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992) themselves have put it, the LSV measure cannot dis-
entangle ‘intentional’ (or ‘true’) herding from ‘unintentional’ (or ‘spurious’) herding. Unintentional
herding results when institutions move in the same direction simply because they get similar signals
and follow similar trading strategies (momentum strategy, for example). According to Bikhchandani
4
put it simply, for a stock and a period of interest, LSV measure herding as the excess
tendency of a group of investors to buy (sell) the stock at the same time over the
period, relative to what could be expected if they traded independently. On the other
hand, Sias measures herding as the portion of the inter-temporal correlation between
contemporaneous and lag investor demands over two adjacent periods that is due to
investors’ following the lag demand of other investors. Throughout this study, we
also refer to the LSV herding as ‘intra-period’ herding and the Sias herding as ‘inter-
period’ herding for obvious reason. Examining both intra- and inter-period herdings
together would give us a better understanding of how differently institutions behave
in different information environments.
We begin with examining intra-period herding across countries using the LSV
herding measure. We find a mean intra-period herding of 2.2% when we consider
country-month pairs with at least five active institutions.7 At a first glance, the
size of intra-period herding may look small. However, the LSV measure is com-
puted by subtracting the so-called adjustment factor term, and the mean value of
this adjustment term amounts to 6.5%. During our sample period, the time-series
mean of the average institutional demand across all countries was 50.4%. Hence, the
mean intra-period herding value of 2.2% can be interpreted as implying that 59.1%
(=50.4+2.2+6.5) of institutions were moving in the same direction in an average
country-month pair and 40.9% in the opposite direction.8 The measured intra-period
herding is also strongly significant with a t-statistic value of 17.23. Excluding a few
and Sharma (2000), what the LSV measure really measures is the correlation in trading patterns for
a particular group of traders. For this reason, Feng and Saesholes (2004) use the term “correlated
trading” rather than “herding” while they employ the LSV measure.
7The measured level of intra-period herding of 2.2% is smaller than that found by Wermers
(1999), 3.4% for U.S. individual stocks, and larger than that by Choi and Sias (2009), 1.4% for 49
U.S. industries, although these values are not directly comparable to each other.
8Previous studies do not consider the effect of the adjustment term for this kind of argument
(Lakonishok et al., 1992; Wermers, 1999). However, the adjustment term is usually sizable as can
be seen from Figure 1.
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smallest market capitalization countries from the sample does not change the mea-
sured herding level significantly. Importantly, we find that the measured intra-period
herding varies greatly across countries. In terms of the time-series average over the
sample period, the measured intra-period herding ranges from the lowest -0.7% for
Thailand to the highest 4.0% for Korea.
Next, using the Sias herding measure, we find strong evidence of inter-period herd-
ing. Specifically, the inter-temporal correlation between the fraction of institutional
investors buying a country this month and the fraction buying last month amounts
to about 0.3, and more than 60% of the correlation is accounted for by institutional
investors’ following other institutional investors’ previous trades, which represents
inter-period herding in Sias (2004). The portion of the inter-temporal correlation due
to inter-period herding increases monotonically as we require more number of active
institutions in country-month pairs. The results of inter-period herding are also ro-
bust from the influence of a few small market capitalization countries. Again, we
find that the measured inter-period herding varies a great deal across countries. In
terms of the standardized time-series average over the sample period, the measured
inter-period herding ranges from the lowest -1.85 for Brazil to the highest 3.13 for
Russia.
Given the evidence of widely varying intra- and inter-period herdings across coun-
tries, we then investigate whether the cross-country differences in information envi-
ronments can explain such variations in the measured herding levels across countries.
For this purpose, we employ nine proxies for a country’s information environments,
which are drawn from the finance and accounting literature. They are: (1) the average
idiosyncratic volatility across all stocks of a country divided by the average systematic
volatility (Morck, Yeung, and Yu, 2000); (2) a dummy variable indicating whether a
country is classified as a developed market; (3) a dummy variable indicating whether
English is the official language; (4) a dummy variable indicating whether the legal
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origin is the English common law; (5) the level of corporate information disclosure
requirements; (6) the level of accounting standards; (7) the frequency of information
disclosures; (8) the percentage of firms audited by big five auditing companies; and (9)
the number of analysts following the largest 30 companies in a country. Considering
that each of the nine proxies above is an imperfect proxy for information environ-
ments, we also consider a composite proxy for information environments constructed
based on the first principal component of the correlation matrix of these nine proxy
variables (Baker and Wurgler, 2006; Brown and Cliff, 2004). To examine the effect
of information environments on herding, we employ the Fama-MacBeth regression
procedure with controlling for previous-period local stock market performances.
With regard to intra-period herding, we find that buy herding is inversely related
to the quality of information environments, meaning that buy herding is larger in
countries with weaker information environments.9 On the other hand, sell herding
is positively related to the quality of information environments, meaning that intra-
period sell herding is larger in countries with stronger information environments. We
find that previous-month local market returns have no significant relation with intra-
period herding this month. Next, with regard to inter-period herding, we find that
buy herding is inversely related to the quality of information environments, meaning
that inter-period buy herding is larger in countries with weaker information environ-
ments.10 On the other hand, inter-period sell herding has no significant relation with
the quality of information environments. We also find that inter-period buy herding
is significantly larger when previous market returns are larger, but that inter-period
9Following Wermers (1999), we define a country-month pair as a buy herding pair if the fraction
of institutions buying the country relative to active institutions is greater than its expected value
under the null hypothesis of no herding.
10Following Choi and Sias (2009), we define a country-month pair this month as a buy herding pair
if the fraction of institutions buying the country relative to active institutions last month is greater
than its expected value under the null of no herding. In addition, we decompose the inter-temporal
correlation between contemporaneous and lag investor demands over two adjacent periods into its
country-wise components, which is detailed in Section 2. This way, we can compute inter-period
herding at the country level, which is straight-forward when we use the LSV measure.
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sell herding has no significant relation with previous market returns. Both results
of intra- and inter-period herdings taken together suggest that information environ-
ments have asymmetric effects on the buy- and sell-side herdings, and are consistent
with the view that, in the buy side, institutions herd as a result of ‘intentionally’
inferring information from each other’s trades, whereas, in the sell side, correlated
signals primarily drive their ‘unintentional’ herding across countries.
Last, but not the least, we find that institutional demand impacts local stock
market performances. In an average month over the sample period, top five coun-
tries most heavily demanded by institutions outperform bottom five countries least
demanded by 1.52% per month (18.2% per annum). We also find that institutions
in our sample tend to demand countries that performed poorly more than those that
performed well over the previous six to twelve months. Hence, institutions as a group
tend to act as contrarians at six- to twelve-month horizons. Also, countries demanded
most this month exhibit return continuation over the next 6-month period and there
is no return reversal phenomenon for countries demanded least this month. The
long-short portfolio constructed by longing countries demanded more than average
and shorting countries demanded less than average generates positive returns over
the next 1- to 3-month periods. Taken together, these results show no evidence that
trades by institutions in our sample drive prices away from the fundamental values;
rather, they help to speed the price-adjustment process.
Our findings in this paper contribute to the herding literature in at least two ways.
First, we provide the first evidence of institutional herding across countries and its
impacts on local stock market performances. As mentioned earlier, most prior stud-
ies examining institutional herding behavior have focused only on a single country.
Second, our study is also the first to explicitly examine the link between institutional
herding across countries and countries’ information environments. Despite that in-
formation asymmetry among decision makers plays a critical role in the theoretical
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literature of herding, few prior studies have explicitly examined the link between the
two.11
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the
two herding measures we employ. It also introduces some notations used throughout
this study. Section 3 describes our data. Section 4 presents evidence of both intra-
and inter-period herdings. Section 5 investigates the relation between institutional
demands and local stock market performances. Section 6 addresses the question of
whether and how information environments affect the herding behavior. Section 7
concludes.
1.2 Measurement of Herding
In this section, we introduce two herding measures we use: one proposed by Lakon-
ishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992), which we refer to as the LSV measure, and the
other proposed by Sias (2004), which we refer to as the Sias measure. For ease of our
discussion and readers’ understanding, we first present several notations that we use
throughout this study.
1.2.1 Notations
To enumerate countries, months, and institutional investors, we use k for a country,
t for a month, and n (or m) for an institutional investor. We define Nk,t as the
number (or index set) of institutions active in country k during month t and In,k,t
as the number (or index set) of country k’s stocks actively traded by institution n
during month t.12 Following LSV (1992), Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1995),
11One notable exception is Christoffersen and Tang (2010), who examine the relation between
institutional herding and information environments in the U.S. stock markets by constructing various
proxies for information environments at the individual stock level.
12The reason why we define Nk,t, for example, as either the number or the index set of institutions
is as follows. Suppose there are 100 institutions and a unique identification number (ID) ranging
from 1 to 100 is assigned to each institution. Suppose that, during month t, only three institutions
with IDs 11, 40, and 89 were active in country k. Then, a notation such as
∑Nk,t
n=1 does not make
sense whereas
∑
n∈Nk,t makes sense since Nk,t also means the index set {11, 40, 89}.
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and Sias (2009), we define institution n as a buyer of country k during month t if the
dollar value of the institution’s position in the country increased over the month.13
Specifically, institution n is classified as a buyer of country k during month t if
∑
i∈In,k,t
Pi,t−(Sharesn,i,t+ − Sharesn,i,t−) > 0 (1.1)
and as a seller if this value is negative. Here, Pi,t− represents the price of stock i of
country k at the beginning of month t, and Sharesn,i,t− (Sharesn,i,t+) represents the
number of shares of stock i held by institution n at the beginning (end) of month t.
The number of shares are adjusted for both stock splits and stock dividends. Finally,
we use the following notations:
- Dn,k,t = 1 (0) if institution n is a buyer (seller) of country k during month t;
- Bk,t = the number of institutions that are buyers of country k during month t;
- Sk,t = the number of institutions that are sellers of country k during month t;
and
- ∆k,t = Bk,t/(Bk,t+Sk,t) = Bk,t/Nk,t = the fraction of buyers of country k relative
to active institutions during month t.
1.2.2 LSV herding measure
In their abstract, LSV (1992) define herding as “buying (selling) simultaneously the
same stocks as other managers buy (sell).” For country k during month t, the LSV
herding measure is defined as follows:












13Although the focus of the LSV (1992) study is on institutional herding at the individual stock
level, they also examine institutional herding at the industry level (p.34).
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The term AFk,t = E0[|∆k,t − ∆∗t |] is called the adjustment factor. It is calculated
under the null hypothesis of no herding, the reason why we add subscript ‘0’ to the
expectation operator. More specifically, during month t, under the null hypothesis of
no herding the probability of a randomly-chosen institutional investor being a buyer
of country k is simply ∆∗t .
14 For example, suppose that we have ∆∗t = 0.55, Bk,t = 6,
and Sk,t = 4. Then, under the null hypothesis of no herding, Bk,t follows a binomial












Note that, given ∆∗t , AFk,t depends only on Nk,t and ∆
∗
t , although both Bk,t and Sk,t
affect ∆∗t in the beginning. Figure 1 shows the size of the adjustment factor when the
number of active institutions varies from 1 to 100. For the figure, we use ∆∗t = 0.504.
Note from the figure that the adjustment factor can be very large for a wide range
of Nk,t values.
15 When the number of active institutions is 1, 10, 50, and 100, the
adjustment factor is equal to 0.5, 0.123, 0.056, and 0.040, respectively.
Since its introduction, the LSV herding measure has been widely used in empir-
ical studies examining the herding behavior in financial markets. Since the measure
is computed at each security level (at each country level in our study), it is easy
to compute the herding level for any particular group of securities. On the other
hand, however, as LSV themselves have put it, the LSV measure cannot disentan-
gle ‘intentional’ herding from ‘unintentional’ herding. Unintentional herding results
when institutions move in the same direction simply because they get similar signals
and follow similar trading strategies (momentum strategy for example). According
to Bikhchandani and Sharma (2000), “while it (the LSV measure) is called a herding
14Some studies, such as Grinblatt et al. (1995), use ∆t = (1/K)
∑K
k=1 ∆k,t instead of ∆
∗
t .
15When N goes to infinity, AF (N, p) converges to zero. But, it does so very slowly with the
order of 1/
√




p(1− p)/√N . Here, aN ∼ bN means
limN→∞ aN/bN = 1. If p = 0.5, then we have AF (N, p) ∼ 0.3989/
√
N and hence AF (100, 0.5) is
close to 0.04.
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Figure 1.1: Adjustment Factor
This figure shows the size of the adjustment factor when the number of active institutions varies
from 1 to 100. Let N be the number of active institutions and p be the fraction of buyers under the

















p, which is 0.504. The three horizontal lines inserted represent y = 0, y = 0.05, and y = 0.1. For
example, when the number of active institutions is one (a hundred), the adjustment factor is equal
to 0.500 (0.040).
measure, it really assesses the correlation in trading patterns for a particular group
of traders and their tendency to buy and sell the same set of stocks. (Intentional)
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Herding clearly leads to correlated trading, but the converse need not be true.” In ad-
dition, the LSV measure does not allow researchers to identify inter-temporal trading
patterns (Sias, 2004; Puckett and Yan, 2008; Choi and Sias, 2009).
Throughout this study, we refer to the LSV herding as ‘intra-period’ herding to
distinguish it from the Sias herding introduced in the following subsection, which we
refer to as ‘inter-period’ herding.
1.2.3 Sias herding measure
The Sias (2004) herding measure, the second measure of herding we use, implements
the idea that herding should occur sequentially in principle (see, e.g., Banerjee, 1992;
Scharfstein and Stein, 1990; Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch, 1992; Welch, 1992;
Devenow and Welch, 1996; Bikhchandani and Sharma, 2000). The Sias measure is
defined as the term ρHt in the decomposition of the inter-temporal cross-sectional
correlation between institutional demand this month ∆t = (∆1,t, ..., ∆K,t) and demand
last month ∆t−1 = (∆1,t−1, ..., ∆K,t−1) into two parts as shown in the following:



































































t (self-reinforcing) + ρ
H









k=1(∆k,t−∆t)2, and ∆t−1 and σt−1 are defined
similarly; Kt represents the number of countries for which both ∆k,t and ∆k,t−1 are
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defined;16 and we use the convention that
∑K
k=1 ∆k,t∆k,t−1, for example, is equal to
the sum of ∆k,t∆k,t−1s for which ∆k,t and ∆k,t−1 both are defined.
Note that the Sias measure ρHt in Equation (1.5) represents the portion of the
correlation accounted for by individual investors following the lag demand of other
investors, i.e, herding. On the other hand, the term ρSRt represents the portion of the
correlation accounted for by individual investors following their own lag demand. A
positive ρSRt implies that investors tend to increase (decrease) their investments this
month in countries that they increased (decreased) their investments last month. That
is, ρSRt can be interpreted as the extent to which investors engage in inter-period ‘self-
reinforcing’ trading. Finally, as shown in the defining equation, we can decompose
ρHt , inter-period herding, into its country-wise components ρ
H
k,ts. Later, when we
examine the relation between inter-period herding and information environments at
the country level, we will use these country-wise components. For example, inter-
period herding in country k during month t refers to ρHk,t.
1.3 Data
The key dataset for the current study is the transaction-level trading data of a
large sample of U.S. institutional investors trading around the world from January
1, 2002 to December 31, 2009, which we purchased from Ancerno Ltd. (formerly
the Abel/Noser Corporation).17 During our 8-year sample period, the Ancerno Non-
US Equity Trade database contains more than 30 million transaction records of more
than 530 institutional investors trading around the world outside the U.S.18 Although
16Although K = 37 in our sample, Kt can be less than 37, especially in the earlier part of the
sample period.
17Ancerno collects transaction-level trade data from a large sample of U.S. institutional traders
and conducts and provides transaction cost analysis for them.
18The Ancerno US Equity Trading database has been utilized by many researchers to examine
trading activities of institutional investors within the U.S. (Goldstein, Irvine, Kandel, and Wiener,
2009; Lipson and Puckett, 2007; Puckett and Yan, 2008, 2011; Hu, McLean, Pontiff, and Wang,
2010). However, the Ancerno Non-US Equity Trading database has been provided to academics
only recently, so few prior studies have utilized the database to date. As far as we know, Pagano
(2009a) and Pagano (2009b) are only studies that use the database to examine the time-trend of
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the database does not capture trading by all institutional investors registered in the
U.S., it does represent a significant portion of institutional investors’ trading activ-
ities around the world. Later, we show that the Ancerno Non-US Equity Trading
database represents about 5% of the worldwide equity trading volume outside the
U.S., a substantial portion of the world equity trading volume.
Among several data files of the Ancerno Non-US Equity Trade database, we com-
bine three data files: (i) Equity Trade Data File, which contains the date of transac-
tion, client code (institutional investor identification code), stock identifier, country
code of stock origin, market code, buy/sell indicator, amount of shares transacted,
currency code, exchange rate applied, etc.; (ii) Stock Reference File, which contains
the stock identifier, company name, ticker symbol, 8-character alphanumeric CUSIP,
7-character SEDOL19; and (iii) Country Reference File, which contains the country
code and country name. After carefully checking and screening erroneous transac-
tion data, we merge the transaction data with the data of daily stock prices and
number of shares outstanding from the COMPUSTAT Global and North America
databases. We exclude transaction data of preferred stocks, units, trusts, income
funds, real estate investment trusts, exchange-traded funds, etc. from the sample
and include transaction data of only common stocks and depository receipts, mostly
American Depository Receipts (ADRs), in our analysis.20 For each transaction, we
require the stock involved to have data on previous month-end stock price and the
number of shares outstanding from the COMPUSTAT databases. Stocks for which
the total number of transactions during the entire sample period is less than 30 are
also excluded from the sample. In addition, to maintain the integrity of the data and
trading costs and trading volume in global equity markets.
19SEDOL stands for the Stock Exchange Daily Official List, a list of security identifiers used in the
United Kingdom and Ireland for clearing purposes. It is assigned by the London Stock Exchange,
on request by the security issuer.
20For a company that has multiple share classes, we include only its primary class in our sample.
The COMPUSTAT database provides the unique company identifier GVKEY (6 digits) and issue
identifier IID (2 digits plus 1 character) to identify a company and its share classes.
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filter out possible errors, we eliminate transaction data where the order quantities are
greater than 5% of the total number of shares outstanding of the involved stock.
Table 1.1 reports the summary characteristics of the data. Panel A of the table
reports the number of stocks traded by institutions and the number of active insti-
tutions by year. The reported mean value shows that in an average year 4747 stocks
were traded by institutions in our sample. The reported total value shows that, dur-
ing the 8-year sample period 2002-2008, a total of 7759 stocks were traded by a total
of 531 institutional investors. Panel A also shows that both the number of stocks
traded and the number of active institutions increased steadily over the period from
2002 to 2008. However, in the aftermath of global financial crises in late 2008, the
number of active institutions decreased by about 27% from 278 in 2008 to 202 in
2009, and the number of stocks traded also decreased by about 14% from 6254 in
2008 to 5391 in 2009.
Next, Panel B of Table 1.1 reports the descriptive statistics for the number of
stocks traded by institutions and the number of active institutions in a randomly
selected country-month pair. For each month, we calculate the cross-sectional mean,
standard deviation, minimum, median, and maximum of the number of stocks traded
and the number of active institutions across 37 countries. Panel B reports the monthly
time-series average of these five statistics. It shows that, for a randomly selected
country-month pair, 91 different stocks were traded by 52 institutions on average.
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Table 1.1: Sample Characteristics
This table presents the sample characteristics of our trading data of 531 U.S. institutional investors
trading across 37 countries during the period from January 2002 to December 2009 (96 months),
which is from Ancerno Ltd. (formerly the Abel/Noser Corporation). Panel A presents the number
of stocks traded by institutions and the number of institutions active by year. The last column Total
represents the total number of different stocks traded and the total number of different institutions
active during the entire sample period. Panel B presents descriptive statistics for the number
of stocks traded by institutions and the number of institutions active measured at the monthly
frequency. For each month during the sample period, we calculate the mean, standard deviation,
minimum, median, and maximum of the number of stocks traded and the number of institutions
active across 37 countries. Then, we compute the time-series average over 96 months of these five
statistics. Lastly, Panel C presents the time-series average over 96 months of the number of stocks
traded (N stock) and the number of institutions active (N inst) measured at the monthly frequency,
together with stock market capitalization and turnover information by country. The N tran and T
val represent the average number of transactions (in thousands) and the average value of transactions
(in billion dollars) measured at the yearly frequency, respectively. The MktCap and Turn represent
the average stock market capitalization (in billion dollars) and the average turnover ratio (in percent
terms) measured at the yearly frequency, respectively. The annual turnover ratio we use represents
the total value, not volume, of shares traded during a given year divided by the average market
capitalization for the year. Stock market capitalization and turnover ratio data are obtained from
the World Development Indicators (WDI) database of the World Bank for all countries except for
Taiwan. For Taiwan, we collect data from various annual issues of the Taiwan Stock Exchange Fact
Book.
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Table 1.1: Sample Characteristics (Continued)
Panel A: Number of stocks and institutions by year
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Mean Total
N stocks traded 2864 3451 3744 4591 5530 6147 6254 5391 4747 7759
N institutions active 102 131 140 131 157 244 278 202 173 531
Panel B: Number of stocks and institutions per month
Mean SD Min Med Max
N stocks traded in a country 91 145 9 47 804
N institutions active in a country 52 26 12 48 99
Panel C: Number of stocks and institutional investors by country
N stock N inst N tran T val (%) MktCap (%) Turn wTurn
(a) (b) (c) a/(b*c)
Australia 133 74 118.7 33.9 (2.8) 950.0 (3.8) 86.8 4.1
Austria 22 43 18.2 6.5 (0.5) 105.7 (0.4) 43.0 14.4
Belgium 32 44 26.7 9.3 (0.8) 260.2 (1.0) 71.2 5.0
Brazil 26 27 16.7 5.3 (0.4) 631.4 (2.5) 44.9 1.9
Canada 202 70 94.0 39.5 (3.3) 1336.2 (5.3) 78.3 3.8
China 76 50 58.4 20.2 (1.7) 2425.8 (9.6) 109.7 0.8
Denmark 27 52 22.3 8.4 (0.7) 169.5 (0.7) 82.8 6.0
Finland 35 61 36.3 17.3 (1.5) 197.7 (0.8) 137.6 6.4
France 141 92 249.6 112.2 (9.4) 1791.6 (7.1) 106.0 5.9
Germany 115 88 167.0 95.9 (8.1) 1295.4 (5.1) 155.1 4.8
Greece 30 44 23.4 6.9 (0.6) 132.4 (0.5) 48.5 10.7
Hong Kong 150 79 125.5 31.8 (2.7) 1006.4 (4.0) 62.2 5.1
India 83 25 24.4 10.0 (0.8) 712.3 (2.8) 119.5 1.2
Indonesia 29 29 15.8 4.0 (0.3) 108.4 (0.4) 50.6 7.4
Ireland 23 58 39.3 12.8 (1.1) 95.0 (0.4) 63.4 21.2
Israel 18 23 8.4 3.0 (0.3) 133.1 (0.5) 57.7 3.9
Italy 96 73 80.6 37.8 (3.2) 703.9 (2.8) 162.9 3.3
Japan 803 96 652.0 186.6 (15.7) 3667.7 (14.5) 115.5 4.4
Korea 128 52 67.7 31.0 (2.6) 627.1 (2.5) 210.5 2.3
Malaysia 53 30 17.5 3.8 (0.3) 208.7 (0.8) 33.0 5.5
Mexico 28 38 19.3 5.2 (0.4) 246.0 (1.0) 28.6 7.4
Netherlands 70 84 107.5 49.3 (4.1) 588.6 (2.3) 146.1 5.7
New Zealand 14 21 6.3 0.9 (0.1) 39.6 (0.2) 42.3 5.5
Norway 39 58 39.4 15.6 (1.3) 185.2 (0.7) 119.3 7.0
Philippines 14 16 3.6 0.6 (0.1) 54.5 (0.2) 19.2 6.1
Poland 17 20 5.0 1.5 (0.1) 101.7 (0.4) 37.6 3.8
Portugal 14 30 8.2 2.4 (0.2) 82.7 (0.3) 69.8 4.1
Russia 11 27 13.2 7.0 (0.6) 624.1 (2.5) 53.3 2.1
Singapore 60 58 34.1 8.4 (0.7) 264.8 (1.0) 72.9 4.4
South Africa 54 40 43.7 11.5 (1.0) 532.4 (2.1) 53.5 4.0
Spain 56 71 60.9 36.4 (3.1) 1060.1 (4.2) 173.2 2.0
Sweden 73 71 67.1 25.3 (2.1) 395.2 (1.6) 127.9 5.0
Switzerland 93 85 259.4 92.0 (7.7) 939.4 (3.7) 113.2 8.7
Taiwan 121 36 49.0 19.3 (1.6) 488.8 (1.9) 168.0 2.3
Thailand 22 24 5.8 1.3 (0.1) 123.4 (0.5) 85.5 1.3
Turkey 36 28 13.2 5.1 (0.4) 144.2 (0.6) 155.3 2.3
United Kingdom 442 98 560.1 231.9 (19.5) 2819.4 (11.2) 162.7 5.1
Average 91 52 85.4 32.2 (2.7) 682.4 (2.7) 93.7 5.3
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Lastly, Panel C of Table 1.1 reports transaction information by country, together
with stock market capitalization and turnover information. The first two columns
report the monthly time-series average over 96 months of the number of stocks traded
and number of active institutions by country. In an average month, institutions in
our sample traded the largest number of stocks of Japan (803 stocks). They traded
more than 100 stocks in another 8 countries: the United Kingdom (442), Canada
(202), Hong Kong (150), France (141), Australia (133), Korea (128), Taiwan (121),
and Germany (115). On average, they traded 91 stocks of one country during one
month, which is the same as the mean value reported in Panel B. Next, in an average
month, the largest number of institutions traded actively in the United Kingdom (98
institutions), followed by Japan (96), France (92), Germany (88), Switzerland (85),
Netherlands (84), Hong Kong (79), Australia (74), Spain (71), Sweden (71), and
Canada (70). On average, 52 institutions traded actively in one country during one
month, which is also the same as the mean value reported in Panel B.
The next two columns report the yearly time-series average over 8 years of the
number and value of transactions by country. The number of transactions is repre-
sented in a multiple of thousand and the value of transactions in U.S. billion dollars.
In an average year, institutions in our sample made transactions most frequently in
Japan (652 thousands). They made more than 100 thousand transactions in another
7 countries: the United Kingdom (560), Switzerland (259), France (250), Germany
(167), Hong Kong (126), Australia (188), and Netherlands (107). On average, they
made 85.4 thousand transactions in one country during one year. Next, in terms of
the total value of shares traded, in an average year, institutions in our sample made
transactions worth more than 231 billion dollars in the United Kingdom. They made
transactions worth more than 100 billion dollars in another 2 countries: Japan (186)
and France (112). On average, they made transactions worth more than 32 billion
dollars in one country during one year.
19
The fifth and sixth columns report the yearly time-series average over 8 years
of the country stock market capitalization, MktCap, and turnover ratio, Turn, by
country.21 The turnover ratio represents the total value, not volume, of shares traded
in an average year divided by the average market capitalization for the year. In
terms of the market capitalization, the three largest countries outside the U.S. was
Japan, the United Kingdom, and China. During the sample period, they represented
14.5%, 11.2%, and 9.6% of the total market capitalization of the sampled countries,
respectively. Not surprisingly, the correlation between column (a) and column (b) is
very high with 0.85. During our sample period, the average turnover ratio was the
highest for Korea (211%), followed by Spain (173%), Taiwan (168%), Italy (163%),
and the United Kingdom (163%).
The last column, wTurn, represents the total value of shares traded by institutions
in our sample divided by the product of market capitalization and turnover ratio, i.e.,
a/(b*c). Hence, 4.1% for Australia, for example, can be interpreted as meaning that
the total value of shares traded by institutions in our sample accounts for 4.1% of the
total value of shares traded in Australia during an average year. The average of the
wTurn values across 37 countries amounts to 5.3%, confirming that our data represent
a substantial portion of the world equity trading value. At the country level, trades
by institutions in our sample account for more than 10% of the total value of shares
traded for Ireland (21.2%), Austria (14.4%), and Greece (10.7%). On the other hand,
they account for less than 2% of the total value of shares traded for China (0.8%),
India (1.2%), Thailand (1.3%), and Brazil (1.9%).
21We obtain stock market capitalization and turnover ratio data from the World Bank World
Development Indicators (WDI) for all countries except for Taiwan. For Taiwan, we collect data
from various issues of the Taiwan Stock Exchange Fact Book.
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Table 1.2: Intra-period Herding
This table presents the results of intra-period herding measured by using the LSV herding measure
(Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1992). For each country and a given month, an institutional
investor is defined as a buyer (seller) of the country if the total net dollar purchases during the
month is greater (less) than zero. The LSV herding measure Hk,t for a given country-month is then
calculated as |∆k,t − ∆∗t | − E0[|∆k,t − ∆∗t |], where ∆k,t equals the proportion of institutions that
are buyers of country k during month t relative to the total number of institutions active and ∆∗t
the proportion of institutions that are buyers of any country during month t relative to the total
number of institutions active. The second term E0[|∆k,t−∆∗t |] is called the adjustment factor. This
adjustment factor is calculated under the null hypothesis of no herding, which is the reason subscript
‘0’ added in the expectation operator. The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics calculated under
the assumption that all Hk,ts available are independent and identically distributed. The bottom row
reports the number of country-month pairs used to calculate the mean herding value. Note that the
maximum number of country-month pairs possible is 3552 (=37 countries*96 months).
Number of active institutions
≥ 1 ≥ 5 ≥ 10 ≥ 20
Mean herding 0.022 0.022 0.023 0.024
T statistic (16.76) (17.23) (16.26) (15.51)
Mean adjustment factor 0.067 0.065 0.062 0.057
Number of country-months 3548 3499 3374 3020
1.4 Institutional Herding across Countries
In this section, we examine whether institutional investors do herd across countries.
We begin with examining intra-period herding by employing the LSV measure, and
then move on to examine inter-period herding by employing the Sias measure. Lastly,
we show that there exists substantial cross-country and inter-temporal variations in
the measured intra- and inter-period herding levels.
1.4.1 Intra-period herding
Table 1.2 presents the results of intra-period herding measured by using the LSV
measure. The reported mean herding values are the average of Hk,ts defined through
Equation (1.2) across all country-month pairs with at least 1, 5, 10, or 20 active
institutions. The numbers in parentheses are associated t-statistics calculated under
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the assumption that all Hk,ts are independent and identically distributed. The mean
adjustment factor represents the average of the adjustment factor AFk,t in Equation
(1.2). The bottom row reports the number of country-month pairs used to calculate
the mean herding value. Note that the maximum number of country-month pairs
possible is 3552 (=37 countries*96 months).
When country-months with at least five active institutions are considered, the
measured intra-period herding value is equal to 2.2%, which is strongly significant
with a t-statistic value of 17.23. The measured level of intra-period herding of 2.2%
is smaller than 3.4% for U.S. individual stocks in Wermers (1999), and 2.5% for U.K.
individual stocks in Wylie (2005), but larger than 1.4% for U.S. industries in Choi
and Sias (2009), although these values are not directly comparable to each other. At
a first glance, the size of intra-period herding may look small. However, the LSV
measure is computed by subtracting the so-called adjustment factor term, and the
mean value of this adjustment term amounts to 6.5%. During our sample period, the
time-series average of average institutional demand across all country-month pairs
was 50.4%. Hence, the mean intra-period herding value of 2.2% can be interpreted
as that 59.1% (=50.4+2.2+6.5) of institutions were moving in the same direction
in an average country-month pair and 40.9% in the opposite direction. The same
analysis with restricting sample to those country-months with at least 10 or 20 active
institutions produces almost identical results, suggesting that the results of intra-
period herding are not driven by country-months with only a few number of active
institutions.
1.4.2 Intra-period herding: Further results
The results of intra-period herding reported in Table 1.2 show that institutional in-
vestors do tend to increase (or decrease) their investments in the same countries at
the same time. In this subsection, as further analyses, we first examine whether
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Table 1.3: Further Results of Intra-period Herding
This table presents the results of several further tests for intra-period herding. All results reported
in this table are calculated using relevant statistics for country-month pairs with at least five active
institutions. In Panel A, the mean LSV herding measure, the average of Hk,ts, is calculated sepa-
rately conditioned on ∆k,t > ∆∗t (labeled as buy herding) and ∆k,t < ∆∗t (labeled as sell herding).
Panel A also reports the result of the test for the difference between buy and sell herdings. Panel B
reports the mean intra-period herding after excluding countries with the monthly average number
of stocks traded less than 20 from the sample. Specifically, we exclude six countries–Israel, New
Zealand, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, and Russia–from the sample (refer to Table 1) and use only
31 countries remaining. Lastly, Panel C reports the mean intra-period herding separately for two
sub-periods along with the result of the test for the difference between two sub-periods. Numbers
in parentheses are t-statistics.
Mean herding







Panel B: Excluding countries with the average number of stocks per month < 20
0.023
(15.30)







there is any difference between the buy and sell intra-period herdings. Studies like
Wylie (2005) and Brown, Wei, and Wermers (2009) point out the possibility that
short-selling constraints imposed on institutional investors may prevent them from
herding on the sell-side, suggesting that institutional sell herding might be more lim-
ited than buy herding. In addition, short-selling a stock would be much more difficult
for stocks of foreign countries than for domestic stocks. Following Grinblatt et al.
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(1995) and Wermers (1999), we partition all country-month pairs into those country-
month pairs with ∆k,t > ∆∗t and those country-month pairs with ∆k,t < ∆
∗
t , where
∆k,t and ∆∗t are defined in Section 2. We interpret Hk,t as representing buy herding
when ∆k,t > ∆∗t and as representing sell herding when ∆k,t < ∆
∗
t . Panel A of Table
1.3 reports the results of buy and sell intra-period herdings separately along with the
test for the difference between the two. Note that all the results reported in Table
1.3 are calculated using relevant statistics for country-month pairs with at least five
active institutions. The results of Panel A show that there is no significant difference
between the measured buy and sell intra-period herding values, although sell herding
is slightly smaller than buy herding.
Next, as robustness checks of the results reported in Table 1.2, we repeat the same
analysis in Table 1.2 (i) by using only a sub-sample of countries and (ii) by dividing
the sample into two equally-divided 48-month periods, i.e., 2002-2005 and 2006-2009.
Panel B of Table 1.3 reports the mean intra-period herding after excluding countries
with the monthly average number of stocks traded less than 20 from the sample.
Specifically, we exclude six countries–Israel, New Zealand, Philippines, Poland, Por-
tugal, and Russia–from the sample (refer to Table 1.1) and use only 31 countries
remaining. The results show that excluding these six countries from the sample does
not produce any noticeable difference in the measured mean intra-period herding val-
ues. Next, Panel C of Table 1.3 reports the results of intra-period herding for two
equally-divided 48-month periods. The results show that the intra-period herding
has decreased from 2.8% in earlier sub-period to 1.7% in later sub-period over the
two sub-periods. The test for the difference shows that the decrease is statistically
significant at the 1% level.
In summary, the results of Table 1.3 confirm that the evidence of institutional
intra-period herding across countries documented in Table 1.2 remains robust to var-
ious specifications, although the level of intra-period herding has decreased somewhat
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Table 1.4: Inter-period Herding
This table presents the results of inter-period herding measured by using the Sias herding measure
(Sias, 2004). The Sias herding measure, denoted by ρH , is derived from decomposing the inter-
temporal correlation ρ between institutional demands this month ∆t = (∆1,t, ..., ∆K,t) and last
month ∆t−1 = (∆1,t−1, ..., ∆K,t−1) into two parts, where ∆k,t equals the proportion of institutions
that are buyers of country k during month t relative to the total number of institutions active
(refer to Equation (1.5) in Section 2). The column labeled as ρSR represents the portion of the
correlation ρ due to institutions following their own lag demand. If ρSR is positive, then it means that
investors tend to increase (decrease) their investments this month in countries that they increased
(decreased) their investments last month. That is, ρSR can be interpreted as the extent to which
investors engage in inter-period self-reinforcing trades. The column labeled as ρH represents the
portion of the correlation ρ due to institutions following others’ lag demands, which represents
the Sias herding measure. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics computed using the standard
errors adjusted for hetero-skedasticities and autocorrelations by using the Newey and West (1986)
procedure. Specifically, to determine the lag length when applying the Newey and West procedure,
we use the automatic lag selection procedure suggested by Newey and West (1994). Numbers in
brackets represent the contribution of ρSR and ρH to ρ.
Partitioned correlation
Institutions following Institutions following Number of countries
Correlation (ρ) their own trades (ρSR) others’ trades (ρH) Min Med Max
Panel A: Countries with ≥ 1 active institutions in both this month and last month
0.295 0.109 [37.0%] 0.186 [63.0%] 36 37 37
(13.40) (25.09) (9.63)
Panel B: Countries with ≥ 5 active institutions in both this month and last month
0.301 0.107 [35.6%] 0.194 [64.4%] 31 37 37
(14.96) (28.98) (9.40)
Panel C: Countries with ≥ 10 active institutions in both this month and last month
0.305 0.099 [32.3%] 0.206 [67.7%] 23 36 37
(14.46) (18.93) (11.12)
Panel D: Countries with ≥ 20 active institutions in both this month and last month
0.308 0.088 [28.7%] 0.219 [71.3%] 16 32 37
(16.39) (16.14) (11.27)
over the sample period.
1.4.3 Inter-period herding
Table 1.4 presents the results of inter-period herding measured by using the Sias mea-
sure. The first column of the table reports the time-series average of 95 inter-temporal




t=2 ρt, where ρt is defined in Equation (1.5) in Section 2. Here, t = 2
represents the second month in our sample period, February 2002, and t = 96 the
last month, December 2009. The numbers in parentheses are associated t-statistics
computed using the Newey-West hetero-skedasticity and autocorrelation consistent
standard errors (Newey and West, 1986).22 The results of Table 1.4 show strong
evidence that institutional demands this month and last month are significantly cor-
related across countries. When country-months with at least one active institution are
considered (Panel A), the correlation amounts to 0.295, which is strongly significant
with a t-statistic value of 13.40. As we require more number of active institutions in
country-month pairs, the correlation increases monotonically from 0.295 (Panel A) to
0.308 (Panel D), although the increment appears to be not substantial. In previous
studies examining institutional inter-period herding, Sias (2004) reports correlations
ranging from 0.120 to 0.176 in his study of institutional herding across U.S. individual
stocks, and Choi and Sias (2009) report correlations ranging from 0.247 to 0.414 in
their study of institutional herding across U.S. industries. Although any direct com-
parison between these numbers is not fully meaningful, the correlation coefficient of
0.295 in our study is almost two times larger than that of Sias (2004) for individual
stocks and comparable to that of Choi and Sias (2009) for U.S. industries.
The second and third columns of Table 1.4 report the time-series average of the 95
partitioned correlations ρSRt s and ρ
H
t s defined in Equation (1.5) with their associated
t-statistics in parentheses. Recall that ρSRt is due to institutions following their own
previous trades and ρHt due to institutions following others’ previous trades and that
ρHt measures the extent of inter-period herding. When country-months with at least
one active institution are considered (Panel A), the time-series average of the 95
correlations due to institutions following their own previous trades amounts to 0.109,
22Specifically, to determine the lag length when applying the Newey and West procedure, we use
the automatic lag selection procedure suggested by Newey and West (1994).
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which is strongly significant with a t-statistic value of 25.09. On the other hand,
the time-series average of the 95 correlations due to institutions following others’
previous trades amounts to 0.186. Hence, the herding component explains 63.0%
(=0.186/0.295) of the inter-temporal correlation of institutional demands between
this month and last month, and the remaining 37.0% (=0.109/0.295) is explained
by institutions following their own previous trades.23 As we require more number of
active institutions, the correlation due to inter-period herding increases monotonically
from 0.186 (Panel A) to 0.219 (Panel D). Note also that the percentage of contribution
due to herding also increases monotonically from 63.0% (Panel A) to 71.3% (Panel
D).
The last three columns of Table 1.4 report the time-series minimum, median, and
maximum of the number of countries for which both ∆k,t and ∆k,t−1 are defined, i.e.,
Kt in Equation (1.5) in Section 2. By definition, Kt is decreasing in the number of
active institutions required. For example, the value of 16 for the minimum in Panel
D means that if we require at least 20 active institutions, both ∆k,t and ∆k,t−1 are
defined only for 16 countries for some adjacent months t and t− 1.
1.4.4 Inter-period herding: Further results
As further tests of institutional inter-period herding, we first examine whether the
extent to which institutions follow others’ previous trades in country-month kt de-
pends on the previous month demand ∆k,t−1. Following Choi and Sias (2009), for
each month t, we partition all countries into those countries with the proportion of
buyers last month greater than ∆∗t−1 (i.e., ∆k,t−1 > ∆
∗
t−1) and those countries with
the proportion of buyers last month smaller than ∆∗t−1 (i.e., ∆k,t−1 < ∆
∗
t−1). We
interpret ρHk,t as representing buy herding when ∆k,t−1 > ∆
∗
t−1 and as representing
23One reason why institutions follow their own previous trades could be due to the fact that
institutions execute their trading over time through multiple orders to minimize both price impacts
and transaction costs of their trading (Keim and Madhavan, 1995; Chan and Lakonishok, 1995).
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Table 1.5: Further Results of Inter-period Herding
This table presents the results of several further tests for inter-period herding. All results reported
in this table are calculated using relevant statistics for country-month pairs with at least five ac-
tive institutions. In Panel A, following Sias (2004) and Choi and Sias (2009) the inter-temporal
correlation ρ between institutional demands this month ∆t = (∆1,t, ..., ∆K,t) and last month
∆t−1 = (∆1,t−1, ..., ∆K,t−1) is decomposed into two parts ρSR and ρH conditioned on ∆k,t−1 > ∆∗t−1
(labeled as buy herding) and ∆k,t−1 > ∆∗t−1 (labeled as sell herding). Panel A also reports the result
of the test for the difference between buy and sell herdings. Panel B reports the mean inter-period
herding after excluding countries with the monthly average number of stocks traded less than 20
from the sample. Specifically, we exclude six countries–Israel, New Zealand, Philippines, Poland,
Portugal, and Russia–from the sample (refer to Table 1) and use only 31 countries remaining. Lastly,
Panel C reports the mean inter-period herding separately for two sub-periods along with the result
of the test for the difference between two sub-periods. In all results, the numbers in parentheses are
t-statistics computed using the standard errors adjusted for hetero-skedasticities and autocorrela-
tions by using the Newey and West (1986) procedure. Specifically, to determine the lag length when
applying the Newey and West procedure, we use the automatic lag selection procedure suggested by
Newey and West (1994). Numbers in brackets represent the contribution of ρSR and ρH to ρ.
Partitioned correlation
Institutions following Institutions following Number of countries
Correlation (ρ) their own trades (ρSR) others’ trades (ρH) Min Med Max
Panel A: Buy herding vs. sell herding
Buy 0.159 0.062 [39.3%] 0.096 [60.7%]
(12.11) (17.93) (7.23)
Sell 0.143 0.045 [31.4%] 0.098 [68.6%]
(14.57) (14.60) (10.10)
Difference 0.016 0.018 -0.002
(1.35) (3.26) (-0.18)
Panel B: Excluding countries with the average number of stocks per month < 20
0.285 0.095 [33.2%] 0.190 [66.8%] 29 31 31
(14.99) (22.41) (10.20)
Panel C: Sub-period results
2002-2005 0.289 0.106 [36.5%] 0.184 [63.5%] 31 37 37
(9.92) (21.57) (6.20)
2006-2009 0.316 0.108 [34.2%] 0.208 [65.8%] 36 37 37
(13.17) (23.04) (8.30)
Difference 0.027 0.003 0.024
(0.75) (0.39) (0.65)
sell herding when ∆k,t−1 < ∆∗t−1.
24 Panel A of Table 1.5 reports the results. Note
24We also examined the results using ∆t−1 or 0.5 instead of ∆∗t−1 as a cutoff value, but obtained
the nearly same results as those reported in Panel A of Table 1.5.
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that all the results reported in Table 1.5 are calculated using relevant statistics for
country-month pairs with at least five active institutions. Hence, the sum of the av-
erage correlations for buy and sell herdings is equal to 0.301 from Panel B of Table
1.4. The results show that there is no significant difference between buy and sell
inter-period herdings, although the portion of the correlation due to institutions fol-
lowing own previous trades is statistically larger for the buy herding than for the sell
herding.
Next, as robustness checks of the results reported in Table 1.4, we repeat the
same analysis in Table 1.4 (i) by using only a sub-sample of countries and (ii) by
dividing the sample period into two equally-divided 48-month periods, i.e., 2002-2005
and 2006-2009. Panel B of Table 1.5 reports the results when we exclude from the
sample countries with the monthly time-series average of the number of stocks traded
less than 20. Specifically, we exclude six countries–Israel, New Zealand, Philippines,
Poland, Portugal, and Russia–from the sample (refer to Table 1.1) and use only 31
countries remaining. The average correlation coefficient decreases slightly to 0.2848
from 0.3014 (Panel B of Table 1.4). However, the contribution of the herding compo-
nent increases slightly to 66.8% from 64.4% (Panel B of Table 1.4). Panel C of Table
1.5 reports the results of inter-period herding for two equally divided sub-sample peri-
ods. The results show that the average correlation has increased from 0.2894 to 0.3162
by 0.0268 over the two sub-periods. The contribution of the herding component has
also increased slightly from 63.5% to 65.8%. But, the tests for the differences in aver-
age correlations and in average partitioned correlations between these two sub-periods
show no evidence that the inter-period herding behavior of the sampled institutional
investors has changed over time.
In summary, results from Table 1.5 confirm that the institutional inter-period
herding across countries documented in Table 1.4 remains robust to various specifi-
cations.
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1.4.5 Cross-country and inter-temporal variations in intra- and inter-
period herdings
Table 1.6 presents the mean and standard deviation for the LSV herding value, Hk,t
and Sias herding value, ρHk,t, by country. The LSV herding values are presented in
percent terms. Also, for ease of presentation, we multiplied the Sias herding values by
one hundred. The results at the bottom row tell us that for a randomly selected coun-
try k the time-series standard deviation of the intra-period herding (6.82%) is more
than three times larger than its time-series mean (2.23%) and that the time-series
standard deviation of the inter-period herding (2.80) is more than five times larger
than its time-series mean (0.54). This observation implies that, for each country, both
intra- and inter-period herding varies widely over time.
More importantly, Table 1.6 also shows that both intra- and inter-period herdings
vary widely across countries. In terms of the time-series average over the sample pe-
riod, the measured intra-period herding is the highest for Korea (4.04%), followed by
Russia (3.99%) and Turkey (3.72%), and is the lowest for Thailand (-0.66%), followed
by Brazil (0.14%) and India (0.26%). The measured mean inter-period herding is the
highest for Russia (2.03), followed by Portugal (1.30) and Taiwan (1.29), and the
lowest for Brazil (-0.35), followed by Thailand (-0.28) and India (-0.22).
Figure 2 shows the relation between intra- and inter-period herdings measured
at the country level. Interestingly, it shows that the two herding measures–LSV
and Sias measures–are significantly positively related. The correlation between the
LSV herding (H) and the Sias herding (ρH) measures amounts to 0.72, which is
strongly significant. This observation suggests that the two herding measures are
closely related although they are intended to capture different patterns of herding
behavior, i.e., intra-period herding vs. inter-period herding.
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Table 1.6: Summary Statistics for Intra- and Inter-period Herdings by Country
This table presents the time-series means and standard deviations by country for the intra-period
herding (H) and the inter-period herding (ρH). The LSV herding values are presented in percent
terms. Also, for ease of presentation, we multiplied the Sias herding values by a hundred and then
computed its time-series mean and standard deviation for each country k.
LSV herding (H) Sias herding (ρH)
Country Mean SD Mean SD
Australia 2.46 5.63 0.37 2.40
Austria 2.53 7.72 1.08 3.34
Belgium 0.59 6.13 -0.16 2.18
Brazil 0.14 7.47 -0.35 4.05
Canada 1.91 5.28 0.29 1.61
China 3.22 6.94 0.55 2.94
Denmark 2.17 6.23 0.40 1.72
Finland 2.60 6.06 0.59 2.25
France 1.74 4.67 0.35 1.64
Germany 3.68 5.55 0.36 2.14
Greece 2.04 7.20 0.41 2.55
Hong Kong 3.13 5.70 0.68 2.06
India 0.26 7.94 -0.22 2.66
Indonesia 3.23 8.08 0.49 3.53
Ireland 1.46 5.29 0.38 1.63
Israel 1.70 9.60 0.64 4.73
Italy 3.36 5.77 0.75 2.09
Japan 3.80 6.29 0.61 2.14
Korea 4.04 7.07 1.26 3.18
Malaysia 2.63 7.26 1.13 3.65
Mexico 1.81 5.53 0.27 2.16
Netherlands 1.76 4.97 0.19 1.46
New Zealand 1.50 9.25 0.26 4.10
Norway 1.47 5.66 0.28 1.72
Philippines 0.60 9.96 0.36 5.13
Poland 0.38 7.54 0.50 3.53
Portugal 2.97 9.35 1.30 3.82
Russia 3.88 8.39 2.03 6.21
Singapore 2.48 6.54 0.67 1.98
South Africa 1.58 6.89 0.47 2.95
Spain 2.94 6.05 0.98 3.18
Sweden 1.71 5.93 0.32 1.42
Switzerland 3.03 5.77 0.31 1.82
Taiwan 3.40 7.68 1.29 2.93
Thailand -0.66 5.76 -0.28 2.16
Turkey 3.72 9.74 0.86 4.67
United Kingdom 3.24 5.51 0.42 1.82
Average 2.23 6.82 0.54 2.80
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Figure 1.2: Relation between the LSV and Sias Herding Measures
This figure shows the relationship between the LSV and Sias herding measures computed at the
country level and reported in Table 9.
1.5 Institutional Demands and Stock Market Performances
In the previous section, we have documented evidence of intra-period herding across
countries by employing the LSV measure and evidence of inter-period herding by
employing the Sias measure. In this section, we examine (i) whether such a herding
behavior simply reflects their return-chasing strategies and (ii) what are the impacts
of their herding behavior on contemporaneous and subsequent stock market perfor-
mances. The answers to these two questions has long been of particular interest to
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Table 1.7: Prior Market Performances and Institutional Demands
This table presents institutional demands this month by prior market performance. For example, in
the last column of the table (titled as ‘-1’), for each month t we partition countries into five quintiles
based on their previous month local market returns, and then calculate the average of current
institutional demands ∆k,ts this month across countries within each group of those five quintiles. In
the columns labeled as ‘-12 to -1’, ‘-6 to -1’, and ‘-3 to -1’, countries are grouped into five quintiles
based on their previous 12-month, 6-month, and 3-month local market returns, respectively. *, **,
and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Prior market return -12 to -1 -6 to -1 -3 to -1 -1
R1 (Highest) 50.13 50.29 51.24 51.25
R2 49.96 50.88 50.49 50.41
R3 50.65 50.12 50.43 50.48
R4 50.57 50.66 50.08 50.24
R5 (Lowest) 51.47 50.90 50.71 50.59
R1 - R5 -1.35** -0.62 0.53 0.66
(-2.25) (-0.75) (0.72) (0.99)
academics, practitioners, and policy makers with regard to whether institutional in-
vestors destabilize stock markets or not (see, e.g., Cutler, Poterba, and Summers,
1990; DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldman, 1990; Lakonishok, Shleifer, and
Vishny, 1992; Choe, Kho, and Stulz, 1999; Wermers, 1999).
We begin with examining the relation between prior market performance and cur-
rent institutional demand. Table 1.7 presents the results. The last column of the table
(titled as ‘-1’) reports the fraction of buyers this month conditioned on the previous
one-month local market returns. Specifically, each month we partition countries into
five quintile groups based on their previous month local market returns and then cal-
culate the average of institutional demands ∆k,ts this month across countries within
each of five quintile groups. The results show that institutions in our sample do not
exhibit the return-chasing behavior at the one-month horizon. The institutional de-
mand for countries performed well last month (51.25%) is slightly larger than that
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for countries performed poorly last month (50.29%), but the difference between the
two has no statistical significance. Also, across the five quintile groups, institutional
demands display rather a U-shaped pattern. That is, they demand both countries
that performed well and countries that performed poorly in the previous month more
than countries that performed in the middle. A similar demand pattern is observed
when we partition countries into quintiles based on their local market returns over the
previous three months. However, when we partition countries into quintiles based on
their local market returns over the previous six or twelve months, a different demand
pattern emerges. Institutions in our sample demand countries that performed poorly
more than those that performed well over the previous six to twelve months. Hence,
they as a group tend to act as contrarians conditioned on the six- to twelve-month
local market returns.
Next, we examine the relation between institutional demand and contemporaneous
and subsequent market performances. Table 1.8 presents the results. The first col-
umn of the table (titled as ‘0’) reports the contemporaneous one-month local market
returns conditioned on the fraction of buyers this month. Specifically, each month we
partition countries into six groups based on the intensity of institutional demand and
then calculate the equal-weighted average abnormal returns across countries within
each group. In the table, the intense buy (sell) group represents the top (bottom)
five countries based on the faction of buyers this month. The medium buy (sell)
group represents the next top (bottom) five countries, and the light buy (sell) group
represents the remaining countries in the buy (sell) group. Following Kaniel, Saar,
and Titman (2008), we calculate abnormal returns by subtracting the equal-weighted
average return across all countries in the sample. Not surprisingly, we find that the
demand intensity is positively related to the contemporaneous local stock market per-
formances. The average abnormal return for the group of countries demanded most is
positive (1.02% per month) and statistically significant at the 1% level. On the other
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Table 1.8: Institutional Demands and Contemporaneous and Subsequent Mar-
ket Performances
This table presents contemporaneous and subsequent market performances by institutional demand
this month. For example, in the first column of the table (titled as ‘0’), for each month t we partition
countries into six groups based on their current month institutional demands, and then calculate
the average of current month local market returns across countries within each of six groups. The
intense buy (sell) group represents the top (bottom) five countries based on the faction of buyers this
month. The medium buy (sell) group represents the next top (bottom) five countries, and the light
buy (sell) group represents the remaining countries in the buy (sell) group. The columns labeled as
‘1’, ‘1 to 3’, ‘1 to 6’, and ‘1 to 12’ reports subsequent 1-month, 3-month, 6-month, and 12-month
holding period returns for each of six groups, respectively. In each column, we calculate abnormal
returns by subtracting the equal-weighted average return across all countries in the sample (Kaniel,
Saar, and Titman, 2008). *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels, respectively.
Current demand 0 1 1 to 3 1 to 6 1 to 12
B1 (Intense buy) 1.02*** 0.30* 1.16*** 1.64** 1.08
(4.39) (1.71) (2.65) (2.45) (1.08)
B2 (Medium buy) 0.33 0.09 -0.07 -0.51 -0.24
(1.37) (0.38) (-0.19) (-1.00) (-0.26)
B3 (Light buy) -0.11 -0.06 -0.24 -0.52 -1.10*
(-1.07) (-0.35) (-0.88) (-1.41) (-1.95)
S3 (Light sell) -0.21 0.05 -0.39* -0.35 -1.32***
(-1.41) (0.31) (-1.74) (-1.08) (-2.99)
S2 (Medium sell) -0.34** -0.27 -0.60 -0.38 -0.60
(-2.11) (-1.28) (-1.60) (-0.72) (-0.52)
S1 (Intense sell) -0.50** -0.10 0.26 0.26 1.10
(-1.99) (-0.64) (0.68) (0.43) (1.07)
B1 - S1 1.52*** 0.39* 0.91 1.39 -0.02
(3.73) (1.80) (1.51) (1.32) (-0.01)
(B1 to B3) - (S1 to S3) 0.68*** 0.14 0.45* 0.20 0.09
(3.76) (1.16) (1.74) (0.40) (0.14)
hand, the average abnormal return for the group of countries demanded least is neg-
ative (-0.50% per month) and statistically significant at the 5% level. The difference
of the abnormal returns between these two extreme groups (1.52% per month) is also
significant at the 1% level. The bottom row of the table also shows that the abnormal
return of countries demanded more than the cross-country average demand is higher
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by 0.68% per month than that of countries demanded less than the cross-country
average demand, with the difference being also significant at the 1% level. The next
four columns of the table report subsequent stock market performances at the 1-, 3-,
6-, and 12-month horizons. The results show that countries demanded most exhibit
return continuation over the next 6-month period. On the contrary, there is no ev-
idence of return reversal phenomenon for countries demanded least. The long-short
portfolio constructed by longing countries demanded more than average and shorting
countries demanded less than average generates significantly positive returns over the
next 1- to 3-month horizons.
In summary, our findings in this section suggest that institutional investors in our
sample do not engage in potentially destabilizing practices. Rather, they tend to help
to speed the price-adjustment process.
1.6 Institutional Herding and Information Environments
In Section 4, we have documented evidence of both intra- and inter-period herd-
ings. Importantly, we have also documented evidence that institutional herding varies
widely across countries and over time. In this section, we examine whether the cross-
country differences in information environments can explain such variations in the
measured herding levels across countries and over time. In the following subsection,
we first introduce our proxies of a country’s information environments. Then, we
move on to examine the effect of information environments on intra-period herding
and on inter-period herding one by one.
1.6.1 Proxies for a country’s information environments
As proxies for a country’s information environments, we consider a total of nine
variables, which are drawn from the finance and accounting literature. As somewhat
indirect proxies for information environments, we consider the following four variables:
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1. Idio/Sys: The average idiosyncratic volatility across all stocks of a country
divided by the average systematic volatility, which equals minus one times the
stock return co-movement measure from Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000);25
2. English: A dummy variable which takes one if the official language of a country
is English and zero otherwise;
3. Develop: A dummy variable which takes one if a country is classified as devel-
oped and zero otherwise; and
4. ComLaw: A dummy variable which takes one if the legal origin of a country is
the English common law and zero otherwise.
The extent of idiosyncratic volatility relative to systematic volatility of a stock has
long been regarded as a proxy for the degree of private information impounded into
the stock’s prices (see, e.g., French and Roll, 1986; Roll, 1988; Morck, Yeung, and Yu,
2000; Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu, 2001; Durnev, Morck, Yeung, and Zarowin,
2003; Jin and Meyers, 2006; Fernandes and Ferreira, 2008). Hence, it is likely that
the higher the Idio/Sys value of a country, the stronger the country’s information
environments. Next, we hypothesize that, from the perspective of U.S. investors,
information environments would be stronger in countries whose official language is
English than in countries otherwise the same. Also, it is conceivable that developed
countries have more stronger information environments than emerging or developing
countries. Lastly, a long literature of law and finance has documented evidence that
common-law countries tend to provide stronger information environments than civil-
law countries (see, e.g., La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1998, 2000,
2002; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2006).
25Specifically, for country k, the Idio/Sys variable represents − log(R2k/(1−R2k)), where R2k is the
weighted average of R2i,k of stock i across all stocks of country k. Following Morck, Yeung, and Yu
(2000), we calculate R2i,k as the regression R-square from the regression of weekly returns of stock i
on weekly returns of local market index and weekly returns (converted in local currency terms) of
U.S. market index. Refer to Morck et al. for a more detailed explanation.
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In addition to these four proxies, we consider the following five more variables as
proxies for a country’s information environments, which measure corporate reporting-
and disclosure-specific information environments more directly:
5. DiscReq: The corporate information disclosure requirement index drawn from
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2006), which is the average of six
sub-category scores regarding the quality of disclosure requirements on: (1)
prospectus; (2) insider compensations; (3) large shareholder ownership; (4) in-
sider ownership; (5) irregular contracts; and (6) related parties transactions;
6. AcctgStd: The accounting standard index drawn from Bushman, Piotroski, and
Smith (2004), which examines and rates companies’ annual reports on their
inclusion or omission of 90 items. This index is an updated version by using
more recent data of the ‘Accounting Standards’ variable from La Porta et al.
(1998);
7. RepFreq: The average ranking of the answers to the following interim reporting
questions drawn from Bushman et al. (2004): frequency of reports; count of
disclosed items; and consolidation of interim reports;
8. PctgAudit: The percentage of the share of total value of firms in a country
audited by the Big 5 accounting firms, which is drawn from Bushman et al.
(2004);
9. NAnalyst: The number of analysts following the largest 30 companies, which is
drawn from Chang, Khanna, and Palepu (2000) and Frost, Gordon, and Hayes
(2006).
By the very definition of these variables, we interpret a higher value of each one of
these five variables as indicating stronger information environments of a country.
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Table 1.9: Regression Variables
This table presents the summary of the regression variables used. All values reported are time-series
averages over the entire sample period 2002-2009. The first two columns labeled as LSV H and Sias
ρH represent the intra-period herding and the intra-period herding, respectively, measured at the
monthly frequency. The LSV herding values are presented in percent terms. For ease of presentation,
we multiplied the Sias herding values by a hundred and then computed its time-series mean and
standard deviation for each country k. The other regression variables are detailed in Section 6.
Briefly, Idio/Sys represents the average idiosyncratic volatility across all stocks of a country divided
by the average systematic volatility, which equals minus one times the stock return co-movement
measure from Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000); English takes one if the official language of a country
is English and zero otherwise; Develop takes one if a country is classified as developed by IMF and
zero otherwise; ComLaw takes one if the legal origin of a country is the English common law and
zero otherwise; DiscReq represents the information disclosure requirements index from La Porta et
al. (2006); AcctgStd is the index created by examining and rating companies’ annual reports on their
inclusion or omission of 90 items taken from Bushman et al. (2004); RepFreq represents the timeliness
and frequency of information disclosures, which is drawn from Bushman et al. (2004); PctgAudit
represents the percentage of the total value of firms in a country audited by the Big 5 accounting
firms, which is drawn from Bushman et al. (2004); and NAnalyst represents the number of analysts
following the largest 30 companies of a country, which is drawn from Chang et al. (2000). Lastly,
InfoEnv represents the first principal component, rescaled to have unit variance, of the correlation
matrix of nine proxies for information environments.
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Table 1.9: Regression Variables (Continued)
Country LSV H Sias ρH Idio/Sys English Develop ComLaw
Australia 2.46 0.37 2.41 1 1 1
Austria 2.53 1.08 1.98 0 1 0
Belgium 0.59 -0.16 2.11 0 1 0
Brazil 0.14 -0.35 1.58 0 0 0
Canada 1.91 0.29 2.63 1 1 1
China 3.22 0.55 0.83 0 0 0
Denmark 2.17 0.40 1.92 0 1 0
Finland 2.60 0.59 1.70 0 1 0
France 1.74 0.35 1.99 0 1 0
Germany 3.68 0.36 2.36 0 1 0
Greece 2.04 0.41 1.31 0 1 0
Hong Kong 3.13 0.68 1.97 1 1 1
India 0.26 -0.22 1.72 1 0 0
Indonesia 3.23 0.49 1.68 0 0 0
Ireland 1.46 0.38 1.88 1 1 1
Israel 1.70 0.64 2.47 0 0 1
Italy 3.36 0.75 1.57 0 1 0
Japan 3.80 0.61 1.73 0 1 0
Korea 4.04 1.26 1.83 0 0 0
Malaysia 2.63 1.13 1.46 1 0 1
Mexico 1.81 0.27 1.49 0 0 0
Netherlands 1.76 0.19 1.85 0 1 0
New Zealand 1.50 0.26 2.29 1 1 1
Norway 1.47 0.28 1.74 0 1 0
Philippines 0.60 0.36 1.41 1 0 0
Poland 0.38 0.50 1.76 0 0 0
Portugal 2.97 1.30 1.56 0 1 0
Russia 3.88 2.03 1.02 0 0 0
Singapore 2.48 0.67 1.48 1 1 1
South Africa 1.58 0.47 2.16 1 0 1
Spain 2.94 0.98 1.91 0 1 0
Sweden 1.71 0.32 1.71 0 1 0
Switzerland 3.03 0.31 1.78 0 1 0
Taiwan 3.40 1.29 1.11 0 0 0
Thailand -0.66 -0.28 1.38 0 0 1
Turkey 3.72 0.86 1.08 0 0 0
United Kingdom 3.24 0.42 2.15 1 1 1
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Table 1.9: Regression Variables (Continued)
Country DiscReq AcctgStd RepFreq PctgAudit NAnalyst InfoEnv
Australia 0.75 80 89.13 4 12.30 1.49
Austria 0.25 62 68.12 3 8.63 -0.72
Belgium 0.42 68 63.04 3 15.33 -0.31
Brazil 0.25 56 86.96 3 16.10 -1.14
Canada 0.92 75 99.28 4 16.90 1.71
China . . . . .
Denmark 0.58 75 73.91 4 12.87 0.17
Finland 0.50 83 78.99 4 14.90 0.29
France 0.75 78 78.26 3 23.20 0.36
Germany 0.42 67 68.12 4 32.40 0.31
Greece 0.33 61 17.39 1 6.10 -1.90
Hong Kong 0.92 73 69.57 4 25.00 1.22
India 0.92 61 45.65 1 11.90 -0.97
Indonesia 0.50 . . . .
Ireland 0.67 81 69.57 4 5.43 0.94
Israel 0.67 74 66.67 2 3.19 -0.07
Italy 0.67 66 86.96 4 21.57 0.02
Japan 0.75 71 86.23 4 14.87 0.19
Korea 0.75 68 17.39 3 9.90 -0.94
Malaysia 0.92 79 65.22 3 19.90 0.50
Mexico 0.58 71 84.78 3 18.53 -0.52
Netherlands 0.50 74 78.26 4 29.53 0.33
New Zealand 0.67 80 17.39 3 0.00 0.43
Norway 0.58 75 94.20 4 12.83 0.22
Philippines 0.83 64 75.36 1 10.87 -0.90
Poland . . . . .
Portugal 0.42 56 62.32 3 5.33 -1.09
Russia . . . . .
Singapore 1.00 79 63.77 4 20.90 1.09
South Africa 0.83 79 86.96 4 7.40 1.00
Spain 0.50 72 89.13 4 22.73 0.28
Sweden 0.58 83 86.23 4 20.60 0.49
Switzerland 0.67 80 73.91 3 19.97 0.18
Taiwan 0.75 58 17.39 2 6.80 -1.87
Thailand 0.92 66 89.13 3 9.77 -0.20
Turkey 0.50 58 17.39 1 7.97 -2.25
United Kingdom 0.83 85 86.96 4 20.10 1.65
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Table 1.9 presents the summary of these regression variables by country. The
Idio/Sys column shows that the influence of market-wide systematic factors on indi-
vidual stock returns is highest for China (Idio/Sys=0.83), followed by Russia (1.02)
and Turkey (1.08). On the contrary, stocks of Canada (Idio/Sys=2.63), Israel (2.47),
and Australia (2.41) are less influenced by market-wide systematic factors. For the
other variables, we reserve comments to save space.
1.6.2 Intra-period herding and information environments
To examine the effect of a country’s information environments on intra-period herd-
ing, we employ the Fama-MacBeth regression procedure (Fama and MacBeth, 1973).
Specifically, for each month t, we run the cross-sectional regression of the following
form:
Hk,t = αt + βtRk,t−1 + γtXk,t + εk,t, k = 1, 2, ..., 37, (1.6)
where Hk,t represents the intra-period herding measured by using the LSV measure for
country k during month t when country months with at least five active institutions
are considered, Rk,t−1 represents the local market return of country k during month
t− 1, and Xk,t represents a proxy for information environments of country k.26 Note
that, except for the Idio/Sys variable, all proxies for information environments are
not time-varying by construction. The Idio/Sys variable is updated annually. After
obtaining estimates of βt and γt for each month t, we calculate their time-series
averages and associated time-series standard errors. Noting that buy-side and sell-
side intra-period herdings can depend on prior market performances in a different
fashion, we run the above regression (1.6) separately for a sup-sample of those country-
month pairs with ∆k,t > ∆∗t and for a sub-sample of those country-month pairs with
∆k,t < ∆∗t , where ∆k,t and ∆
∗
t are defined in Section 2.
26Note that replacing Rk,t−1 with (Rk,t−1 −Rt−1), for example, does not change the estimates of
βt and γt and their significances.
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Table 1.10: Information Environments and Intra-period Herding
This table presents the results of the following regressions
Hk,t = αt + βtRk,t−1 + γtXk,t + εk,t, k = 1, 2, ..., 37,
where Hk,t represents the intra-period herding for country k during month t, Rk,t−1 the local market
return of country k during month t− 1, and Xk,t a proxy for information environments of country
k. Except for the Idio/Sys variable, all proxies for information environments are not time-varying.
The Idio/Sys variable is updated annually. After obtaining estimates of βt and γt for each month
t, we calculate their time-series averages and associated time-series standard errors. Following
Wermers (1999), we interpret Hk,t as representing buy herding when ∆k,t > ∆∗t and as representing
sell herding when ∆k,t < ∆∗t . Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. *, **, and *** represent
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Firm-specific Return Volatility, Language, Development Stage, and Legal Origin
Xk,t
Idio/Sys English Develop ComLaw
Buy Rk,t−1 0.024 0.024 0.020 0.028
(0.55) (0.53) (0.43) (0.59)
Xk,t -1.049*** -1.474*** -0.330 -1.292***
(-2.83) (-4.01) (-0.77) (-3.53)
Sell Rk,t−1 -0.050 -0.077 -0.028 -0.069
(-0.93) (-1.46) (-0.57) (-1.37)
Xk,t -0.442 0.380 1.206*** 0.098
(-1.02) (0.96) (2.74) (0.26)
Panel B: Disclosure Requirement, Accounting Standard, Reporting Frequency, and Credibility
Xk,t
DiscReq AcctgStd RepFreq PctgAudit NAnalyst
Buy Rk,t−1 -0.032 -0.027 0.025 0.001 -0.015
(-0.66) (-0.52) (0.49) (0.02) (-0.31)
Xk,t -2.689*** -0.031 -0.035*** -0.415* -0.005
(-2.69) (-1.20) (-3.53) (-1.73) (-0.23)
Sell Rk,t−1 -0.052 -0.086 -0.025 -0.064 -0.079
(-0.85) (-1.56) (-0.43) (-1.10) (-1.37)
Xk,t 1.606 0.039* 0.020** 1.058*** 0.081**
(1.31) (1.71) (2.28) (4.16) (2.48)
Table 1.10 reports the results using each of nine proxies for information environ-
ments of a country. The buy-side regression results show that information environ-
ments is generally negatively related to the cross-sectional intra-period herding. That
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is, intra-period buy herding is larger in countries with weaker information environ-
ments. All coefficients on our nine proxies are estimated as being negative, and those
on six proxies—Idio/Sys, English, ComLaw, DiscReq, RepFreq, and PctgAudit—are
statistically significant at least at the 10% level. Judging from the estimated signif-
icance, institutions in our sample tend to intra-period-herd more in countries where
stock markets are more driven by systematic or market-wide shocks (Idio/Sys), where
the official language is not English (English), where the legal origin is not English com-
mon law (ComLaw), where corporate disclosure requirements are lower (DiscReq),
where the timeliness of financial information dissemination is worse (RepFreq), and
where the credibility of disclosed accounting information is lower (PctgAudit). In
short, in the buy side, they tend to intra-period-herd more in countries that have
weaker information environments.
In contrast to the buy-side regression results, the sell-side regressions deliver op-
posite results. The results show that information environments is generally positively
related to the intra-period herding, meaning that intra-period sell herding is larger in
countries with stronger information environments. Coefficients on eight proxies are
estimated as being positive, and those on five proxies are statistically significant at
least at the 10% level. Except for one proxy variable Develop, all proxy variables
that are significantly positively related to intra-period herding are variables directly
related to corporate information disclosure environments. Again, judging from the
estimated significance, institutions in our sample tend to intra-period-herd more in
more developed countries (Develop), in countries where accounting standards are
higher (AcctgStd), in countries where the timeliness of financial information dissemi-
nation is better (RepFreq), and in countries where more analysts follow and produce
information on companies (NAnalyst). In short, in the sell side, they tend to intra-
period-herd more in countries that have stronger information environments.
Lastly, we find that previous-month market returns have no significant relation to
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intra-period herding this month, which is consistent with the results from Table 1.7.
In summary, our results for intra-period herding show that information environ-
ments of a country have asymmetric effects on the buy- and sell-side herding. In
the buy-side, institutions tend to intra-period-herd more in countries with weaker
information environments; on the other hand, in the sell-side, they tend to intra-
period-herd more in countries with stronger information environments.
1.6.3 Inter-period herding and information environments
To examine the effect of information environments of a country on inter-period herd-
ing, we run the cross-sectional regression of the following form
ρHk,t = αt + βtRk,t−1 + γtXk,t + εk,t, k = 1, 2, ..., 37 (1.7)
for each month t, and then calculate the time-series averages of βt and γt and as-
sociated time-series standard errors. Here, ρHk,t represents the inter-period herding
measured by using the Sias measure when country months with at least five ac-
tive institutions are considered. Similarly as in the previous subsection, we run the
above regression (1.7) separately for a sup-sample of those country-month pairs with
∆k,t−1 > ∆∗t−1 and for a sub-sample of those country-month pairs with ∆k,t−1 < ∆
∗
t−1,
which is consistent with Choi and Sias (2009).
Table 1.11 reports the results using each of nine proxies for information environ-
ments of a country. Compared with the results of intra-period herding in the previous
subsection, three points are noteworthy. First, information environments of a coun-
try are significantly related to only buy-side inter-period herding. In the sell-side,
the inter-period herding has no significant relation with information environments.
Second, like the buy-side intra-period herding in Table 1.11, the buy-side inter-period
herding is also larger in countries with weaker information environments. Third, the
buy-side inter-period herding is larger in countries that performed well in the previ-
ous month. The estimated coefficients on the previous-month market return are all
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Table 1.11: Information Environments and Inter-period Herding
This table presents the results of the following regressions
ρHk,t = αt + βtRk,t−1 + γtXk,t + εk,t, k = 1, 2, ..., 37,
where ρHk,t represents the inter-period herding for country k over this month t and last month t− 1,
Rk,t−1 the local market return of country k during month t − 1, and Xk,t a proxy for information
environments of country k. Except for the Idio/Sys variable, all proxies for information environments
are not time-varying. The Idio/Sys variable is updated annually. After obtaining estimates of βt and
γt for each month t, we calculate their time-series averages and associated time-series standard errors.
Following Choi and Sias (2009), we interpret ρHk,t as representing buy herding when ∆k,t−1 > ∆
∗
t−1
and as representing sell herding when ∆k,t−1 < ∆∗t−1. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. *,
**, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Firm-specific Return Volatility, Language, Development Stage, and Legal Origin
Xk,t
Idio/Sys English Develop ComLaw
Buy Rk,t−1 0.073*** 0.076*** 0.062** 0.070***
(3.07) (2.85) (2.51) (2.87)
Xk,t -0.665*** -0.644*** -0.250 -0.305*
(-3.18) (-3.69) (-1.38) (-1.71)
Sell Rk,t−1 0.013 0.014 0.011 0.015
(0.63) (0.67) (0.52) (0.69)
Xk,t -0.244 0.140 0.055 -0.032
(-1.47) (0.88) (0.29) (-0.20)
Panel B: Disclosure Requirement, Accounting Standard, Reporting Frequency, and Credibility
Xk,t
DiscReq AcctgStd RepFreq PctgAudit NAnalyst
Buy Rk,t−1 0.042** 0.027 0.040* 0.032 0.041*
(2.14) (1.08) (1.77) (1.37) (1.67)
Xk,t -0.998** -0.018* -0.012** -0.103 -0.029**
(-2.30) (-1.68) (-2.58) (-1.05) (-2.60)
Sell Rk,t−1 0.023 0.003 0.022 0.025 0.003
(0.98) (0.12) (0.80) (1.18) (0.14)
Xk,t 0.230 -0.006 0.005 0.152 0.016
(0.53) (-0.45) (1.26) (1.41) (1.39)
positive, and they are statistically significant in seven out of nine regression models.
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In summary, our results for inter-period herding show that, in the buy-side, in-
stitutions in our sample tend to inter-period-herd more in countries with weaker
information environments. However, in the sell-side, information environments have
no significant relation to their inter-period herding.
1.6.4 Herding and a composite information proxy
In this subsection, we construct a composite information index that captures the com-
mon component in the nine proxies for information environments and then examine
the relation between information environments and intra- and inter-period herdings
by using this composite proxy for information environments. Following Baker and
Wurgler (2006) and Brown and Clifford (2004), we compute the first principal com-
ponent of the correlation matrix of our nine proxy variables. The first principal
component thus computed, which we denote as InfoEnv, is equal to
InfoEnvk =0.195 ∗ Idio/Sysk + 0.155 ∗ Englishk + 0.139 ∗Developk
+0.185 ∗ ComLawk + 0.135 ∗DiscReqk + 0.242 ∗ AcctgStdk
+0.181 ∗RepFreqk + 0.227 ∗ PctgAuditk + 0.115 ∗NAnalystk, (1.8)
where each proxy has first been standardized. The loading coefficients on individual
proxies in InfoEnv are rescaled so that InfoEnv has unit variance. We use the numbers
presented in Table 1.9 to compute the first principal component. Here, all proxy
variables, including the Idio/Sys variable which we updated annually in the previous
two subsections, are assumed to be constant over the sample period. Hence, InfoEnv
has no argument for time.
Although four countries–China, Indonesia, Poland, and Russia–are removed from
the sample due to missing values for some individual proxies, the InfoEnv index has
some nice properties. First, each individual proxy enters with the expected sign and
with roughly similar magnitude. Second, InfoEnv explains 39% of the sample vari-
ance, so we conclude that it captures substantial portion of the common variation.
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Table 1.12: A Composite Proxy for Information Environments and Herdings:
Bivariate Relationship
This table shows bivariate relations between information environments and intra- and inter-period
herdings. For the LSV herding measure, a country-month pair (k, t) is classified as a buy-side pair
if ∆k,t > ∆∗t and as a sell-side pair if ∆k,t < ∆∗t . For the Sias herding measure, a country-month
pair (k, t) is classified as a buy-side pair if ∆k,t−1 > ∆∗t−1 and as a sell-side pair if ∆k,t−1 > ∆
∗
t−1.
The information environment of a country is classified as “Strong” if the InfoEnv value in Table
9 is above the median and as ”Weak” if the value is below the median. The LSV herding values
are presented in percent terms and, for ease of presentation, the Sias herding values are multiplied
by a hundred. Numbers reported are the average herding values for each category. The correlation
represents the correlation between InfoEnv and herding for each column. Numbers in parentheses
are t-statistics, and *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively.
Intra-period (LSV) herding, H Inter-period (Sias) herding, ρH
Information Environments Buy Sell Buy Sell
Strong 1.81% 2.68% 0.27 0.67
Weak 2.50% 1.46% 0.63 0.37
Correlation -0.085*** 0.093*** -0.084*** 0.026
(-3.36) (12.17) (-3.29) (1.03)
The last column labeled as InfoEnv in Table 1.9 shows this composite proxy for infor-
mation environments by country. Turkey has the weakest information environments
(InfoEnv=-2.25), followed by Greece (-1.90) and Taiwan (-1.87). On the other hand,
Canada has the strongest information environments (InfoEnv=1.71), followed by the
United Kingdom (1.65) and Australia (1.49).
As a preliminary analysis, we first examine the bivariate relationship between
herding and information environments of a country proxied by InfoEnv. Table 1.12
and Figure 1.3 present the results. The information environment of a country is
classified as “Strong” if the InfoEnv value of the country is above the median and



































Figure 1.3: Information Environments and Herding
This figure shows the bivariate relationship between information environments and intra- and inter-
period herdings. For the intra-period LSV herding measure, a country-month pair (k, t) is classified
as a buy-side pair if ∆k,t > ∆∗t and as a sell-side pair if ∆k,t < ∆∗t . For the inter-period Sias
herding measure, a country-month pair (k, t) is classified as a buy-side pair if ∆k,t−1 > ∆∗t−1 and
as a sell-side pair if ∆k,t−1 > ∆∗t−1. The information environment of a country is classified as
“Strong” if the InfoEnv value in Table 9 is above the median and as “Weak” if the value is below the
median. The LSV herding values are presented in percent terms and, for ease of presentation, the
Sias herding values are multiplied by a hundred. Numbers reported are the average herding values
for each category.
and Figure 1.3 represent the average herding values for each category.27 Consistent
with the results in the previous two subsections, the results of Table 1.12 and Figure
1.3 clearly show that, in the buy side, both intra- and inter-period herdings are more
pronounced in countries with weak information environments and that, in the sell-
side, inter-period herding is more pronounced in countries with stronger information
environments, whereas the relation between inter-period sell herding and information
environments is not significant. Note that inter-period sell herding is also larger in
countries with stronger information environments, however.
27The LSV herding values are presented in percent terms, and, for ease of presentation, we mul-
tiplied the Sias herding values by a hundred.
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Next, using this composite proxy for information environments, we run the cross-
sectional regression of the following form
Hk,t (or ρ
H
k,t) = αt + βtRk,t−m→t−1 + γtInfoEnvk + εk,t, k = 1, 2, ..., 37 (1.9)
for each month t, and then calculate the time-series averages of βt and γt and as-
sociated time-series standard errors. Here, Hk,t (ρ
H
k,t) represents the intra-period
(inter-period) herding for country k this month t (over this month t and last month
t− 1) when country months with at least five active institutions are considered, and
Rk,t−m→t−1 the local market return of country k during previous m months.
Table 1.13 presents the results of the regression (1.9) for m = 1, 3, 6, 12. Again,
it shows that, irrespective of which prior market returns we use, the effect of infor-
mation environments on intra- and inter-period buy and sell herdings remains the
qualitatively same as the results from the previous two subsections. That is, (i) in
the buy side, both intra- and inter-period herdings are more pronounced in countries
with weaker information environments, but (ii) in the sell side, intra-period herding
is more pronounced in countries with stronger information environments, whereas
inter-period herding is not significantly related to information environments.
In terms of the effect of the previous market returns on herding, the results of Table
1.13 show that, for intra-period herding, the sell-side herding exhibits a return-chasing
behavior conditioned on the previous 1-, 3-, or 6-month market returns, whereas the
buy-side herding exhibits no return-chasing behaviors conditioned on the short-term
market returns but a contrarian behavior conditioned on the previous 12-month mar-
ket returns. For inter-period herding, only the buy-side herding exhibits a contrarian
behavior conditioned on the previous 6- or 12-month market returns.
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Table 1.13: A Composite Proxy for Information Environments and Herdings
This table presents the results of the following regressions
Hk,t (or ρHk,t) = αt + βtRk,t−m→t−1 + γtInfoEnvk + εk,t, k = 1, 2, ..., 37,
where Hk,t (ρHk,t) represents the intra-period (inter-period) herding for country k this month t (over
this month t and last month t−1), Rk,t−m→t−1 the local market return of country k during previous
m months, and InfoEnvk the first principal component, rescaled to have unit variance, of the cor-
relation matrix of nine proxies for information environments of country k. After obtaining estimates
of βt and γt for each month t, we calculate their time-series averages and associated time-series
standard errors. For the definition of buy and sell herdings, refer to annotations in Tables 10 and
11. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Dependent Variable = Hk,t
Market Return over the Previous m Months
m = 1 3 6 12
Buy Rk,t−m→t−1 -0.016 -0.026 -0.039 -0.045***
(-0.33) (-0.90) (-1.66) (-2.74)
InfoEnvk -0.512** -0.538** -0.476** -0.505**
(-2.47) (-2.49) (-2.18) (-2.23)
Sell Rk,t−m→t−1 -0.089* -0.071** -0.052** 0.004
(-1.73) (-2.12) (-2.01) (0.23)
InfoEnvk 0.634*** 0.547*** 0.452* 0.480**
(3.01) (2.65) (1.93) (2.05)
Panel B: Dependent Variable = ρHk,t
Market Return over the Previous m Months
m = 1 3 6 12
Buy Rk,t−m→t−1 0.031 0.002 -0.022** -0.019***
(1.25) (0.12) (-2.02) (-2.81)
InfoEnvk -0.192** -0.178* -0.236** -0.239***
(-2.21) (-1.87) (-2.40) (-2.72)
Sell Rk,t−m→t−1 0.012 -0.004 -0.014 0.007
(0.54) (-0.30) (-1.19) (1.01)
InfoEnvk 0.040 -0.000 0.006 -0.034
(0.39) (-0.00) (0.05) (-0.28)
1.6.5 Discussion of the regression results
Taken together, our regression results in this section show: (i) in the buy side, both
intra- and inter-period herdings are more pronounced in countries with weaker infor-
mation environments; but (ii) in the sell side, intra-period herding is more pronounced
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in countries with stronger information environments, whereas inter-period herding is
not significantly related to information environments.
At a first glance, the results obtained may seem to be not easily reconcilable.
However, note that the intra-period herding measured by employing the LSV mea-
sure cannot distinguish ‘intentional’ herding from ‘unintentional’ herding (LSV, 1992).
Intentional herding is likely to be larger when information asymmetry is larger among
investors and thus investors tend to mimic or copy other investors’ trading. On the
other hand, unintentional herding is likely to be larger when information asymmetry
is smaller among investors because in such environments investors would receive cor-
related signals and may react to them in a similar fashion. This is also the case for
inter-period herding.
Hence, our regression results in the buy-side is consistent with the intentional
herding story, which predicts that both intra- and inter-period buy herdings would
be more pronounced in countries with weaker information environments. This is what
we have found in the buy side. On the other hand, our regression results in the sell-side
is consistent with the unintentional herding story or herding story based on correlated
signals. We have found that intra-period sell herding is more pronounced in countries
with stronger information environments. Although we have found that inter-period
sell herding is not significantly related to information environments, this finding is
also not unexpected. In psychology, it is well known that bad news is stronger or more
influential than good news (see, e.g., Baumeister et al., 2001; Peeters and Czapinski,
1990; Skowronski and Carlston, 1989). This suggests that, when institutions receive
bad signals, they tend to react quickly to them and may do so independently with-
out paying attention to what others are doing. Thus, they tend to “unintentionally”
herd to sell quickly within a period, and would do so more in countries with stronger
information environments than in countries with weaker information environments.
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Hence, it is likely that inter-period sell herding is not significantly related to informa-
tion environments, although we still observe a higher level of mean inter-period sell
herding in countries with stronger information environments (Table 1.12). This story
is consistent with what we have found for the intra- and inter-period herdings in the
sell side.
1.7 Summary and Concluding Remarks
In the current paper, we document evidence of institutional herding across a wide
cross-section of countries, examine its impacts on local stock market performances,
and investigate whether information environments of a country affect their herding
behavior. Using a new transaction-level trading data of 531 U.S. institutional in-
vestors trading across 37 countries around the world for the period January 2002
to December 2009, we find: (i) institutions in our sample engage in a significant
level of intra- and inter-period herdings across countries; (ii) their herding behav-
ior, however, does not destabilize local stock markets; rather, they help to speed the
price-adjustment process; and (iii) information environments of a country have asym-
metric influences on their buy- and sell-side herding behavior. We find that both
intra- and inter-period buy herdings are larger in countries with weaker information
environments, but that intra-period sell herding is larger in countries with stronger
information environments whereas inter-period sell herding is not significantly related
to information environments.
The overall results of the current study suggests that information environments
have asymmetric effects on the buy- and sell-side herdings and are consistent with the
view that, in the buy side, institutions herd as a result of “intentionally” inferring
information from each other’s trades, whereas, in the sell side, correlated signals




In the current paper, we (i) document that the degree of co-movement between bilat-
eral USD exchange rates has increased substantially since the introduction of the euro
in 1999 and (ii) investigate what drives the increased co-movement. For each of our 33
sampled bilateral USD exchange rates, we measure the degree of co-movement using
the R-square from regressing weekly exchange rate changes on the weekly world ex-
change rate factor. Our results show that, for the majority of sample exchange rates,
the R-square has increased substantially over the period 1999-2010. Specifically, the
average R-square was 0.15 in 1999, but it increased to 0.47 by more than 200% in 2010.
Further analysis reveals that the rising influence of the euro relative to USD over a
third currency can explain most of the increase in the measured co-movement over
time. Our cross-sectional regression analysis indicates that trade propensity, financial
integration, and inflation have some additional power in explaining the cross-sectional
variation in the measured co-movement. However, our cross-sectional and time-series
regression analysis reveals that once the effect of the influence of the euro relative to
USD over a third currency is controlled for, the other explanatory variables lose most
of their power in explaining the time-series variation in the measured co-movement.
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2.1 Introduction
Reducing risk by investing in a variety of assets, i.e., diversification, is at the heart
of finance. Diversification does not work, of course, if assets move in lock-step with
each other. As such, practitioners and academics have long been interested in the
degree of co-movement between given assets and its inter-temporal dynamics. For
international stock markets, for example, earlier studies like Grubel (1968), Levy and
Sarnat (1970), and Solnik (1974) report that international stock markets during the
1950s and 1960s were relatively weakly correlated and thus the gains from interna-
tional diversification were substantial. However, a number of more recent studies
report that international stock markets have been becoming more integrated over the
past two to three decades, suggesting the decreasing benefits from international di-
versification (see , e.g., Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad, and Siegel, 2009; Brooks and Del
Negro, 2004; Carrieri, Errunza, and Hogan, 2007; Eun and Lee, 2010; Goetzman, Li,
and Rouwenhorst, 2005; Hardouvelis, Malliaropulos, and Priestley, 2006; Korajczyk,
1996; Levine and Zervos, 1998; Longin and Solnik, 1995; and Pukthuanthong and
Roll, 2009). For example, Pukthuanthong and Roll (2009) report that international
stock markets have been becoming more integrated over the period 1973-2006 in the
sense that the influence of common global factors on local stock markets has been
becoming more important.
There is, however, little empirical research on the degree of co-movement between
foreign exchange rates and its inter-temporal dynamics. This is surprising considering
that the foreign exchange market is by far the largest financial market as a single asset
market.1 According to a recent survey report by Bank for International Settlements
(BIS), the average daily turnover value of global foreign exchange markets is about
1The popular press such as Wall Street Journal and New York Times reports frequently that
currency has emerged as an independent asset class in the sense that currency exposure is a way to
diversify portfolio risk and introduce new sources of return.
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$4.0 trillion during April 2010, which is more than 8 times larger than the average
daily turnover value of global equity markets during 2010 (BIS, 2010).2
To be precise, there exist a few number of studies under the title of ‘comove-
ment among exchange rates’ (Baffes, 1994) or ‘comovements of exchange rates’ (Kuhl,
2008). However, the interest of these studies is in the existence of cointegration be-
tween sample exchanges rates and its implications for market efficiency, like that
of many other studies including Hakkio and Rush (1989), MacDonald and Taylor
(1989), Coleman (1990), Alexander and Johnson (1992), Ballie and Bollerslev (1989,
1994), Norrbin (1996), Ferre and Hall (2002), and Kuhl (2007). Simply speaking, this
strand of literature is based on the Granger’s (1986) argument that different asset
prices coming from jointly efficient markets cannot be cointegrated, since if they were
one would help predict the other and hence profit opportunities would arise.3 How-
ever, documenting evidence of the cointegration relation between sampled exchange
rates by using data for a certain period of time does not tell us much about the degree
of co-movement between them and its change over time, on which the current paper
is focused.
The purpose of this paper is (i) to document the degree of co-movement between
2According to the 2010 World Federation of Exchanges (WFE) Market Highlights, the average
daily turnover value of gloabl equity markets is about $497 billion (WFE, 2010).
3Consider two bilateral exchange rates Sa and Sb against a same base currency and suppose there
exists an error correction representation of the following form (Engle and Granger, 1987):
∆Sat = −ρ1(Sat−1 − βSbt−1) + lagged (∆Sat , ∆Sbt ) + ε1,t,
∆Sbt = −ρ2(Sat−1 − βSbt−1) + lagged (∆Sat , ∆Sbt ) + ε2,t.
Then, as long as |ρ1| + |ρ2| 6= 0, knowing Sat−1 and Sbt−1 helps predict Sat or Sbt . Hence, tests for
the existence of cointegration between Sa and Sb have implications for market efficiency. However,
such test results are not helpful in quantifying the degree of co-movement between Sa and Sb and
its change over time. For example, using 10 bilateral USD exchange rates for the period 1973-1985,
MacDonald and Taylor (1989) find no strong evidence of cointegration. However, even if they found
some evidence of cointegration for the period, it would not tell us what the degree of co-movement
between their sample exchange rates was in 1983, for example, and how it evolved over their sample
period.
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foreign exchange rates and its inter-temporal dynamics over the 12-year period 1999-
2010 after the introduction of the euro in 1999 and (ii) to investigate what drives
the degree of co-movement and its change over time. For this purpose, we consider
33 bilateral USD exchange rates, i.e., 34 currencies that have been relatively inde-
pendently floating during the sample period 1999-2010. We measure the degree of
co-movement of a currency x’s bilateral USD exchange rate with the other bilateral
USD exchange rates by the regression R-square from regressing the weekly change in
log $/X exchange rates on the weekly world exchange rate factor. The weekly world
exchange rate factor is constructed as either the GDP-weighted, trade-weighted, or
equally-weighted average of the weekly changes in log $/X exchange rates across
all currencies, although most results are presented using the GDP-weighted world
exchange rate factor. Throughout this paper, we refer to the regression R-square
computed in this manner as the ‘currency R-square.’ Our first key finding is that the
degree of co-movement between 33 bilateral USD exchange rates in our sample has
increased substantially over the sample period 1999-2010. Specifically, in 1999 the
average currency R-square across all currencies was 0.15, but it increased to 0.47 in
2010 by more than 200%.
Next, to investigate what drives such a marked increase in the measured co-
movement between sample exchange rates, we begin with examining how many cur-
rencies play a dominant role among sample exchange rates. Answering this question
first is critical in our subsequent analysis because the behavior of many currencies,
especially currencies of relatively small economies may be influenced by a few ma-
jor currencies of large economies such as the U.S., euro area, Japan, and the U.K.
Employing statistical clustering analysis, we find that there are essentially two large
currency clusters: one cluster centered around the U.S. dollar and the other cluster
centered around the euro.
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The results of our cluster analysis, though informal, suggests that two currencies—
the U.S. dollar and euro—would play an important role in explaining co-movement
between sampled exchange rates.4 Thus, we consider the influence of the euro relative
to the U.S. dollar on a currency x to be a key variable that could explain our finding,
i.e., the increased co-movement between sample exchange rates. Specifically, following
Eun and Lai (2003), we compute the so-called ‘currency beta’ to measure the influence
of the euro relative to the U.S. dollar on a third currency x. For other factors that
might drive the increased co-movement between sample exchange rates, we also con-
sider trade propensity, degree of financial integration, and inflation. We expect that,
other things being equal, currencies of countries with lower trade propensity, coun-
tries less financially integrated with the rest of the world, and countries with higher
inflation are likely to behave more independently against other foreign currencies.
We find that, cross-sectionally, the currency beta together with the other three
explanatory variables that we consider can explain about 90% of the cross-currency
variation in the measured currency R-square values. In terms of statistical signif-
icance, the explanatory power of the currency beta variable is by far the largest.
The currency beta variable alone can explain more than 80% of the cross-currency
variation in the measured currency R-square values. Although the other explanatory
variables also retain some statistically significant explanatory power, they, all com-
bined, can increase the explanatory power only by 7% to 9% once the effect of the
currency beta variable is controlled for. Next, from the cross-sectional and time-series
regression analysis, we also find that the explanatory power of the currency beta vari-
able is by far the largest. The change in the currency beta values alone can explain
the change in the currency R-square values as much as about 70% to 80%. Of the
other explanatory variables, only the financial integration variable survives to explain
4The discussion in Subsection 4.1 further suggests that the extent to which a currency tracks the
euro or the dollar would play an important role in explaining the level of the currency R-square and
its change over time
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the change in the currency R-square values over time, but its explanatory power is
much smaller than that of the currency beta variable.
Our findings of the markedly increased degree of co-movement between bilateral
USD exchange rates over the recent decade have implications for a wide range of finan-
cial decision makings such as asset allocation, currency hedging, as well as economic
policies. Our findings indicate that currency risk is becoming more systematic and
its main driver is the increasing alignment of many currencies with the euro. Hence,
for USD-based investors, our findings imply that investing in international financial
markets is more exposed to currency risk. This is also the case for multinational
companies headquartered in the U.S. As such, our findings suggest that when hedg-
ing international investments through currency forward and/or derivatives markets,
investors or multinational companies need to pay more attention to the dynamics
of the dollar-euro exchange rate. Policymakers might as well be concerned that an
increasing co-movement between exchange rates will lead to a rising susceptibility of
the economy’s current and capital account balances to currency risk.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes our
sample currencies and exchange rates data. Section 3 introduces the notion of the
world exchange rate factor and the currency R-square, and then document evidence
of the increasing degree of co-movement between bilateral USD exchange rates. In
Section 4, we explore possible factors that might drive the degree of co-movement
and its change over time. Section 5 presents the results of the cross-sectional and
time-series regression analysis. Section 6 concludes.
2.2 Data
2.2.1 Sample Currencies
In this study, we use 33 bilateral USD exchange rates (34 currencies) for the sample
period from January 1999 to December 2010. Our sample period starts from January
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1, 1999, when the euro was introduced to the world financial markets as an accounting
currency.
We select our sample currencies according to the following procedure. We first
start with 74 currencies that are classified as independently floating or managed
floating according to the classification of exchange rate arrangements and monetary
policy frameworks by International Monetary Fund (IMF) as of April 2010.5 Ac-
cording to IMF, “the classification system is based on the members’ actual, de facto
arrangements, as identified by IMF staff, which may differ from their officially an-
nounced, de jure arrangements [italics added].” We then exclude currencies of 27
small-economy countries that may have negligible effects on the foreign exchange
rate markets. Specifically, we exclude currencies of countries whose gross domestic
products (GDP) account for less than 0.05% of the world GDP as of 2010. This
step excludes currencies of such countries as Albania, D.R. Congo, Ghana, Paraguay,
Uganda, and Zambia from the sample. In addition, due to the lack of available daily
exchange rates data against the U.S. dollar, U.K. pound, or euro for the substantial
sub-period of our sample period, we exclude currencies of 7 countries from the sam-
ple: Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, I.R Iran, Myanmar, Serbia, and
Sudan. As a final screening, for the remaining 40 currencies we have investigated both
the history of exchange rate arrangements and their actual exchange rate behaviors
against the U.S. dollar, UK pound, or euro to identify currencies that can be consid-
ered to be de facto floating during our sample period. From this investigation, we
exclude currencies of 6 more countries from the sample: Argentina, Egypt, Kuwait,
Malaysia, Ukraine, and Vietnam. This leaves us with 34 (=74-27-7-6) currencies.
Table 2.1 presents the 34 sampled currencies, along with the GDP and foreign
5In terms of the number of countries, currencies of 89 countries are identified as free floating,
floating, or managed floating by IMF as of April 2010. The 89 countries, however, contain 16
eurozone countries. Hence, in terms of the number of distinct currencies, only 74 currencies, including
the euro, are identified as either floating or managed floating. [Estonia joined the eurozone in January
2011.]
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Table 2.1: Sample Currencies
Our sample consists of 34 currencies that are identified as floating or managed floating according to
the exchange rate regime classification by IMF (2010). The currency ISO code represents the three-
letter currency code by the International Organization for Standardization. GDP represents the
gross domestic products and Trade the sum of imports and exports. Both GDP and trade amount
are 2010 data, obtained from the International Financial Statistics (IFS) database. The numbers in
(%) columns are computed relative to the sample.
Country Currency (ISO Code) GDP ($ bil) (%) Trade ($ bil) (%)
Algeria Dinar (DZD) 159 (0.3) 98 (0.5)
Australia Dollar (AUD) 1,220 (2.4) 414 (2.3)
Brazil Real (BRL) 2,024 (4.0) 393 (2.2)
Canada Dollar (CAD) 1,564 (3.1) 777 (4.3)
Chile Peso (CLP) 199 (0.4) 127 (0.7)
Colombia Peso (COP) 283 (0.6) 80 (0.4)
Czech Rep. Koruna (CZK) 195 (0.4) 255 (1.4)
Euro Area Euro (EUR) 12,067 (23.9) 3,844 (21.1)
Hungary Forint (HUF) 132 (0.3) 189 (1.0)
India Rupee (INR) 1,430 (2.8) 584 (3.2)
Indonesia Rupiah (IDR) 695 (1.4) 290 (1.6)
Israel Shekel (ILS) 201 (0.4) 117 (0.6)
Japan Yen (JPY) 5,391 (10.7) 1,462 (8.0)
Kenya Shilling (KES) 32 (0.1) 15 (0.1)
Korea Won (KRW) 986 (2.0) 892 (4.9)
Mexico Peso (MXN) 1,004 (2.0) 600 (3.3)
New Zealand Dollar (NZD) 138 (0.3) 63 (0.3)
Nigeria Naira (NGN) 207 (0.4) 125 (0.7)
Norway Krone (NOK) 414 (0.8) 206 (1.1)
Pakistan Rupee (PKR) 175 (0.3) 57 (0.3)
Peru Nuevo sol (PEN) 154 (0.3) 63 (0.3)
Philippines Peso (PHP) 189 (0.4) 113 (0.6)
Poland Zloty (PLN) 439 (0.9) 326 (1.8)
Romania Leu (RON) 158 (0.3) 111 (0.6)
Russia Rouble (RUB) 1,477 (2.9) 613 (3.4)
Singapore Dollar (SGD) 217 (0.4) 663 (3.6)
South Africa Rand (ZAR) 354 (0.7) 162 (0.9)
Sweden Krona (SEK) 445 (0.9) 306 (1.7)
Switzerland Franc (CHF) 522 (1.0) 353 (1.9)
Thailand Baht (THB) 313 (0.6) 380 (2.1)
Turkey Lira (TRY) 729 (1.4) 299 (1.6)
U.K. Pound sterling (GBP) 2,259 (4.5) 971 (5.3)
U.S. Dollar (USD) 14,624 (29.0) 3,246 (17.8)
Uruguay Peso (UYU) 41 (0.1) 16 (0.1)
SUM 50,436 (100.0) 18,210 (100.0)
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trade amount information as of year 2010.6 The foreign trade amount, the Trade
variable in the table, is defined as the sum of exports and imports. In terms of both
GDP and foreign trade amount, the United States, euro area, Japan, and the United
Kingdom come first, second, third, and fourth, respectively.7 The United States and
euro area together account for 53 percent of the total GDP and 39 percent of the
total trade amount of the sampled countries.
2.2.2 Exchange Rates Data
In this study, we use daily exchange rates sampled at the weekly frequency on every
Wednesday during our sample period 1999-2010 (626 weeks). The data are obtained
from Datastream. Specifically, we use exchange rates supplied by WM/Reuters, if
possible, which provides exchange rates recorded at 4:00 p.m. in London time.
Table 2.2 presents the descriptive statistics for our exchange rates data. The bi-
lateral exchange rate between USD and a given currency x is expressed in $/X, and
weekly exchange rate changes are computed as the first difference of log spot ex-
change rates. A few points are noteworthy from the table. First, the mean exchange
rate change is negative for 17 currencies and positive for 16 currencies. Since the
exchange rate between USD and a currency x is expressed in $/X, the positive (nega-
tive) mean represents the appreciation (depreciation) of the currency x against USD
during the sample period. For example, the euro appreciated 0.018 percent per week
against USD, which is translated to about 11.3 percent during the 1999-2010 period
(626 weeks). Among the sample currencies, the Australian dollar appreciated most
against USD. The Canadian dollar, Japanese yen, and Swiss franc also appreciated
strongly against USD. On the other hand, the Turkish lira depreciated most against
USD, followed by Romanian leu and Uruguayan peso. Second, the standard deviation
6The euro area represents 16 countries. Unless there could be some confusion, however, we regard
the euro area as representing one country.
7Among countries not included in our sample, China is the largest economy country with the
GDP amount of $5,745 billion and the foreign trade amount of $2,972 billion as of 2010.
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Table 2.2: Weekly Exchange Rate Changes: Summary Statistics
This table reports the descriptive statistics for the weekly changes in the log bilateral USD exchange
rates during the sample period 1999-2010. The bilateral exchange rate between USD and a given
currency x is expressed in $/X, obtained from Datastream. SD, Min, Max, Skew, and Kurt represent
the standard deviation, minimum, maximum, skewness, and excess kurtosis, respectively. JB rep-
resents the Jarque-Bera statistic which tests for normality. The JB statistic follows asymptotically
the chi-square distribution with two degrees of freedom, χ2(2). The upper critical value of χ2(2)
at the one-sided 1% significance level is 9.2. Serial Corr represents the autocorrelation at lag one.
Mean, SD, Min, and Max are expressed in percent terms. The star symbols *, **, and *** represent
the statistical significance at the %10, %5, and %1 levels, respectively.
Currency Mean SD Min Max Skew Kurt JB Serial Corr
Algeria -0.035 1.05 -6.53 4.09 -0.70 5.56 859.0 -0.13***
Australia 0.076 1.82 -17.05 6.36 -1.74 13.54 5100.9 0.01
Brazil -0.053 2.82 -20.72 16.10 -1.63 16.90 7724.7 -0.05
Canada 0.066 1.33 -6.03 6.07 -0.24 3.03 245.1 -0.03
Chile 0.000 1.46 -10.44 5.74 -0.58 4.67 603.6 0.10**
Colombia -0.038 1.58 -7.39 6.47 -0.19 3.64 349.2 0.03
Czech Rep. 0.069 1.82 -8.62 8.14 -0.31 2.35 154.5 0.02
Euro Area 0.018 1.47 -5.09 9.81 0.30 3.00 244.6 0.01
Hungary 0.001 2.08 -9.20 9.18 -0.41 2.13 136.1 -0.06
India -0.009 0.76 -3.83 4.58 0.29 7.66 1539.0 0.07*
Indonesia -0.020 2.08 -13.76 11.50 -0.19 10.73 3005.2 -0.02
Israel 0.021 1.09 -5.26 5.36 -0.18 3.17 265.7 0.02
Japan 0.051 1.39 -4.11 6.18 0.37 0.97 39.1 0.00
Kenya -0.042 1.17 -8.64 8.01 0.05 12.41 4016.4 -0.12***
Korea 0.002 1.69 -16.11 12.03 -0.88 23.64 14655.2 -0.10
Mexico -0.038 1.45 -11.81 6.29 -1.14 9.02 2258.0 -0.02
New Zealand 0.056 1.91 -11.60 7.27 -0.84 3.86 460.8 -0.02
Nigeria -0.081 1.54 -11.21 11.22 -0.55 18.76 9215.8 -0.13***
Norway 0.036 1.66 -9.55 5.99 -0.57 2.64 215.8 -0.06
Pakistan -0.086*** 0.64 -5.83 2.77 -2.16 17.93 8868.7 0.05
Peru 0.020 0.71 -5.31 4.94 -0.92 14.16 5315.2 -0.03
Philippines -0.022 1.00 -6.12 11.70 2.32 32.47 28054.6 -0.09**
Poland 0.020 2.00 -12.31 5.99 -1.31 5.44 950.7 -0.06
Romania -0.171** 1.79 -18.24 11.43 -1.41 21.70 12492.1 -0.08*
Russia -0.042 1.14 -10.41 4.67 -2.64 20.50 11685.9 -0.09**
Singapore 0.041 0.67 -2.23 3.66 0.04 2.01 105.2 0.06
South Africa -0.025 2.39 -16.77 10.79 -1.01 6.21 1112.4 -0.04
Sweden 0.023 1.66 -8.25 5.75 -0.25 1.62 75.1 -0.01
Switzerland 0.060 1.45 -4.26 9.99 0.49 3.03 264.9 0.05
Thailand 0.030 0.87 -8.95 4.91 -1.45 20.45 11126.3 -0.03
Turkey -0.255** 2.58 -33.90 8.35 -5.04 55.18 82076.7 0.02
U.K. -0.011 1.37 -7.17 5.30 -0.55 3.07 278.0 -0.01
Uruguay -0.098 1.71 -14.82 16.51 -1.09 31.81 26511.3 0.09**
MEAN -0.013 1.52 -10.35 7.79 -0.73 11.61 3573.8 -0.02
63
ranges from 0.76 for Peru to 2.82 for Brazil, with a mean of 1.52. Assuming no serial
correlations in the weekly exchange rate changes, the mean standard deviation of
1.52 percent per week is translated to about 11.0 percent per year (11.0=1.52*
√
52).
Note also that the standard deviation is much larger than the mean by one or two
order of magnitude, indicating that exchange rate changes are very volatile. Third,
the minimum, maximum, skewness, kurtosis, and Jarque-Bera statistics, combined
together, suggest that exchange rate changes can be characterized by highly skewed
and heavy-tailed non-normal distributions. Lastly, for 9 currencies, the autocorre-
lation coefficient at lag one is significant at least at the 10% level. The associated
countries are relatively poor countries among the sample.
2.3 Measurement of Co-movement
2.3.1 The World Exchange Rate Factor









wj,t + w$,t = 1. (2.2)
Here, Sj,t represents the spot exchange rate between USD and currency j expressed in
$/J, wj,t an weight assigned to Sj,t, and N(t) the number of bilateral USD exchange
rates.8 In this study, we consider three alternative definitions of the world exchange
rate factor of this form, namely, GDP-weighted, trade-weighted, and equally-weighted
world exchange rate factors. As the names imply, the weight wj,t is proportional to
8Let’s consider a dollar exchange rate index at time t, It, defined as





the country j’s GDP at time t for the GDP-weighed world exchange rate factor; it is
proportional to the country j’s foreign trade amount at time t for the trade-weighted
world exchange rate factor; and it is simply 1/(N(t) + 1) for the equally-weighted
world exchange rate factor. Although we consider three alternative definitions of the
world exchange rate factor, the most results presented in this study are obtained by
using the GDP-weighted world exchange rate factor. Using the other two definitions
of the world exchange rate factor produces qualitatively similar results, however.
Note that the last term in Equation (2.1) is zero since S$,t = 1 by definition. Still,
the last term affects fW,t through its effect on the weights. Though the inclusion of
this last term might look strange at a first glance, there are several reasons for us to
do so. To begin with, suppose a USD-based agent invests $1 in N(t) + 1 currencies,
including the U.S. dollar, with the weight wj,t to currency j at time t− 1. Then the
log return to this investment over the interval [t− 1, t] can be expressed as
N(t)∑
j=1
wj,t(ln Sj,t − ln Sj,t−1 + ij,t−1) + w$,t(ln S$,t − ln S$,t−1 + i$,t−1), (2.3)
where ij,t−1 represents the interest rate on currency j over the interval [t− 1, t]. Here,
the last term represents the return to investing in the home currency. Since ij,t−1 is
extremely small over the one-week interval and exchange rate changes are much more
volatile as evidenced by Table 2.2, Equations (2.1) and (2.3) are essentially the same.
Therefore, if one views currencies as an independent asset class, defining the world
exchange rate factor with including the last term in Equation (2.1) is more consistent




wj,t(lnSj,t − ln Sj,t−1).
Hence, without the last term in Equation (1), the world exchange rate factor fW,t is simply the log
return of the dollar exchange rate index It. When the weight wj,t is proportional to the bilateral
trade amount between the U.S. and country of currency j, the dollar exchange rate index It thus
constructed is usually referred to as the nominal effective exchange rate. The U.S. Federal Reserve
Board has been publishing an index of the foreign exchange value of the dollar of this form since
1977 (Hooper and Morton, 1978; Pauls, 1987; Leahy, 1998, 2005).
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with the convention in the asset pricing literature than defining the world exchange
rate factor without the last term in Equation (2.1).
To explain another reason for including the last term in Equation (2.1), consider
the GDP-weighted world exchange rate factor for example. If we use the GDP data
reported in Table 2.1, then the weight assigned to the dollar-euro exchange rate is
0.336 (=0.239/[1-0.290]) without the last term in Equation (2.1) whereas it is 0.239
with the last term. In general, the weight wj,t is GDPj,t/[
∑
j GDPj,t − GDPUS,t]
without the last term whereas it is GDPj,t/
∑
j GDPj,t with the last term, where
∑
j GDPj,t includes the U.S. GDP. Hence, if we let f
∗
W,t be the world exchange rate
factor without the last term in Equation (2.1), then we have the following relation







If we update the weight wj,t only annually, f
∗
W,t is just a constant multiple of fW,t
except for only 11 weeks during the 12-year sample period 1999-2010. In this study,
fW,t is used only for the purpose of computing the regression R-square from the
regression of (ln Sj,t − ln Sj,t−1) on fW,t. Therefore, the effects of the last term in
Equation (2.1) on the empirical results obtained in this study would be minimal, if
not zero.
One additional reason for the inclusion of the last term in Equation (2.1) is that
with this definition it is easier to construct the world exchange rate factor when we
change the base currency. For example, if one wants to construct the world exchange
rate factor by using the U.K. pound as the base currency, this can be easily done by
using the following relation:
f£W,t = fW,t − (ln S£,t − ln S£,t−1), (2.5)
where f£W,t and fW,t represent the world exchange rate factors constructed by using
the U.K. pound and U.S. dollar as the base currency, respectively.
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2.3.2 The Exchange Rate Market Model and Currency R-square
In this study, we measure the extent to which bilateral exchange rates between USD
and currency j move together with the other bilateral USD exchange rates by the
explanatory power of the following time-series regression model
fj,t = aj + bjfW,t + εj,t, (2.6)
where
fj,t = (ln Sj,t − ln Sj,t−1). (2.7)
Throughout this paper, we refer to this regression model as the ‘exchange rate market
model,’ borrowing a terminology from the asset pricing literature, and the explanatory
power of this regression model as the ‘currency R-square’ to differentiate it from
regression R-squares obtained from any other regression models.
Table 2.3 presents the estimation results of the regression model Equation (2.6) for
each of 33 bilateral USD exchange rates for the entire sample period 1999-2010. The
results are reported separately for three alternative choices of weighting schemes—
GDP-weighted, trade-weighted, and equally-weighted approaches. In the table, the
currency R-square is denoted by CR2 for clarity. Note first that the estimation
results across three alternative choices of weighting schemes are roughly comparable
to each other. Indeed, the correlation between currency R-squares obtained from
using the GDP-weighted world factor and from using the trade-weighted world factor
amounts to 0.989, for example.9 On the other hand, there exists a wide variation
in the estimated beta coefficients and currency R-square values across currencies.
Specifically, currencies of European countries and those of Australia and New Zealand
have relatively large beta coefficients and large currency R-square values. By contrast,
9The correlation between currency R-squares obtained from using the GDP-weighted world factor
and from using the equally-weighted world factor amounts to 0.900; and the correlation between
currency R-squares obtained from using the trade-weighted world factor and from using the equally-
weighted world factor amounts to 0.924.
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Table 2.3: Estimation of the Exchange Rate Market Model
This table reports the estimation results from the regression of weekly changes in the log bilateral
USD exchange rates on the world exchange rate factor for the sample period 1999-2010 (a total of
625 weekly changes). The bilateral exchange rate between USD and a given currency x is expressed
in $/X. The weekly world exchange rate factor is computed as the GDP-weighted, trade-weighted,
or equally-weighted average of weekly changes in the log bilateral USD exchange rates. For the
euro, GDP is computed as the sum of 16 eurozone countries’ GDPs. α, β, and CR2 represent the
intercept, slope, and R-square, respectively, from the estimated regression results.
GDP-weighted Trade-weighted Equally-weighted
World Factor World Factor World Factor
Currency α β CR2 α β CR2 α β CR2
Algeria -0.0004 0.57 13.7 0.0004 0.44 12.5 0.0003 0.45 12.1
Australia 0.0006 1.84 47.8 -0.0007 1.63 58.3 -0.0010 1.77 62.2
Brazil -0.0007 1.56 14.3 0.0005 1.43 18.4 0.0003 1.74 24.9
Canada 0.0005 1.16 36.0 -0.0006 1.02 42.7 -0.0008 1.09 44.2
Chile -0.0001 0.71 11.3 0.0000 0.75 18.9 -0.0001 0.84 22.0
Colombia -0.0004 0.75 10.5 0.0004 0.75 16.4 0.0003 0.88 20.2
Czech Rep. 0.0005 2.21 69.2 -0.0007 1.74 66.9 -0.0009 1.75 60.9
Euro Area 0.0000 1.96 83.4 -0.0002 1.40 66.5 -0.0004 1.41 61.1
Hungary -0.0002 2.50 67.5 0.0000 2.10 73.7 -0.0003 2.12 68.4
India -0.0001 0.54 23.5 0.0001 0.49 30.3 0.0000 0.53 31.8
Indonesia -0.0003 0.67 4.9 0.0002 0.77 9.7 0.0001 0.82 10.0
Israel 0.0001 0.70 19.5 -0.0002 0.63 24.0 -0.0003 0.65 23.6
Japan 0.0004 0.77 14.2 -0.0005 0.24 2.1 -0.0005 0.23 1.6
Kenya -0.0005 0.38 4.9 0.0004 0.41 8.7 0.0004 0.44 9.0
Korea -0.0001 1.16 22.0 0.0000 1.11 31.0 -0.0002 1.17 31.5
Mexico -0.0004 0.75 12.5 0.0004 0.83 23.4 0.0003 0.92 25.9
New Zealand 0.0004 1.88 45.3 -0.0005 1.67 55.5 -0.0008 1.79 57.6
Nigeria -0.0008 0.04 0.0 0.0008 0.13 0.4 0.0008 0.14 0.4
Norway 0.0002 2.01 68.4 -0.0004 1.56 64.0 -0.0006 1.62 61.9
Pakistan -0.0009 0.05 0.3 0.0009 0.07 0.6 0.0009 0.08 1.0
Peru 0.0002 0.26 6.3 -0.0002 0.29 11.9 -0.0002 0.33 13.9
Philippines -0.0003 0.46 9.9 0.0002 0.49 17.6 0.0002 0.51 17.1
Poland 0.0000 2.21 57.5 -0.0002 1.95 69.5 -0.0005 2.02 67.4
Romania -0.0019 1.52 33.9 0.0017 1.31 39.2 0.0015 1.36 38.3
Russia -0.0005 0.77 21.4 0.0004 0.67 24.9 0.0003 0.71 24.8
Singapore 0.0003 0.73 55.7 -0.0004 0.61 60.8 -0.0005 0.60 54.2
South Africa -0.0004 1.78 26.0 0.0003 1.70 36.6 0.0000 1.83 38.5
Sweden 0.0000 2.01 68.8 -0.0002 1.60 67.6 -0.0004 1.65 64.6
Switzerland 0.0004 1.70 64.5 -0.0006 1.14 45.3 -0.0007 1.13 39.8
Thailand 0.0003 0.48 14.0 -0.0003 0.44 18.1 -0.0004 0.43 15.7
Turkey -0.0027 1.40 13.8 0.0025 1.45 22.9 0.0023 1.67 27.4
U.K. -0.0003 1.48 55.0 0.0001 1.13 49.6 0.0000 1.15 46.8
Uruguay -0.0010 -0.05 0.0 0.0010 1.28 17.5 0.0010 0.15 0.4
MEAN -0.0002 1.12 30.2 0.0001 1.01 33.5 0.0000 1.03 32.7
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currencies of African, Asian (except for Singapore), and South American countries
have relatively small beta coefficients and small currency R-square values. If we
focus on the results obtained using the GDP-weighted world exchange rate factor, of
33 currencies, currencies of seven European countries and Singapore have currency
R-square values larger than 0.50. Also, currencies of Australia and New Zealand
have relatively large currency R-square values of 0.48 and 0.45, respectively. For
the remaining currencies, the currency R-square value is less than 0.30, except for
currencies of two countries Canada (currency R-square=0.36) and Romania (currency
R-square=0.34).
To examine whether the degree of co-movement among the bilateral USD exchange
rates has changed over time, we next estimate the exchange rate market model,
Equation (2.6), separately for two equally-divided six-year sub-periods: 1999-2004
and 2005-2006. Table 2.4 presents the estimation results by currency. The last
column of the table reports the difference in the currency R-square values between
two sub-periods, ∆CR2. Again, we denote the currency R-square by CR2 in the
table for clarity. The results show that the currency R-square value has decreased
only for 7 currencies and increased for the remaining 26 currencies. Of the 7 currencies
whose currency R-square values have decreased, the Japanese yen appears to be the
only currency with a substantial decrease. On the other hand, of the 26 currencies
whose currency R-square values have increased, 8 currencies exhibit an increase of
the currency R-square value by more than 0.3, 7 currencies by more than 0.2, and 9
currencies by more than 0.1. For currencies of most European countries, the currency
R-square value in the earlier sub-period 1999-2004 was already fairly large. Even with
this, however, the increase of the currency R-square values between two sub-periods
is also very large for several currencies. For example, the currency R-square value
has increased by 0.146 for Czech Republic, by 0.145 for the euro area, by 0.212 for
Hungary, and by 0.118 for Switzerland.
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Table 2.4: Estimation of the Exchange Rate Market Model: Sub-period Results
This table reports the regression statistics presented in Table 3 separately for two six-year subperiods:
1999-2004 and 2005-2010. Here, the world exchange rate factor is computed as the GDP-weighted
average of the weekly changes in the log bilateral USD exchange rates. In the last two columns, ∆β
(∆CR2) represents the difference of β (CR2) between later and earlier sub-periods.
1999-2004 2005-2010
Currency α β CR2 α β CR2 ∆β ∆CR2
Algeria -0.0007 0.85 15.7 -0.0001 0.43 14.7 -0.42 -1.1
Australia 0.0005 1.39 28.2 0.0007 2.07 59.4 0.69 31.2
Brazil -0.0027 1.23 4.7 0.0014 1.73 32.0 0.50 27.3
Canada 0.0006 0.67 16.8 0.0005 1.41 46.3 0.74 29.5
Chile -0.0006 0.31 2.1 0.0005 0.92 19.0 0.61 17.0
Colombia -0.0015 0.15 0.5 0.0006 1.05 19.1 0.90 18.6
Czech Rep. 0.0006 2.20 60.2 0.0003 2.21 74.9 0.01 14.6
Euro Area 0.0002 2.24 76.8 -0.0002 1.81 91.2 -0.43 14.5
Hungary 0.0003 2.19 53.7 -0.0007 2.65 74.9 0.46 21.2
India -0.0001 0.14 4.4 -0.0001 0.74 33.5 0.60 29.2
Indonesia -0.0006 0.73 2.5 0.0001 0.64 14.1 -0.08 11.7
Israel -0.0002 0.20 2.0 0.0006 0.95 33.0 0.75 30.9
Japan 0.0001 1.46 36.1 0.0007 0.42 5.3 -1.04 -30.8
Kenya -0.0007 0.22 1.6 -0.0002 0.46 7.4 0.24 5.8
Korea 0.0003 0.62 12.0 -0.0004 1.43 27.1 0.81 15.1
Mexico -0.0005 0.14 0.5 -0.0004 1.06 25.0 0.92 24.5
New Zealand 0.0007 1.54 29.8 0.0001 2.05 54.4 0.52 24.6
Nigeria -0.0012 0.11 0.1 -0.0005 0.01 0.0 -0.11 -0.1
Norway 0.0004 1.92 61.1 -0.0001 2.05 72.3 0.13 11.2
Pakistan -0.0006 0.10 0.6 -0.0012 0.03 0.2 -0.06 -0.4
Peru -0.0001 0.05 0.3 0.0005 0.37 10.7 0.32 10.4
Philippines -0.0013 0.17 0.8 0.0008 0.61 27.0 0.44 26.2
Poland 0.0003 1.38 27.7 -0.0002 2.63 74.4 1.25 46.7
Romania -0.0031 0.65 5.2 -0.0005 1.96 62.9 1.31 57.7
Russia -0.0006 0.07 0.2 -0.0004 1.13 47.0 1.07 46.8
Singapore 0.0000 0.64 37.0 0.0007 0.77 68.9 0.13 32.0
South Africa -0.0002 1.19 9.5 -0.0006 2.08 39.9 0.89 30.4
Sweden 0.0003 2.02 61.5 -0.0003 2.01 73.3 -0.02 11.8
Switzerland 0.0004 2.13 69.4 0.0005 1.48 63.9 -0.65 -5.6
Thailand -0.0003 0.56 15.3 0.0008 0.44 13.6 -0.12 -1.7
Turkey -0.0048 0.94 3.3 -0.0006 1.63 36.1 0.69 32.9
U.K. 0.0003 1.35 49.4 -0.0008 1.55 58.0 0.19 8.6
Uruguay -0.0028 -0.15 0.2 0.0009 0.01 0.0 0.15 -0.1


































































































































































Y = 0.1738 + 0.0067 * X
(8.86)    (10.78)
R2 = 82.1%
Figure 2.1: Time-trend of the Average Currency R-square
This figure shows the time-trend of the average of the currency R-square values across 33 currencies.
A three-month moving window approach is employed. For each quarter end and a given currency,
past one-year weekly observations are used in computing the currency R-square. The estimated linear
time-trend equation with t-statistics in parentheses are overlaid. The t-statistics are computed using
the Newey-West heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors with allowing for
autocorrelations up to lag 4 (Newey and West, 1987).
We next estimate the exchange rate market model using a three-month mov-
ing one-year-window approach to examine the time-varying degree of co-movement
between bilateral USD exchange rates more closely. The first currency R-square val-
ues of individual currencies are computed using the one-year weekly observations
between 01/01/1999 and 12/31/1999. The second currency R-square values are com-
puted using the one-year weekly observations between 04/01/1999 and 03/31/2000.
Proceeding this way, the last currency R-square values are computed using the one-
year weekly observations between 01/01/2010 and 12/31/2010. We then compute
the cross-currency average of the currency R-square values at each quarter end. Fig-
ure 2.1 shows the time-trend of the cross-currency average of the currency R-square
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values across 33 currencies. The fitted linear time-trend regression model is inserted
within the figure. The t-statistics in parentheses are computed using the Newey-
West heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors with allowing
for autocorrelations up to lag 4. The figure strongly indicates that the degree of
co-movement between bilateral USD exchange rates has steadily increased over the
past 12-year period since the euro was adopted. According to the estimated slope
coefficient, the cross-currency average of the currency R-square values has increased
about 0.027 (=0.0067*4) per year, i.e., about 0.32 during the past 12-year period.
Indeed, the cross-currency average of the currency R-square values was 0.15 for year
1999 and it increased to 0.47 for year 2010. Hence, over the 12-year period since the
introduction of the euro, the degree of co-movement between bilateral USD exchange
rates has increased substantially by more than 200%.
Figure 2.2 shows the effect of the increased co-movement between bilateral USD
exchange rates on the diversification benefits from a USD-based investor’s viewpoint.
The figure plots the relation between the number of currencies in a currency portfolio
and the risk of the portfolio for the period 1999-2004 and for the period 2005-2010
separately. Similarly as in Solnik (1974), for a given N (2 ≤ N ≤ 31), we choose
N bilateral USD exchange rates (expressed in US dollars per foreign currency unit)
randomly out of our 33 sample exchange rates. Then, we compute the variance
of a currency portfolio constructed by equally-weighting the N sampled weekly log
exchange-rate changes. We repeat this procedure 300 times and compute the average
of the 300 variances computed in this manner and denote it by V ar(PN). For N = 1,
V ar(P1) is computed as the average of the 33 individual variances of weekly log
exchange-rate changes. For N = 33, V ar(P33) is computed as the variance of the
equally-weighted portfolio of all 33 weekly exchange-rate changes. For N = 32, the
number of different combinations of choosing 32 out of 33 is only 33, so we compute
V ar(P32) as the average of all possible 33 equally-weighted portfolio variances, where
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Figure 2.2: The Effect of Diversification on Risk Reduction: 1999-2004 vs.
2005-2010
This figure plots the relation between the number of currencies in a currency portfolio and the risk
of the portfolio for the period 1999-2004 and for the period 2005-2010 separately. For a given N
(2 ≤ N ≤ 31), we choose N bilateral USD exchange rates (expressed in US dollars per foreign
currency unit) randomly out of 33 exchange rates. Then, we compute the variance of a currency
portfolio constructed by equally-weighting the N sampled weekly log exchange-rate changes. We
repeat this procedure 300 times and compute the average of the 300 variances computed in this
manner and denote it by V ar(PN ). For N = 1, V ar(P1) is computed as the average of the 33
individual variances of weekly log exchange-rate changes. For N = 33, V ar(P33) is computed as
the variance of the equally-weighted portfolio of all 33 weekly exchange-rate changes. For N = 32,
the number of different combinations of choosing 32 out of 33 is only 33, so we compute V ar(P32)
as the average of all possible 33 equally-weighted portfolio variances, where each portfolio contains





The two dotted horizontal lines represent y=13.9% for the 1999-2004 period and y=37.3% for the
2005-2010 period.







The two dotted horizontal lines represent y=13.9% for the 1999-2004 period and
y=37.3% for the 2005-2010 period. The figure shows that an American investor
in foreign exchange markets can enjoy most of the diversification benefits by hold-
ing about 15 to 20 different currencies. Importantly, the figure also shows that the
systematic risk of a well-diversified currency portfolio is substantially higher for the
2005-2010 period than that for the 1999-2004 period. The ratio of the return variance
of a well-diversified currency portfolio relative to that of a portfolio containing only
one currency increased from 13.9% for the earlier sub-period to 37.3% for the later
sub-period by about 200%.
2.4 What Can Explain the Currency R-square and Its Change
Over Time?
2.4.1 A Close Look at the World Exchange Rate Factor
In the previous section, we have seen that there exists a wide variation in the measured
currency R-square values across the sample currencies (Table 2.3). We have also seen
that the degree of co-movement between bilateral USD exchange rates has steadily
increased over time since the euro was adopted (Table 2.4 and Figures 2.1 and 2.2).
The next question arising naturally is, then, what drives these findings. To address
this question, we need to better understand the exchange rate market model, Equation
(2.6). Suppose that there are essentially only two currencies in the world, the U.S.
dollar and euro, and that the currency of any third country is pegged to either the




wj,t(ln Sj,t − ln Sj,t−1) + w$,t(ln S$,t − ln S$,t−1)
reduces to a constant multiple of the dollar-euro exchange rate change. Recall that
Sj,t represents the spot exchange rate between USD and currency j expressed in
74
$/J. Therefore, for the currency pegged to the euro, the currency R-square is simply
one, and for currency pegged to the dollar, the currency R-square is simply zero.
Under this situation, then, the only way that we can observe an increase of the cross-
currency average of the currency R-square values over time is that more countries
should change its exchange rate regime from the pegged-to-the-dollar regime to the
pegged-to-the-euro regime than countries do the other way around.
Extending this extreme case one step further, suppose next that there are essen-
tially three currencies in the world, the U.S. dollar, euro, and U.K. pound, and that
the currency of any third country is pegged to one of these three currencies. This
time, then, the world exchange rate factor reduces to a weighted sum of the dollar-
euro and dollar-pound exchange rate changes. Still, for the currency pegged to the
dollar, the currency R-square is simply zero. However, for the currency pegged to
the euro, the currency R-square will take some value A between 0 and 1, and for
currency pegged to the pound, it will take another value B between 0 and 1. Under
this situation, there are several ways in which we can observe an increase of the cross-
currency average of the currency R-square values over time. Clearly, however, if some
countries change its exchange rate regime from the pegged-to-the-dollar regime to
either the pegged-to-the-euro or pegged-to-the-pound regime, then we will observe an
increase of the cross-currency average of the currency R-square values with assuming
that currencies pegged to either the euro or pound at first remain the same.10
In general, the discussion here suggests that if the influence of other major cur-
rencies over a third currency increases over time than that of the U.S. dollar over the
currency does, then we will observe an increase of the cross-currency average of the
currency R-square values over time as seen in Figure 2.1.
10To explain there exists a more complicated way, suppose A > B and (A − B) > B. Under
this situation, if one country changes its exchange rate regime from the pegged-to-the-pound to
the pegged-to-the-euro, then we will also observe an increase of the cross-currency average of the
currency R-square values over time, even if one other country changes its exchange rate regime from
the pegged-to-the-pound to the pegged-to-the-dollar.
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2.4.2 Currency Clusters
According to the preceding discussion, it would be helpful to investigate the following
questions: how many currencies play dominant roles in the foreign exchange rate
markets?; and which countries belong to which currency cluster? These questions are
also worthwhile to investigate by themselves (Mundell, 2000). In this subsection, we
use the cluster analysis to explore this issue empirically.
Simply speaking, given a collection of items, the cluster analysis is a statistical
method of finding a good cluster solution in which each cluster is very different from
other clusters (between-cluster heterogeneity) and items within each cluster are as
similar as possible (within-cluster homogeneity). To apply the cluster analysis in our
situation, we first need to define a measure of the similarity or dissimilarity between
two currencies. For this, here we treat currency j as identical with the 625-dimensional
vector fj = (fj,1, fj,2, ..., fj,625), where fj,t = (ln Sj,t − ln Sj,t−1), and measure the
dissimilarity between two currencies j and j* as the Euclidean distance between two
vectors fj and fj∗. Note that f$ represents the origin of the 625-dimensional Euclidean
space. Note also that the Euclidean distance between two vectors fj and fj∗ does not
depend on the choice of a base currency (refer to Appendix 2.7.1 for explanation).
Accordingly, the results of the clustering analysis presented here remain the same
whichever currency we use as the base currency when expressing bilateral exchange
rates.
There are many alternative ways of doing the cluster analysis, but we choose to use
the Ward’s method (Ward, 1963), the most widely used clustering method. Basically,
the Ward’s method regards the cluster analysis as an analysis of variance problem.
The homogeneity or similarity of each cluster is measured by the within-cluster sum
of the squared deviations of individual items in the cluster from the cluster center,
which is known as the error sum of squares (ESS). To explain the Ward’s method,
suppose we have N items in the beginning and xj, j = 1, 2, ..., N , represents the
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multivariate measurement associated with the jth item. If there are currently K
clusters, define ESS as
ESS = ESS1 + ESS2 + · · ·+ ESSK , (2.8)
where ESSk, k = 1, 2, ..., K, is the sum of the squared deviations of individual items
in cluster k from the cluster mean. At each step of the analysis, the union of every
possible pair of clusters obtained from the previous step is considered, and the two
clusters whose combination results in the smallest increase in ESS are merged into
one. Initially, each cluster consists of a single item. Hence, ESSk = 0 for all k =
1, 2, ..., N , and thus we have ESS = ESS1 + ESS2 + · · ·+ ESSN = 0. At the end of
the cluster analysis, all N items will be combined into one single cluster of N items,




(xk − x̄)′(xk − x̄), (2.9)




To measure the goodness of fit of the current cluster solution at each step of the





TSS − (ESS1 + ESS2 + ... + ESSK)
TSS
. (2.10)
Here, we assumed that the current cluster solution consists of K clusters. This R2
value can be interpreted as the proportion of variation explained by the current cluster
solution, which is similar to the R2 value in the regression analysis. The difference
of the R2 values between two successive steps is equal to ∆ESS/TSS, and referred
to as the semi-partial R-square. The semi-partial R-square value measures the loss
of homogeneity due to merging two clusters to form a new cluster at each step of
the cluster analysis. If the value obtained is small, then it suggests that the cluster
solution obtained at the current step is formed by merging two very homogeneous
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clusters from the previous step. On the other hand, if the value obtained is large,
then it suggests that the cluster solution obtained at the current step is formed by
merging two relatively heterogeneous clusters from the previous step. Appendix 2.7.2
contains a simple numerical example explaining the Ward’s clustering procedure.
Figure 2.3 displays the results of the cluster analysis graphically. Such a tree
diagram is called the dendrogram. It clearly shows the currency groupings and the
distance levels at which they occur. The x-axis represents the semi-partial R-square
that measures the loss of homogeneity due to merging two clusters to form a new
cluster at each step of the cluster analysis. From the dendrogram, we can see that
there are two large currency groups, one containing the U.S. dollar and the other
containing the euro. Note also that the currencies of three countries, Brazil, Turkey,
and South Africa, are separated from these two large currency groups and that they
can be grouped into one group or two groups.
Next, Figure 2.4 presents the plot of the semi-partial R-square against the number
of clusters. It shows that there is a large loss of within-cluster homogeneity when we
try to merge the last three or four clusters.
Lastly, Table 2.5 presents the distances of a currency from the cluster center, the
U.S. dollar, and the euro. In the table, we assumed the three-cluster solution from
the cluster analysis, which seems acceptable as evidenced by Figures 2.3 and 2.4. The
results show that the euro is located closest to the center of the cluster it belongs to
and that, except for the Singapore dollar, the U.S. dollar is also located closest to the
center of the cluster it belongs to.
To summarize, our cluster analysis in this section suggests that there are essen-
tially two large currency clusters–one cluster centered around the U.S. dollar and the
other cluster centered around the euro–and that the U.S. dollar plays a ‘central’ role
within one cluster group and the euro within the other cluster group.
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Figure 2.3: Currency Dendrogram
This figure shows the clustering patterns among 34 currencies. In performing cluster analysis, a
currency x is treated as identical with the 625-dimensional vector of the weekly changes in the log
bilateral USD exchange rates during the sample period, denoted by fx = (fx,1, ..., fx,625), where
fx,t = (ln Sx,t − ln Sx,t−1) with S the spot exchange rate between USD and currency x expressed in
$/X. We employed the Ward’s hierarchical clustering procedure (Ward, 1963), which is detailed in
Section 4.2. The clustering patterns presented in this figure are independent of the choice of a base
currency (here USD).
2.4.3 Currency Beta
The cluster analysis in the previous subsection, though informal, suggests that the
U.S. dollar and euro play a central role in the foreign exchange markets. The dis-














































































Figure 2.4: Plot of the Number of Clusters vs. the Semi-partial R-square
This figure shows the relation between the number of clusters and the semi-partial R-square. For
example, the figure tells us that when the number of clusters changes from two to one, the loss of
within-cluster homogeneity amounts to a semi-partial R-square of about 0.15.
tracks the euro or the dollar would play an important role in explaining the level of
the currency R-square and its change over time.
To formally measure the extent to which a certain currency tracks either the U.S.
dollar or euro, we use the concept of the ‘currency beta’ proposed by Eun and Lai
(2003). Following Eun and Lai, we define the euro beta, βe, and dollar beta, β$, of a
currency x using the estimated slope coefficients from the following regressions
∆ ln SX/$ = α1 + βe∆ ln Se/$ + ε1 (2.11)
∆ ln Se/X = α2 + β$∆ ln Se/$ + ε2, (2.12)
where S denotes the spot exchange rate and ∆ the first difference operator. The euro
beta βe (dollar beta β$) measures the sensitivity of the movements of the x-dollar
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Table 2.5: Currency Clusters
This table reports the distances of each individual currency from the cluster center, US dollar,
and euro with assuming that there exist three cluster groups. In performing cluster analysis, a
currency x is treated as identical with the 625-dimensional vector fx = (fx,1, ..., fx,625), where
fx,t = (ln Sx,t − ln Sx,t−1) with S the spot exchange rate between currency x and USD expressed
in $/X. We employed the Ward’s hierarchical clustering procedure (Ward, 1963). The cluster
center is computed as the average of fx across all currencies belonging to each cluster, and the
distance represents the Euclidean distance. The results presented are independent of the choice of
a base currency (here USD). For ease of interpretation, within each cluster, currencies are sorted in
ascending order based on their distances from the cluster center.
Distance from Distance from Distance from
Cluster Currency Cluster Center USD Euro
Cluster 1 Singapore 0.120 0.167 0.297
U.S. 0.128 0.000 0.366
India 0.150 0.189 0.347
Peru 0.167 0.177 0.382
Pakistan 0.190 0.160 0.394
Thailand 0.193 0.217 0.368
Philippines 0.214 0.250 0.397
Israel 0.239 0.272 0.367
Russia 0.252 0.286 0.370
Algeria 0.259 0.263 0.347
Canada 0.272 0.332 0.363
Kenya 0.273 0.292 0.422
Mexico 0.311 0.363 0.462
Chile 0.316 0.364 0.452
Colombia 0.341 0.395 0.477
Japan 0.350 0.347 0.446
Korea 0.355 0.422 0.468
Nigeria 0.387 0.386 0.534
Uruguay 0.420 0.427 0.570
Indonesia 0.470 0.519 0.606
Cluster 2 Euro 0.155 0.366 0.000
Sweden 0.193 0.415 0.230
Norway 0.207 0.416 0.239
Czech Rep. 0.225 0.454 0.240
Switzerland 0.237 0.362 0.177
U.K. 0.241 0.341 0.283
Hungary 0.262 0.520 0.310
Poland 0.282 0.499 0.363
Australia 0.294 0.455 0.390
New Zealand 0.312 0.478 0.402
Romania 0.340 0.448 0.400
Cluster 3 Turkey 0.417 0.647 0.661
South Africa 0.422 0.597 0.566
Brazil 0.470 0.706 0.729
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(euro-x) exchange rate to the movements of the euro-dollar exchange rate. As long
as the triangular parity holds among the dollar, euro, and currency x, we have the
following relationships:
α1 + α2 = 0, βe + β$ = 1, and ε1 + ε2 = 0. (2.13)
That is, the euro and dollar betas sum to unity. At extreme, if a currency x is pegged
to the U.S. dollar, we have βe = 0 and β$ = 1, whereas if a currency x is pegged to
the euro, we have βe = 1 and β$ = 0. In general, the more closely a currency tracks
the dollar, the closer β$ is to unity, whereas the more closely a currency tracks the
euro, the closer βe is to unity.
Table 2.6 presents the euro and dollar betas of the 34 sampled currencies, esti-
mated using data for the entire sample period 1999-2010. For the computation of
the euro betas, bilateral exchange rates against the U.S. dollar are used, and for the
computation of the dollar betas, bilateral exchange rates against the euro are used.
Hence, empirically βe + β$ don’t have to be exactly equal to one because the tri-
angular parity among the dollar, euro, and currency x does not hold strictly in the
real world. The t-statistics are computed using the Newey-West heteroscedasticity
and autocorrelation consistent standard errors with allowing for autocorrelations up
to lag 4 (Newey and West, 1987). The reported t-statistics for the estimated euro
and dollar beta coefficients are strongly significant for all cases except only four: euro
betas for Nigeria and Pakistan and dollar betas for Norway and Sweden. The es-
timated euro beta βe is larger than 0.5 for 11 currencies, excluding the euro itself,
and the estimated dollar beta β$ is larger than 0.5 for 21 currencies, excluding the
U.S. dollar itself. Not surprisingly, the euro exerts a dominant influence over the
currencies of several European countries such as Czech Republic (βe=1.01), Hungary
(βe=1.10), Norway (βe=0.88), Poland (βe=0.91), Sweden (βe=0.94), and Switzer-
land (βe=0.87). The euro also exhibits a significant influence over the currencies of
such non-European countries as Australia (βe=0.69), New Zealand (βe=0.72), and
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Table 2.6: The Euro Beta and Dollar Beta
This table reports the euro and dollar betas estimated for the period 1999-2010. The euro and dollar
betas of a currency x are estimated from the following regressions:
∆ ln(X/$) = α1 + βe∆ln(e/$) + ε1; ∆ ln(e/X) = α2 + β$∆ln(e/$) + ε2.
For the euro betas, weekly changes in bilateral exchange rates against USD are used; and for the
dollar betas, weekly changes in bilateral exchange rates against the euro are used. The t-statistics are
computed using the Newey-West heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors
with allowing for autocorrelations up to lag 4.
Currency βe t(β) R2 β$ t(β) R2 βe + β$
Algeria 0.28 8.32 15.3 0.74 34.74 35.0 1.02
Australia 0.69 12.49 31.7 0.26 6.98 4.9 0.95
Brazil 0.40 4.74 4.9 0.70 16.65 13.9 1.10
Canada 0.38 7.85 17.3 0.59 21.45 32.8 0.97
Chile 0.22 4.72 5.1 0.78 29.26 38.5 1.00
Colombia 0.24 4.02 5.1 0.79 31.73 35.3 1.04
Czech Rep. 1.01 23.85 66.9 -0.03 -2.08 0.3 0.98
Euro Area 1.00 n.a. 100.0 0.00 0.00 0.0 1.00
Hungary 1.10 20.66 60.1 -0.11 -4.94 1.6 0.99
India 0.18 6.63 12.0 0.87 69.87 76.3 1.05
Indonesia 0.12 2.13 0.7 0.92 32.30 32.4 1.04
Israel 0.28 5.91 14.5 0.81 42.49 55.1 1.09
Japan 0.21 3.35 4.1 0.72 21.72 33.7 0.93
Kenya 0.12 3.33 2.2 0.92 59.39 58.0 1.04
Korea 0.32 4.98 7.7 0.80 27.61 34.3 1.12
Mexico 0.18 2.90 3.4 0.87 30.42 44.3 1.05
New Zealand 0.72 14.23 31.9 0.26 7.56 4.6 0.98
Nigeria -0.01 -0.16 0.0 1.01 48.76 50.5 1.00
Norway 0.88 20.12 60.8 0.03 1.39 0.1 0.91
Pakistan 0.01 0.63 0.1 0.99 97.96 80.0 1.01
Peru 0.07 2.59 2.0 0.97 90.51 82.1 1.03
Philippines 0.13 3.67 3.5 0.91 59.18 63.8 1.04
Poland 0.91 11.74 44.5 0.11 3.18 1.2 1.02
Romania 0.61 9.68 25.4 0.31 8.92 8.8 0.92
Russia 0.29 7.10 14.0 0.72 34.07 48.4 1.01
Singapore 0.26 12.99 33.7 0.75 63.67 76.8 1.01
South Africa 0.61 6.21 14.0 0.36 9.20 5.2 0.97
Sweden 0.94 23.35 63.6 -0.01 -0.28 0.0 0.94
Switzerland 0.87 26.57 67.8 0.06 3.38 1.3 0.93
Thailand 0.17 8.02 8.2 0.88 72.65 66.3 1.05
Turkey 0.41 4.16 5.6 0.55 13.23 7.5 0.97
U.K. 0.57 14.66 38.4 0.37 19.07 22.3 0.95
U.S. 0.00 0.00 0.0 1.00 n.a. 100.0 1.00
Uruguay -0.02 -0.56 0.0 1.03 41.49 44.4 1.01



































Figure 2.5: The Euro Beta vs. the Dollar Beta
This figure shows the relation between the euro and dollar betas. The inserted dotted line is the
straight 45-degree line.
South Africa (βe=0.61). On the other hand, the U.S. dollar exerts a dominant influ-
ence over the currencies of most American, Asian, and African countries.
Figure 2.5 displays the results of Table 2.6 graphically. It shows clearly that the
euro beta is larger than 0.5 for 11 currencies, excluding the euro, and smaller than
0.5 for 21 currencies, excluding the U.S. dollar.
Next, to examine whether the influence of the euro relative to USD over a third
currency has changed over time, we also estimated the euro beta separately for two
equally-divided six-year sub-periods: 1999–2004 and 2005–2010. Table 2.7 presents
the estimation results by currency. The column labeled as ∆βe reports the change in
the euro beta estimates between two sub-periods. The euro beta estimate increased
for 29 currencies and decreased only for 4 currencies. Of the 4 currencies whose
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Table 2.7: The Euro Beta: Sub-period Results
This table reports the euro beta estimates separately for two six-year sub-periods: 1999-2004 and
2005-2010. The euro beta of a currency x is estimated from the following regression
∆ ln(X/$) = α + βe∆ ln(e/$) + ε
For the computation of the euro betas, weekly changes in bilateral exchange rates against USD are
used. The t-statistics are computed using the Newey-West heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation
consistent standard errors with allowing for autocorrelations up to lag 4. ∆βe (∆R2) represents the
difference of βe (R2) between later and earlier sub-periods.
1999-2004 2005-2010
Currency βe t(β) R2 βe t(β) R2 ∆βe ∆R2
Algeria 0.37 7.98 19.1 0.20 5.78 12.4 -0.17 -6.7
Australia 0.44 6.55 17.4 0.91 12.13 44.6 0.47 27.3
Brazil 0.20 1.95 0.8 0.62 4.57 15.5 0.42 14.7
Canada 0.16 4.38 5.9 0.56 7.94 27.4 0.40 21.4
Chile 0.07 1.41 0.7 0.36 5.84 10.7 0.29 10.1
Colombia 0.00 -0.02 0.0 0.45 5.97 13.2 0.45 13.2
Czech Rep. 0.93 27.48 67.6 1.08 14.59 67.1 0.15 -0.5
Euro Area 1.00 n.a. 100.0 1.00 n.a. 100.0 0.00 0.0
Hungary 0.88 22.20 54.8 1.28 13.73 65.6 0.40 10.8
India 0.03 1.83 1.6 0.30 9.44 21.2 0.27 19.6
Indonesia -0.02 -0.15 0.0 0.23 4.90 6.6 0.24 6.6
Israel 0.07 2.38 1.6 0.46 8.48 28.8 0.39 27.2
Japan 0.17 2.36 3.0 0.21 2.50 5.3 0.05 2.3
Kenya 0.05 1.33 0.5 0.17 3.27 4.1 0.12 3.5
Korea 0.06 1.14 0.7 0.54 6.22 14.6 0.48 13.9
Mexico -0.07 -1.56 0.8 0.40 4.36 12.9 0.48 12.1
New Zealand 0.50 7.14 19.9 0.91 16.69 42.5 0.41 22.6
Nigeria 0.00 0.05 0.0 -0.02 -0.27 0.1 -0.02 0.1
Norway 0.79 24.82 64.5 0.96 12.01 59.7 0.18 -4.8
Pakistan 0.02 0.81 0.1 0.01 0.21 0.0 -0.01 -0.1
Peru 0.00 -0.19 0.0 0.13 3.33 5.0 0.13 5.0
Philippines 0.00 -0.09 0.0 0.24 7.75 15.9 0.25 15.9
Poland 0.55 10.97 27.8 1.21 8.70 58.7 0.65 30.9
Romania 0.21 3.40 3.6 0.95 14.42 55.9 0.74 52.3
Russia 0.04 1.42 0.3 0.51 7.46 35.6 0.47 35.3
Singapore 0.17 6.62 15.5 0.35 18.72 52.7 0.18 37.1
South Africa 0.31 3.64 4.0 0.86 5.17 26.0 0.56 22.0
Sweden 0.82 23.96 64.3 0.96 13.68 63.7 0.14 -0.7
Switzerland 0.89 28.29 75.7 0.75 15.25 61.1 -0.14 -14.7
Thailand 0.13 3.66 5.5 0.20 8.63 11.0 0.07 5.6
Turkey 0.15 1.25 0.5 0.64 4.20 21.0 0.49 20.4
U.K. 0.47 14.75 37.5 0.66 9.81 40.3 0.20 2.8
U.S. 0.00 n.a. 0.0 0.00 n.a.. 0.0 0.00 0.0
Uruguay -0.04 -0.59 0.1 -0.01 -0.12 0.0 0.03 -0.1























































Figure 2.6: The Euro Beta: 1999-2004 vs. 2005-2010
This figure shows the relation between the euro beta for the period 1999-2004 and the euro beta for
the 2005-2010. The inserted dotted line is the straight 45-degree line.
euro beta estimates decreased, the Algerian dinar and Swiss franc appear to be only
currencies with a substantial decrease. On average, the euro beta estimate increased
by as much as 0.26 from 0.27 in the earlier sub-period to 0.53 in the later sub-period.
Of the 29 currencies whose euro beta estimates increased, 2 currencies exhibit an
increase of more than 0.6 (Polish zloty and Romanian leu), 12 currencies an increase
of between 0.3 and 0.6, 11 currencies an increase of between 0.1 and 0.3, and 4
currencies an increase of between 0.0 and 0.1. Not surprisingly, for currencies of all
European countries, except for Switzerland, the euro beta value increased over the two
sub-periods. However, it is surprising that the euro beta value increased substantially
for almost all currencies across the world.
Figure 2.6 displays the results of Table 2.7 graphically. It shows clearly that the
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euro beta value has increased over the two sub-periods for almost all currencies.
2.4.4 Other Explanatory Variables
In addition to the currency beta, as other factors that could explain the level of the
currency R-square and its change over time, we consider the following three: (i) the
trade propensity of a country, (ii) the degree of financial integration of a country with
the rest of the world, and (iii) inflation.
Since the exchange rate between currencies of two countries is by definition the
relative price of two currencies, it should be affected by trade and capital flows between
two countries. Hence, we consider the degree of a country’s trade propensity one of
the explanatory variables in our regression analysis. We expect that if a country
trades less with the rest of the world, its currency may behave more independently
against foreign currencies, other things being equal. Specifically, we measure the
trade propensity of a country as the sum of imports and exports divided by GDP of
the country. Similarly, if a country is less financially integrated with the rest of the
world, its currency may behave more independently against foreign currencies, other
things being equal. Thus, we consider the degree of a country’s financial integration
with the rest of the world another explanatory variable in our regression analysis.
Specifically, we measure the degree of financial integration using the stock market
integration measure proposed by Puthuanthong and Roll (2009).11 Simply speaking,
Pukthuanthong and Roll measures a country’s financial integration with the rest of
the world using the explanatory power of a globally-defined multi-factor model in
explaining the country’s stock market returns. In Appendix 2.7.3, we detail how we
computed the stock market integration measure proposed by Puthuanthong and Roll.
11There is no firm consensus on which measure is the most appropriate proxy for the degree of a
country’s financial integration with the rest of the world, however. For example, we may consider
the ratio of the sum of capital investment flows into and out of a country to GDP to be a proxy for
the degree of the country’s financial integration with the rest of the world. Unfortunately, however,
the investment flow data were not available for the majority of our sample countries.
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Lastly, we include inflation as another control variable in our regression analysis. We
expect that currencies of countries with higher inflation rates would be traded less
in the foreign exchange markets and thus may behave more independently against
foreign currencies, other things being equal. In addition, inflation is a key variable
in many economic models of exchange rates, so it will be worthwhile to examine its
effect on the currency R-square without any directional prediction.
2.4.5 Descriptive Statistics for the Regression Variables
Table 2.8 presents the descriptive statistics for all the variables used in our regression
analysis. The currency R-square and euro beta values are estimated from the regres-
sion models Equation (2.6) and Equation (2.11), respectively, by using data for the
entire sample period 1999-2010. Hence, the currency R-square values reported here
are the same as the currency R-square values obtained from using the GDP-weighted
world exchange rate factor reported in Table 2.3. The euro beta values are also the
same as the euro beta values reported in Table 2.6. The other three variables—
trade propensity, financial integration , and inflation—are computed annually first
and then taken the time-series average. The table shows that there exists a sub-
stantial cross-sectional variation in each of the regression variables. The currency
R-square, expressed in percent terms, ranges from the minimum 0.0 for Uruguay to
the maximum 83.4 for the euro area. The mean and standard deviation of the cur-
rency R-square values are 30.2 and 25.1, respectively. The euro beta ranges from the
minimum -0.06 for Uruguay to the maximum 1.10 for Hungary. The trade propensity
ranges from the minimum 0.21 for Brazil to the maximum 3.03 for Singapore. Singa-
pore is the most trade-intensive country in our sample, followed by Czech Republic,
Hungary, and Thailand. The financial integration variable, which measures the de-
gree of stock market integration, ranges from the minimum 2.1% for Nigeria to the
maximum 80.4% for the U.K.
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Table 2.8: The Regression Variables
This table reports the summary of the variables used in our regression analyses by country. The
currency R-square is computed by using the GDP-weighted world exchange rate factor. The currency
R-square and euro beta variables are estimated by using data for the entire sample period 1999-
2010. The financial integration variable represents the stock market integration measure proposed
by Pukthuanthong and Roll (2010). It is computed annually first and then taken the time-series
average. The trade propensity and inflation variables are the time-series average of annual values
over the 12-year sample period 1999-2010. The trade propensity variable is defined as imports plus
exports divided by GDP. The currency R-square and financial integration variables are expressed in
percent terms.





Algeria 13.7 0.28 0.57 n.a. 3.0
Australia 47.8 0.69 0.32 64.6 3.0
Brazil 14.3 0.40 0.21 50.8 6.6
Canada 36.0 0.38 0.61 66.7 2.1
Chile 11.3 0.22 0.59 33.4 3.3
Colombia 10.5 0.24 0.28 17.8 6.3
Czech Rep. 69.2 1.01 1.19 40.2 2.6
Euro Area 83.4 1.00 0.31 71.5 2.0
Hungary 67.5 1.10 1.21 49.4 6.3
India 23.5 0.18 0.27 35.5 6.0
Indonesia 4.9 0.12 0.52 34.7 9.2
Israel 19.5 0.28 0.59 39.5 2.3
Japan 14.2 0.21 0.23 39.7 -0.3
Kenya 4.9 0.12 0.45 6.3 9.9
Korea 22.0 0.32 0.66 53.7 2.9
Mexico 12.5 0.18 0.53 53.6 6.1
New Zealand 45.3 0.72 0.47 54.1 2.5
Nigeria 0.0 -0.01 0.57 2.1 11.9
Norway 68.4 0.88 0.53 64.0 2.1
Pakistan 0.3 0.01 0.32 6.6 8.1
Peru 6.3 0.07 0.36 27.5 2.6
Philippines 9.9 0.13 0.85 26.5 5.2
Poland 57.5 0.91 0.58 50.4 3.8
Romania 33.9 0.61 0.65 25.0 18.0
Russia 21.4 0.29 0.51 39.7 19.4
Singapore 55.7 0.26 3.03 59.4 1.5
South Africa 26.0 0.61 0.50 52.6 5.9
Sweden 68.8 0.94 0.64 78.9 1.4
Switzerland 64.5 0.87 0.64 79.6 0.9
Thailand 14.0 0.17 1.14 37.6 2.3
Turkey 13.8 0.41 0.38 34.9 25.8
U.K. 55.0 0.57 0.39 80.4 2.7
Uruguay 0.0 -0.02 0.36 n.a. 8.2
MEAN 30.2 0.43 0.62 44.4 5.9
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Table 2.9: Correlations between the Regression Variables
This table reports the correlations between the regression variables presented in Table 8. The
numbers in parentheses here represent p-values. The star symbols *, **, and *** represent the
statistical significance at the %10, %5, and %1 levels, respectively.







Trade Propensity 0.31* 0.09
(0.08) (0.61)
Financial Integration 0.76*** 0.65*** 0.13
(0.00) (0.00) (0.48)
Inflation -0.37** -0.22 -0.18 -0.47***
(0.03) (0.23) (0.32) (0.01)
Table 2.9 presents the correlations among the regression variables reported in
Table 2.8. Several interesting points emerge from the results. Most notably, the cor-
relation between the currency R-square and euro beta amounts to 0.92, indicating
that about 85 percent of the variation in the currency R-square values across cur-
rencies are explained by the cross-currency variation in the euro beta values alone.
The correlation between the currency R-square and financial integration (0.76) is also
very large and strongly significant at the 1% level. The correlation between the cur-
rency R-square and trade propensity (0.31) is also positive, but significant only at the
10% level. By contrast, the correlation between the currency R-square and inflation
(-0.37) is negative and significant at the 5% level. Overall, the bivariate relationships
between the currency R-square and the other regression variables are consistent with
our expectation. Note, however, that the correlations among the euro beta, financial
integration, and inflation, are very large. Hence, it is an empirical question which
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variables retain their power in explaining the cross-sectional and time-series variations
in the currency R-square values when they are forced to compete with each other in
the multivariate regression models.
2.5 Regression Analysis
Our primary interest in this section is in the estimation of the cross-sectional regres-
sion models of the following form and their time-series versions:
Currency R2k = γ0 + γ1 ∗ Euro Betak + γ2 ∗ Trade Propensityk
+ γ3 ∗ Financial Integrationk + γ4 ∗ Inflationk + εk, (2.14)
where k represents a currency or country.
2.5.1 Cross-sectional Analysis
Panels A, B, and C of Table 2.10 present the results of the cross-sectional regression
model Equation (2.14) for the 1999-2010, 1999-2004, and 2005-2010 periods, respec-
tively. In Panel A, the currency R-square and euro beta values are computed by us-
ing data for the entire sample period 1999-2010; for the other variables, we compute
the time-series average of 12 corresponding annual values for the 1999-2010 period.
Similarly, in Panel B, the currency R-square and euro beta values are computed by
using data for the earlier sub-period 1999-2004; for the other variables, however, we
compute the time-series average of 6 corresponding annual values for the 1999-2005
period. This is also the case for the cross-sectional analysis for the later sub-period
2005-2010 reported in Panel C. The t-statistics reported in the table are based on the
White heteroscedasticity consistent robust standard errors (White, 1980).
First, the estimated regression R-square values in the bottom row of all three
panels convey us a striking message. Even though the sample size is so small, the
three explanatory variables we consider explain about 90 percent of the cross-sectional
variation in the currency R-square values across all three alternative sample periods.
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Table 2.10: Cross-sectional Regression Results
This table reports the results of the cross-sectional regressions of the following form for the period
1999-2010, 1999-2004, and 2005-2010
Currency R2k = γ0 + γ1 ∗ Euro Betak + γ2 ∗ Trade Propensityk
+ γ3 ∗ Financial Integrationk + γ4 ∗ Inflationk + εk,
where k represents a currency or country. The dependent variable is the currency R-square computed
by using the GDP-weighted world exchange rate factor. The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics,
which are based on the White heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors (White, 1980). All
variables are expressed in percent terms. The star symbols *, **, and *** represent the statistical
significance at the %10, %5, and %1 levels, respectively.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Panel A: Cross-Sectional Regression for the Period 1999-2010
Euro Beta 0.69*** 0.56***
(16.80) (11.72)
Trade Propensity 0.10 0.10***
(1.64) (3.86)




Number of Observations 33 31 31
R-square 0.84 0.61 0.93
Panel B: Cross-Sectional Regression for the Period 1999-2004
Euro Beta 0.69*** 0.57***
(20.02) (15.24)
Trade Propensity 0.06 0.06*
(1.14) (1.97)




Number of Observations 33 31 31
R-square 0.86 0.57 0.93
Panel C: Cross-Sectional Regression for the Period 2005-2010
Euro Beta 0.65*** 0.51***
(13.65) (8.76)
Trade Propensity 0.10* 0.11***
(1.76) (4.13)




Number of Observations 33 31 31
R-square 0.80 0.61 0.88
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Next, in terms of the explanatory power, the euro beta variable emerges as the most
important explanatory variable across all three alternative sample periods. This is
consistent with our discussion in Subsection 4.1 and the results from the clustering
analysis in Subsection 4.2. The coefficient estimate for the euro beta variable (0.55)
from Model 3 of Panel A, for example, indicates that if a country’s currency value is
more sensitive by 0.01 to the euro’s movement than to the dollar’s movement, then its
currency R-square value is higher by 0.0055 than a currency of the country otherwise
the same. The trade propensity of a country is also positively associated with the
country’s currency R-square value, and the variable has become more significant in
the later sub-period. The degree of financial integration of a country with the rest
of the world is also positively associated with the country’s currency R-square value,
and it is significant at the 1% level in both the earlier and later sub-periods. Lastly,
the inflation variable is negatively associated with the currency R-square values, but
it is significant only in the earlier sub-period.
To summarize, the euro beta variable plays the most important role in explaining
the cross-currency variation in the currency R-square values. The euro beta variable
alone can explain more than 80% of the cross-currency variation in the measured
currency R-square values. Although the other explanatory variables also retain sta-
tistically significant explanatory power, they, combined together, can increase the
explanatory power only by 7% to 9% once the effect of the currency beta is controlled
for.
2.5.2 Cross-sectional and Time-series Analysis
The results of Table 2.4 and Figure 2.1 indicate that the currency R-square values have
increased over time for the majority of our sample currencies. The cross-sectional re-
gression analysis in the previous subsection, however, do not tell us much about what
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drives such an increase in the measured currency R-square values over time. To in-
vestigate the dynamic relation between the currency R-square values and explanatory
variables, we first employ a simple regression model of the following form
∆Currency R2k = γ0 + γ1 ∗∆Euro Betak + γ2 ∗∆Trade Propensityk
+ γ3 ∗∆Financial Integrationk + γ4 ∗∆Inflationk + εk. (2.15)
where k represents a currency or country and ∆x the difference of x values computed
for the 1999-2004 and 2005-2010 periods. Though very simple, this model is powerful
in the sense that the estimated results are free from the endogeneity biases that
can arise from the omission of any country-specific variables as long as they are not
time-varying. Panel A of Table 2.11 presents the estimation results. The t-statistics
reported in Panel A are based on the White heteroscedasticity consistent robust
standard errors (White, 1980). If we focus on the result of Model 3, only the change
in the euro beta values, i.e., the change of a currency’s sensitivity to the euro relative
to the U.S. dollar, is statistically significant. Also, from the result of Model 1, the
euro beta variable alone can explain as much as 68 percent of the time-series variation
in the currency R-square values. Changes in the other variables have no additional
explanatory power once the change in the euro beta values is controlled for.
Next, we employ more general cross-sectional and time-series regression models of
the following form
Currency R2k,t = γ0 + γ1 ∗ Euro Betak,t + γ2 ∗ Trade Propensityk,t
+ γ3 ∗ Financial Integrationk,t + γ4 ∗ Inflationk,t
+ Currency and Year Fixed Effects + εk,t, (2.16)
where k represents a currency or country and t a year. Panel B of Table 2.11 presents
the estimation results. We try three regression models: pooled regression model (la-
beled as Pooled), panel regression model with currency fixed effects only (labeled
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Table 2.11: Cross-sectional and Time-series Regression Results
This table reports the results of the cross-sectional regression of the following form (Panel A)
∆Currency R2k = γ0 + γ1 ∗∆Euro Betak + γ2 ∗∆Trade Propensityk
+ γ3 ∗∆Financial Integrationk + γ4 ∗∆Inflationk + εk
and results of the panel regression models of the following form (Panel B)
Currency R2k,t = γ0 + γ1 ∗ Euro Betak,t + γ2 ∗ Trade Propensityk,t
+ γ3 ∗ Financial Integrationk,t + γ4 ∗ Inflationk,t + Fixed Effects + εk,t,
where k represents a currency or country and t a year. The dependent variable is the currency
R-square computed by using the GDP-weighted world exchange rate factor. The numbers in paren-
theses are t-statistics. In Panel A, t-statistics are based on the White heteroscedasticity consistent
standard errors (White, 1980). In the pooled regression model of Panel B, t-statistics are based
on the clustered standard errors clustered at each currency level (Rogers, 1993). In the other two
fixed effect models of Panel B, t-statistics are based on the Newey-West heteroscedasticity and au-
tocorrelation consistent standard errors with allowing for autocorrelations up to lag 2 within each
country (Newey and West, 1987; Petersen, 2009). All variables are expressed in percent terms. The
star symbols *, **, and *** represent the statistical significance at the %10, %5, and %1 levels,
respectively.
Panel A: Cross-Sectional Regression Using Time-Differenced Variables
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
∆Euro Beta 0.64*** 0.57***
(8.26) (4.05)
∆Trade Propensity -0.13 -0.02
(-0.63) (-0.08)




Number of Observations 33 31 31
R-square 0.68 0.43 0.68
Panel B: Panel Regression for the Period 1999-2010
Pooled One-way Fixed Two-way Fixed
Euro Beta 0.47*** 0.42*** 0.42***
(14.33) (11.30) (10.03)
Trade Propensity 0.08*** 0.06 -0.03
(3.58) (0.69) (-0.35)
Financial Integration 0.20*** 0.14*** 0.11**
(4.57) (2.74) (2.15)
Inflation 0.13 0.21 0.28
(0.63) (1.20) (1.61)
Country Fixed Effect No Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effect No No Yes
Number of Observations 372 372 372
R-square 0.77 0.84 0.87
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as One-way Fixed), and panel regression model with both currency and year fixed
effects (labeled as Two-way Fixed). For the pooled regression model, t-statistics are
computed using the clustered standard errors clustered at each country level (Rogers,
1993). For both the one-way and two-way fixed effect models, the t-statistics are com-
puted using the standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticities and autocorrelations
with allowing for autocorrelations up to lag 2 within each country (Newey and West,
1987; Petersen, 2009). Most notably, judging from the magnitude of the estimated
t-statistics across three alternative regression models, we can tell that the euro beta
variable is the most important driver of the inter-temporal change in the currency
R-square values. For the pooled regression model, all explanatory variables, except
for inflation, are statistically significant at the 1% level. However, once we control for
currency fixed effects, the trade propensity variable loses its statistical significance,
and only the euro beta and financial integration variables remain statistically signifi-
cant. Lastly, the results of the two-way fixed effect model is comparable to those of
the one-way fixed effect model except that now the financial integration variable is
significant only at the 5% level.
Lastly, Table 2.12 presents the results of the panel regression model (2.16) with
both country and time fixed effects by using the currency R-square values computed
from using GDP-weighted, trade-weighted, and equally-weighted world exchange rate
factors, respectively. The results confirm that, irrespective of which currency R-
square values we use, the euro beta variable is the most important driver of the
inter-temporal change in the currency R-square values. The financial integration
variable retains some explanatory power; however, it together with other explanatory
variables adds only 1% power to the regression R-square value once the euro beta
variable is controlled for.
Overall, the results of the cross-sectional and time-series regression analyses in this
subsection convey us one message. The most important driver of the inter-temporal
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Table 2.12: Cross-sectional and Time-series Regression Results: Robustness
Check
This table reports the results of the panel regression models of the following form
Currency R2k,t = γ0 + γ1 ∗ Euro Betak,t + γ2 ∗ Trade Propensityk,t
+ γ3 ∗ Financial Integrationk,t + γ4 ∗ Inflationk,t + Fixed Effects + εk,t,
where k represents a currency or country and t a year. The dependent variable is the currency R-
square computed by using the GDP-weighted, trade-weighted, or equally-weighted world exchange
rate factor. The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics based on the Newey-West heteroscedasticity
and autocorrelation consistent standard errors with allowing for autocorrelations up to lag 2 within
each country (Newey and West, 1987; Petersen, 2009). All variables are expressed in percent terms.
The star symbols *, **, and *** represent the statistical significance at the %10, %5, and %1 levels,
respectively.
GDP-weighted Trade-weighted Equally-weighted
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Euro Beta 0.41*** 0.42*** 0.42*** 0.42*** 0.36*** 0.33***
(10.59) (10.03) (12.07) (11.18) (9.39) (9.17)
Trade Propensity -0.03 -0.04 -0.05
(-0.35) (-0.51) (-0.57)
Financial Integration 0.11** 0.10** 0.19***
(2.15) (2.05) (3.71)
Inflation 0.28 0.27 0.08
(1.61) (1.63) (0.67)
Country Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 372 372 372 372 372 372
R-square 0.86 0.87 0.87 0.88 0.81 0.82
change in the currency R-square values is the change in the euro beta values over time.
Once the effect of the influence of the euro relative to USD over a given currency is
controlled for, the other explanatory variables have at best marginal explanatory
power in explaining time-series change in the currency’s co-movement with other
currencies.
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2.6 Summary and Concluding Remarks
During the recent decade, the foreign exchange market expanded rapidly. According
to the triennial survey report by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), over
the 2001–2010 period the foreign exchange market turnover increased by more than
220% to $3.98 trillion a day as of April 2010 from $1.24 trillion a day as of April
2001 (BIS 2010). Investors’ interest in currency trading has also soared together.
The increasing number of currency exchange-traded funds (ETFs) and retail foreign-
exchange trading sites reflects the increasing investors’ interest and also makes easier
for investors to trade currencies than ever.12 Market experts often state that more
investors are now looking at currencies as another asset class, like stocks and bonds,
than they were ever.
Against this backdrop, this study have (i) examined the degree of co-movement
between bilateral USD exchange rates and its change over time since the introduc-
tion of the euro in 1999 and (ii) investigated what drives the co-movement and its
change over time. We first document that the degree of co-movement between foreign
exchange rates has increased substantially during the period of 1999–2010. Specif-
ically, we show that, for each of our 33 sampled bilateral USD exchange rates, its
co-movement with the other bilateral USD exchange rates has increased, on average,
by more than 200% over the period 1999–2010. This study also reveals that the euro
beta variable alone, our measure of the influence of the euro relative to the U.S. dollar
over a third currency, can explain about 90% of the cross-sectional variation in the
measured co-movement and that the change in the euro beta variables over time can
explain about 70 to 80% of the time-series variation in the measured co-movement.
As any other integration research, our findings of the markedly increased degree
of co-movement between bilateral USD exchange rates over the recent decade have
12There was only one currency ETF in December 2005, but the number increased to 44 as of
October 2010, and many financial-services firms keep launching their own currency-related products.
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implications for a wide range of financial decision makings such as asset allocation,
currency hedging, as well as economic policies. Our findings indicate that currency
risk is becoming more systematic and its main driver is the increasing alignment of
many currencies with the euro. Hence, for USD-based investors, our findings imply
that investing in international financial markets is more exposed to currency risk. This
is also the case for multinational companies headquartered in the U.S. Our findings
also suggest that when hedging international investments through currency forward
and/or derivatives markets, investors or multinational companies need to pay more
attention to the dynamics of the dollar-euro exchange rate. Policymakers might as
well be concerned that an increasing co-movement between exchange rates will lead




2.7.1 The Effect of Changing a Base Currency on the Currency Distance
Assume that the exchange rate between currency j and USD at time t, denoted by





and rjt+1 = s
j
t+1 − sjt for t = 1, ..., T . Define the distance between currency i and








Note that d(i, j) represents the Euclidean distance between two (T − 1)-dimensional


























Here, rUSDt = 0 by construction.
Suppose now that we used the Japanese yen (JPY), for example, as a numeraire
currency in the beginning and that Sjt (U) represents units of JPY per one unit of
currency j, i.e., U/J . If we set sjt(U) = log Sjt (U) and rjt+1(U) = sjt+1(U) − sjt(U),
then we have the following relation
rjt (U) = rjt − rUt (2.20)
because we have Sjt (U) = Sjt /SUt . Hence, if we denote the distance between any two
currencies with JPY as a numeraire currency by d(i, j, U), we have










[rit − rUt ]− [rjt − rUt ]
)2
= d2(i, j). (2.21)
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That is, the distance between any two currencies with JPY as a numeraire currency,
d(i, j, U), is equal to d(i, j) with USD as a numeraire currency. Note that the change
of a numeraire currency from USD to JPY has an equivalent effect of changing the
origin of the (T − 1)-dimensional Euclidean space from rUSD = (0, 0, ..., 0)′ to rJPY =
(ri2(U), ri3(U), ..., riT (U))′. Hence, the distance of any two currencies measured this
way remains the same after the change of a numeraire currency.
2.7.2 Ward’s Clustering Procedure






Simply speaking, the Ward’s clustering procedure regards the cluster analysis as an
analysis of variance problem. The homogeneity or similarity of each cluster is mea-
sured by the within-cluster sum of the squared deviations of individual items in the
cluster from the cluster center, which is known as the error sum of squares (ESS).
Initially, we have 4 clusters each of which consists of a single item, so ESS = 0. At
the first step, a total of 6 different three-cluster solutions are possible:
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Cluster Solution ESS
(AB), C, D 2
(AC), B, D 8
(AD), B, C 26
(BC), A, D 10
(BD), A, C 16
(CD), A, B 18
To see how the ESSs are calculated in this table, suppose A and B are combined
in a single cluster at the first step. Then, the cluster center of A and B is (1,0) and
ESSAB = [(0− 1)2 + (0− 0)2] + [(2− 0)2 + (0− 0)2] = 2. Since ESSC = ESSD = 0,
we have ESS = ESSAB + ESSC + ESSD = 2. As another example, suppose A and
D are combined in a single cluster at the first step. Then, the cluster center of A
and D is (3,2) and ESSAD = [(0− 3)2 + (0− 2)2] + [(6− 3)2 + (4− 2)2] = 26. Since
ESSB = ESSC = 0, we have ESS = ESSAD + ESSB + ESSC = 26. This way, we
can compute ESSs for other solutions. Hence, the best cluster solution at the first
step is
(AB), C, D
and we now have three clusters. The next step in the Ward’s method is to evaluate





Hence, the best solution at the second step is
(ABC), D.
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At the third and final step, we have only one big cluster (ABCD), so ESS = TSS =
40.
2.7.3 Pukthuanthong and Roll’s Global Market Integration Measure
Pukthuanthong and Roll (2009) argue that if the true return generating process is
governed by more than one factor, the correlation across markets is a poor measure
of integration. Assuming that multiple global sources of risks affect stock markets
across the world, they propose a new measure of integration based on the explanatory
power of a multi-factor model, i.e., R-square. We detail their procedure below, which
are largely taken from the Section 7 of their article. It should be noted, however, that
we use weekly returns while they use daily returns.
Following the Pukthuanthong and Roll’s procedure, we estimate global factors
using the principal component analysis. For each calendar year, we extract ten eigen-
vectors from the covariance matrix computed using dollar-denominated stock market
index returns of the 17 countries, which they call the pre-1974 cohort. The ten eigen-
vectors are, of course, vectors associated with ten largest eigenvalues of the 17 × 17
covariance matrix. The 17 countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Den-
mark, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Singa-
pore, South Africa, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Then,
the ten eigenvectors thus extracted are applied to the returns of the same 17 coun-
tries during the next year, to compute so-called out-of-sample principal components.
These ten out-of-sample principal components serve as the proxies for global stock
market factors.
In addition, following one of their two precautionary actions taken, for each mem-
ber of the 17 pre-1974 cohort countries separate principal components were estimated
after the country was excluded from the calculation. For example, when the subject
country is Japan, Japan is excluded from the computation of the covariance matrix
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and the out-of-sample principal components. Excluding countries in this manner is
intended to avoid any suspicion that a country’s return regressed on global factors
is biased by that same country being heavily weighted in the principal components.
The other precautionary action Pukthuanthong and Roll take into account is related
to the time zone differences. Since we use weekly returns, not daily returns, however,
we do not consider this issue.
We then compute the regression R-square from the regression of each country’s
market returns on the ten global factors constructed this way for each calendar year
from year 1999 to 2010. For the euro area, we use the average of the regression R-




HOW INTEGRATED ARE DOMESTIC STOCK
MARKETS? EVIDENCE FROM U.S. STATE-SORTED
PORTFOLIOS
Investors are known to exhibit home (local) bias even when they invest in their do-
mestic markets. Since home bias is symptomatic of market segmentation, the ’home
bias at home’ phenomenon raises an important question: How well integrated are
domestic financial markets? The answer for this question will have implications for a
wide range of financial decision makings, including the cost of capital estimation, asset
allocation, and performance evaluation. In the current paper, we address this ques-
tion by estimating the level and trend of integration of U.S. domestic stock markets.
Specifically, for each of our sample states, we construct the state (market) portfo-
lio comprising public firms headquartered within the state and compute R-square,
our measure of integration, from regressing state portfolio returns on national stock
market factors. Using weekly returns, we estimate the regression for each year of
our sample period 1963-2008. The key findings are: (i) For the majority of sample
states, the R-square exhibits a statistically significant upward trend, implying that
U.S. domestic stock markets were not fully integrated and have been integrating dur-
ing the sample period; (ii) consistent with the previous result, the explanatory power
of the state factor over individual stock returns has been decreasing for the major-
ity of states; and (iii) the increasing integration of U.S. domestic stock markets is
associated with the decreasing home state bias, suggesting that investors’ pursuit of




Are the United States domestic stock markets fully integrated geographically? Stan-
dard economic and finance theories suggest the answer to this question should be
yes. The U.S. financial market is national in scope, characterized by free capital flow
across states. U.S. states or regions are subject to relatively few, if any, restrictions
on movements of production, capital, and labor.1 However, recent studies on inter-
national financial integration indicate that explicit or formal barriers to cross-border
economic activities and capital flows cannot adequately account for the level of mar-
ket segmentation observed in the data and that investor portfolio decisions play an
important role in determining financial market integration.
In this paper, we study the process of integration within U.S. domestic stock
markets. We view the U.S. stock markets primarily as a collection of 50 state mar-
kets and examine whether and how state stock markets have been integrating into
the national market during the period 1963-2008. We utilize state portfolio returns
computed by value-weighting the returns of all stocks within each state. Following
the lead of Pukthuanthong and Roll (2009) and other previous studies, we examine
the levels and changes of market integration based on the regression R-squares from
various model specifications that capture the degree to which common national stock
market factors drive state portfolio returns.
Our study builds on the two distinct strands of finance literature—the interna-
tional financial integration and the local bias within the U.S market. The questions
of whether and how international financial markets have been integrating over time
have long attracted interests from academia, policy makers, as well as practitioners
because answers for the questions have important implications for financial decisions
such as the cost of capital estimation, international asset allocation, and performance
1See Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1990, 1991) for related discussions.
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evaluation. For this reason, numerous studies have examined these questions and
documented evidence of greater international market integration over time (Bekaert
and Harvey, 1995; Longin and Solnik, 1995; Korajczyk, 1996; Levine and Zervos,
1998; Brooks and Del Negro, 2004; Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad, and Siegel, 2008;
Pukthuanthong and Roll, 2009).
Studying market integration within the U.S. offers important insights into the un-
derstanding of the level and determinants of international market integration. Con-
sidering that U.S. domestic markets are largely free from cross-border barriers and
subject to similar national regulations, taxation, and accounting standards, the level
of market integration within the U.S. can provide a ‘benchmark’ for evaluating global
financial integration. Such a benchmark is useful for both evaluating the potential
benefits of global market integration and understanding the impacts of economic bar-
riers on the degree of market integration.
The second strand of literature centers on the role of investor behavior in market
integration. Studies of international market integration document that home bias
in portfolio holdings, strong investor preference for domestic stocks in international
financial markets, is likely to be both a result of and a contributing factor to market
segmentation (French and Poterba, 1991; Gehrig, 1993; Lewis, 1999; Van Nieuwer-
burgh and Veldkamp, 2009). Coval and Moskowitz (1999) show that investors’ pref-
erence for investing close to home also applies to the U.S. domestic stock market.
Recent studies further show that investor local bias has significant impacts on stock
returns and stock valuations across geographic regions (Zhu, 2002; Hong, Kubik, and
Stein, 2005, 2008; Ivkovic and Weisbenner, 2005; Pirinsky and Wang, 2006; Korniotis
and Kumar, 2008). If investors prefer to invest close to home, such investment be-
havior can contribute directly to geographical segmentation within the U.S. domestic
market. Our study of domestic market integration would help us to assess the extent
of geographical segmentation of U.S. domestic financial markets and how investor
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behavior may contribute to market segmentation.
We find that state portfolios in our sample exhibit considerable variations in mar-
ket integration over the sample period. For the majority of the states, national stock
market factors now explain a greater portion of the state portfolio returns than they
did a half century ago. The average R-square from the Fama-French three factor
model increases from 0.50 in 1963 to 0.68 in 2008. The increase in market integration
is particularly strong for smaller states and states with low level of integration at
the beginning of the sample period. The results are robust to two alternative speci-
fications for the underlying return generating process: the Fama-French three-factor
model and a statistical factor model. Over the same time period, state portfolio re-
turns exhibit a strong downward trend in explaining individual stock returns in the
state, suggesting a declining local influence on stock returns. Taken together, the
evidence indicates that U.S. domestic stock markets were unlikely to be fully inte-
grated in the sample period and indeed have been integrating over the most recent
time period.
What explains the variations of market integration within the U.S. domestic mar-
ket and the increasing integration over time? U.S. states have enjoyed a high level of
economic integration for a considerable period of time. Because there are few explicit
barriers to economic activities and capital flows across states to begin with, changes
in such restrictions are unlikely to be the explanations for the observed increasing
market integration. While there is little evidence that overall economic integration
at the state level has changed noticeably in the U.S. over the past half century,
integration of economic fundamentals across states could have increased because of
structural changes in the national and local economy and regulation or policy changes
that affect cross-state market activities. For example, banking deregulation related
to inter-state banking in the 1990s could help integrate credit market across states.
We investigate whether changes in state level industry structure and overall economic
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linkages contribute to the increasing stock market integration during the sample pe-
riod.
Greater industrial diversification at the state level could lead to higher market
integration measured by the regression R-square. We find that changes in industrial
structure at the state level have significant impact on the observed increase in domes-
tic stock market integration. However, after controlling for the state level industry
concentration in the time trend regression, we still obtain rather robust results of
greater market integration for the majority of sample states over the sample period.
We next examine whether and how investor behavior, particularly local bias, con-
tributes to the geographic segmentation of the U.S. domestic stock market and the
increasing integration over time. To establish a direct link between investor home
bias and market segmentation, we first compute a measure of local bias at the state
level based on the degree of comovement between the growth of dividends paid by
corporations in the state and the growth of dividends received by residents in the
state. The degree of comovement proxies the propensity of investors to invest in
companies located in the home states, i.e., the extent of local bias. We then examine
whether changes (decline) in local bias over the sample period at the state level help
to explain the increases in market integration during the same period.
In the cross-sectional regression, we find that declines in the measured home bias
at the state level are significantly related to the increases in stock market integration.
The results remain strong even after controlling for the impact of changes in industry
concentration and various economic variables in the state. The empirical results based
on home bias suggest that investor behavior and particularly home bias in domestic
market contribute to geographic segmentation of the U.S. domestic stock market.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and our measures
of market integration. Section 3 presents the evidence on U.S. domestic market
integration, while Section 4 examines the explanations of U.S. market integration
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based on the changes of economic activities and linkages at the state level. Section 5
studies the impact of local bias in investor behavior on the levels and changes of U.S.
domestic stock market integration. Section 6 concludes.
3.2 Data, State Portfolio, and Measurement of Financial
Integration
3.2.1 Data and State Portfolio
To examine the level of financial integration between U.S. states and its change over
time, for each of our sample states, we construct the so-called state market portfolio
by value-weighting stock returns of all companies headquartered within the state
at the weekly frequency, which we refer to simply as the state portfolio.2 We use
weekly stock returns to mitigate the potential problems caused by the presence of
nonsynchronous trading effects, and use only common stocks with CRSP share code 10
or 11 when constructing the state portfolios. We obtain stock return data from Center
for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and company headquarters location data
from COMPUSTAT. However, COMPUSTAT provides only current headquarters
information. For historical headquarters information after 1987, we collect data from
CompactDisc. For companies that existed before 1987 and for which CRSP provides
stock return data, we manually collect headquarters information, if available, from
various annual issues of Standard and Poor’s Stock Reports.
Our sample period spans from July 1963 to December 2008. It starts from 1963
mainly because the number of companies for which CRSP provides stock returns
and COMPUSTAT provides headquarter information sharply increases in 1963. In
our sample, the number was 955 in 1962 but increased sharply to 1,581 in 1963. We
exclude seven states with the average number of stocks less than ten during the sample
2We use company headquarters location as a proxy for firm location following the local bias
literature (Coval and Moskowitz, 1999; Ivkovic and Weisbenner, 2004; Korniotis and Kumar, 2008;
Pirinsky and Wang, 2006).
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period from our analysis. The excluded states are Alaska, Montana, New Mexico,
North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont, and Wyoming. Our final sample consists
of 43 states and District of Columbia, which we refer to as 44 states henceforth for
convenience. Of the 44 states, Hawaii is included in the sample from 1965, whereas
Mississippi and Nebraska are included from 1970.
Table 3.1 presents the summary statistics for our data. The number of firms and
market capitalization share represent the time-series average of annual values. The
other statistics are computed by using weekly state portfolio returns for the entire
sample period. The mean and standard deviation are reported in annualized terms
for convenience. A few points are noteworthy from the table. First, California, New
York, and Texas are three largest states in terms of both the number of firms listed
and market capitalization share. These three states account for about 40 percent of
the total U.S. stock market capitalization. Second, the mean and standard deviation
of state portfolio returns vary widely across states. The mean return ranges from the
highest 18.88% for Arkansas to the lowest 6.60% for Colorado. The standard deviation
ranges from the highest 28.80% for Nevada to the lowest 14.93% for Ohio. Third,
the Sharpe ratio (labeled as SHP) also varies widely across states. It ranges from the
highest 0.493 for Arkansas to the lowest 0.028 for Colorado. The wide cross-sectional
variation in the Sharpe ratios across states partly suggests that U.S. domestic stock
markets may not be fully integrated since if they were we may observe similar levels
of reward-to-risk ratios across states. Lastly, California and Massachusetts have the
largest beta coefficients of 1.21 and 1.20, respectively, whereas Hawaii and Mississippi
have the smallest beta coefficients of 0.64 and 0.65, respectively. Considering that
California and Massachusetts host many technology-oriented companies, the relatively
large beta coefficients for these two states are not surprising.
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
This table reports summary statistics of our sample. Sample period spans from July 1963 to Decem-
ber 2008. U.S. states with fewer than ten stocks on average during the sample period are excluded
from the sample. Of our 44 sample states, the Hawaii sample starts from 1965 and those of Missis-
sippi and Nebraska start from 1970. We construct weekly state portfolio returns by value-weighting
the returns of all stocks within each state. The mean, standard deviation, and Sharpe ratio (SHP)
are reported in annualized terms. During the sample period, the average risk-free rate was 5.97% in
annualized terms. The market beta reports the slope coefficient estimated from regressing weekly
state portfolio returns on the weekly U.S. market returns. The market capitalization share is com-
puted relative to the sample.
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics (Continued)
State Code MktCap
No. of





Alabama AL 0.38 29 12.56 20.91 0.315 0.921
Arizona AZ 0.54 51 10.86 21.10 0.232 1.093
Arkansas AR 1.62 17 18.88 26.18 0.493 1.042
California CA 14.22 598 12.06 21.45 0.284 1.214
Colorado CO 0.98 103 6.60 22.16 0.028 1.039
Connecticut CT 4.26 129 12.14 19.98 0.309 1.098
D.C. DC 0.79 17 12.47 29.02 0.224 1.020
Delaware DE 0.82 22 10.20 22.35 0.189 1.015
Florida FL 1.41 183 10.02 18.98 0.213 1.073
Georgia GA 3.49 102 13.18 17.61 0.409 0.922
Hawaii HI 0.07 10 12.22 18.99 0.329 0.641
Idaho ID 0.19 10 10.69 27.02 0.175 1.030
Illinois IL 6.81 250 11.33 15.80 0.339 0.942
Indiana IN 1.20 60 11.56 19.51 0.287 0.863
Iowa IA 0.26 29 11.94 18.43 0.324 0.847
Kansas KS 0.36 27 8.75 24.25 0.115 0.968
Kentucky KY 0.34 26 12.45 18.67 0.347 0.886
Louisiana LA 0.34 26 10.25 19.46 0.220 0.883
Maine ME 0.08 10 9.27 18.79 0.176 0.636
Maryland MD 0.98 81 10.24 19.26 0.222 1.028
Massachusetts MA 3.39 248 10.36 21.68 0.203 1.196
Michigan MI 1.69 99 10.14 18.41 0.227 0.982
Minnesota MN 2.68 121 12.18 18.10 0.343 0.994
Mississippi MS 0.07 13 10.28 22.94 0.188 0.650
Missouri MO 1.60 72 12.48 16.15 0.403 0.900
North Carolina NC 2.31 78 10.65 18.74 0.250 0.956
New Hampshire NH 0.12 19 13.16 25.95 0.277 1.118
New Jersey NJ 6.88 238 10.78 15.62 0.308 0.821
New York NY 15.00 512 10.60 17.79 0.261 1.064
Nebraska NE 0.98 13 17.03 23.72 0.466 0.884
Nevada NV 0.35 28 11.58 28.80 0.195 1.159
Ohio OH 3.60 161 11.42 14.93 0.365 0.819
Oklahoma OK 0.41 37 12.49 25.45 0.256 0.956
Oregon OR 0.36 37 14.79 22.75 0.388 1.006
Pennsylvania PA 2.92 201 9.72 17.14 0.219 1.003
Rhode Island RI 0.30 13 14.92 23.33 0.384 0.939
South Carolina SC 0.17 27 9.20 18.08 0.179 0.850
Tennessee TN 0.98 55 11.49 20.04 0.276 1.037
Texas TX 10.02 346 11.33 17.45 0.308 0.970
Utah UT 0.19 28 11.54 19.34 0.288 0.878
Virginia VA 3.05 99 13.78 18.49 0.423 0.955
West Virginia WV 0.03 10 11.54 25.76 0.216 0.720
Washington WA 2.98 59 14.63 22.74 0.381 1.050
Wisconsin WI 0.80 58 13.24 17.81 0.408 0.947


































Figure 3.1: Scatter Plot of Risk and Return of State Portfolios
This figure plots the mean state portfolio return and its standard deviation for the 44 U.S. states in
our sample. The mean returns and standard deviations are from Table 1. The solid line represents
the mean-variance frontier. For the two-letter state code, please refer to Table 1.
Figure 3.1 plots the mean state portfolio return and its standard deviation for the
44 U.S. states in our sample. The mean returns and standard deviations are from
Table 3.1. The solid line represents the mean-variance frontier.
3.2.2 Measurement of Market Integration
In this study, to examine the level and trend of integration of U.S. domestic stock
markets, we use a measure of market integration based on the explanatory power
of a multi-factor model.3 Specifically, for each year t and state S, we compute the
3In international finance literature, Pukthuanthong and Roll (2009) argue that if the true return
generating process is governed by more than one factor, then the correlation across markets is a
poor measure of integration and one should use a measure of integration based on the explanatory
power of a multi-factor model. Bekaert and Harvey (1995) also state: “Some have suggested that the
correlation of the local market return with the world return is a measure of integration. However,
this is flawed because a country could be perfectly integrated into world markets but have a low or
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regression R-square, denoted by RSQSt , from the following regression:
rSt,w − rft,w = α + β′Xt,w + εt,w, w = 1, ..., 52, (3.1)
where w represents the w-th week of year t, rSt,w the weekly return of state market
portfolio, rft,w the weekly risk-free return, and Xt,w the national stock market factors.
The RSQSt calculated in this manner is our measure of the level of integration of
state S’s stock market with the national stock markets for year t. We then run the
following linear time-trend regression to investigate whether there is any trend in the
level of integration over time:
RSQSt = α
S + βS(t− t0) + εt, t = t0, .., 2008, (3.2)
where t0 represents the starting year of each state sample, which is 1963 for all
sample states except for Hawaii, Mississippi, and Nebraska. The estimate of αS can
be interpreted as the state S’s initial level of financial integration and βS as the speed
of financial integration.
We consider two multi-factor models for the return-generating process: the Fama-
French three-factor model and a statistical factor model. For a statistical factor
model, we estimate national stock market factors using principal component analy-
sis. Specifically, for each calendar year and given state, we extract five eigenvectors
associated with largest five eigenvalues from the covariance matrix computed using
state portfolio returns of all sample states other than the subject state. Then, the
five eigenvectors thus extracted are applied to the returns of the same sample states
that are used in extracting eigenvectors to compute the so-called in-sample principal
components. Note that, for each sample state, separate principal components are
estimated after the subject state is excluded from the calculation. For example, when
the subject state is California, California is excluded from the computation of the
negative correlation because its industry mix is much different from the average world mix.”
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covariance matrix and the in-sample principal components. Excluding the subject
state in this manner is intended to avoid any suspicion that the regression R-square
calculated from regressing the subject state’s state portfolio return on national fac-
tors is biased by that same state being heavily weighted in the principal components
(Pukthuanthong and Roll, 2009).4
Table 3.2 presents the estimated alpha, factor exposure, and regression R-square
for two multi-factor models by state. For this table, the regression equation (3.1)
is estimated with using all weekly return data for the entire sample period. A few
points are noteworthy from the table. First, our five-factor statistical factor model is
fairly comparable to the Fama-French three-factor model in terms of the (adjusted)
regression R-squares; the average R-square across states is 0.584 for the Fama-French
three-factor model and 0.583 for our statistical factor model. Second, from the es-
timated alphas from the Fama-French model, we can tell that stocks of Arkansas,
Nebraska, and Washington performed fairly well, whereas stocks of Colorado per-
formed very poorly during our sample period.5 Third, from the estimated R-squares
from the Fama-French model, we can tell that stock markets of California, Florida,
Illinois, New York, and Pennsylvania are highly integrated with the national stock
markets, whereas stock markets of Mississippi and West Virginia are less integrated
with the national stock markets. Lastly, from the estimated HML factor exposure
from the Fama-French model, California and Massachusetts have the lowest and neg-
ative HML factor exposures. This is expected because many technology-oriented,
growth firms are headquartered in these states.
4We tried statistical factor models with five to ten different factors, but the results were qualita-
tively the same.
5In our statistical factor model, the five statistical factors have zero sample means by construction,
so αSFM simply represents the average excess state portfolio returns over the risk-free rate during
the sample period. Hence, αSFM should not be interpreted as abnormal returns as it should be in
the Fama-French model. For this reason, statistical significance for αSFM are not reported in the
table.
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics for Two Alternative Models
This table reports alphas, factor exposures, and adjusted R-squares from the regression of weekly
excess state portfolio returns on weekly factor returns over the entire sample period from July 1963
to December 2008. U.S. states with fewer than ten stocks on average during the sample period
are excluded from the sample. Of the 44 sample states, the Hawaii sample starts from 1965 and
those of Mississippi and Nebraska start from 1970. We construct weekly state portfolio returns by
value-weighting the returns of all stocks within each state. For the statistical factor model, each
year five factors are extracted from the covariance matrix of excess state portfolio returns over the
risk-free rates. Five statistical factors have zero sample means, by construction, so αSFM simply
represents the average excess state portfolio returns over the risk-free return during the sample
period. It should not be interpreted as abnormal returns, and statistical significance for αSFM are
not reported for this reason. The star symbols *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
117
Table 3.2: Summary Statistics for Two Alternative Models (Continued)
Fama-French Three-Factor Model SFM
State αFF βMRF βSMB βHML R2 αSFM R2
Alabama 0.002 1.039 0.230 0.530 0.510 0.127 0.544
Arizona -0.034 1.173 0.514 0.371 0.703 0.094 0.714
Arkansas 0.201 *** 1.019 -0.165 -0.108 0.386 0.248 0.386
California 0.073 *** 1.130 0.231 -0.362 0.804 0.117 0.747
Colorado -0.078 * 1.047 0.514 0.058 0.570 0.012 0.588
Connecticut 0.053 * 1.102 -0.141 0.012 0.734 0.119 0.690
D.C. -0.012 1.179 -0.139 0.696 0.336 0.125 0.389
Delaware -0.021 1.118 -0.301 0.437 0.540 0.081 0.514
Florida -0.034 1.129 0.426 0.264 0.816 0.078 0.821
Georgia 0.075 *** 0.954 -0.246 0.129 0.683 0.139 0.648
Hawaii 0.001 0.773 0.391 0.593 0.360 0.119 0.383
Idaho -0.017 1.089 0.362 0.278 0.367 0.091 0.419
Illinois 0.031 * 0.980 -0.117 0.158 0.872 0.103 0.838
Indiana 0.059 0.859 -0.094 -0.024 0.475 0.107 0.471
Iowa -0.012 0.973 0.285 0.567 0.575 0.115 0.596
Kansas -0.063 1.069 0.146 0.449 0.406 0.053 0.438
Kentucky 0.037 0.933 0.224 0.216 0.560 0.124 0.590
Louisiana -0.012 0.958 0.063 0.330 0.515 0.082 0.535
Maine -0.033 0.732 0.228 0.438 0.314 0.063 0.347
Maryland 0.002 1.031 0.357 0.029 0.713 0.082 0.727
Massachusetts 0.034 1.113 0.400 -0.348 0.782 0.084 0.728
Michigan -0.034 1.091 -0.020 0.478 0.729 0.080 0.709
Minnesota 0.055 ** 1.004 -0.072 0.038 0.731 0.119 0.719
Mississippi -0.016 0.736 0.660 0.354 0.282 0.079 0.271
Missouri 0.050 ** 0.933 0.058 0.151 0.756 0.125 0.773
North Carolina -0.039 1.091 0.070 0.598 0.688 0.090 0.702
New Hampshire 0.031 1.132 0.756 0.092 0.510 0.138 0.502
New Jersey 0.053 ** 0.821 -0.300 -0.013 0.695 0.092 0.615
New York 0.020 1.079 -0.124 0.062 0.870 0.089 0.837
Nebraska 0.129 ** 0.939 -0.244 0.236 0.383 0.209 0.386
Nevada -0.057 1.285 0.761 0.588 0.456 0.108 0.500
Ohio 0.028 0.878 -0.084 0.253 0.750 0.105 0.747
Oklahoma 0.027 1.022 0.173 0.294 0.351 0.125 0.410
Oregon 0.077 1.034 0.410 0.137 0.497 0.170 0.549
Pennsylvania -0.018 1.047 0.145 0.200 0.841 0.072 0.830
Rhode Island 0.075 0.994 0.295 0.250 0.408 0.172 0.421
South Carolina -0.043 0.917 0.471 0.317 0.594 0.062 0.589
Tennessee -0.011 1.129 0.187 0.412 0.675 0.106 0.689
Texas 0.026 1.010 -0.082 0.169 0.756 0.103 0.711
Utah 0.001 0.960 0.267 0.370 0.529 0.107 0.557
Virginia 0.074 *** 0.998 -0.116 0.185 0.655 0.150 0.633
West Virginia -0.022 0.839 0.650 0.542 0.252 0.107 0.252
Washington 0.131 *** 0.987 0.013 -0.278 0.524 0.166 0.487
Wisconsin 0.027 1.033 0.281 0.390 0.724 0.140 0.746
Average 0.019 1.008 0.166 0.240 0.584 0.111 0.583
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3.3 Evidence on the U.S. Domestic Stock Market Integra-
tion
3.3.1 Evidence from State Portfolio Returns
In this section, we examine the level and trend of domestic market integration at the
state portfolio level. Table 3.3 presents the estimation results from the regression
model (3.2)
RSQSt = α
S + βS(t− t0) + εt, t = t0, .., 2008,
for each of our 44 sample states. When the hypothesized return-generating model
is the Fama-French three-factor model, 38 states exhibit an increasing stock market
integration and 27 of them a significantly increasing integration at least at the 10%
level. In the beginning year of the sample period, the average R-square was about
0.50, but it increased to 0.68 at the end of the sample period, which represents a
36% increase in the explanatory power of the national factors over the state portfolio
returns. Six states exhibit a decreasing stock market integration, but only one state—
Connecticut—exhibits a significantly decreasing integration. When the hypothesized
return-generating model is the statistical factor model, a stronger time trend of market
integration emerges. Out of the 44 sample states, 37 states exhibit an increasing stock
market integration and 30 of them a significantly increasing integration at least at the
10% level. Seven states exhibit a decreasing stock market integration, but only two
states—Nebraska and New Hampshire—exhibit a significantly decreasing integration.
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Table 3.3: Market Integration over Time at the State Level
For each state S and year t, we compute the regression R-square, RSQSt , from the regression of
weekly excess state portfolio returns on the weekly national market factors. Then, we run the
following linear time-trend regression:
RSQSt = α
S + βS(t− t0) + εt,
where, t0 represents the starting year of the state sample, which equals 1963 for all states except for
Hawaii, Mississippi, and Nebraska. For Hawaii, t0 equals 1965, and for Mississippi and Nebraska it
equals 1970. Estimates of αS and βS are reported for each state S. The star symbols *, **, and ***
represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 3.3: Market Integration over Time at the State Level (Continued)
Fama-French Model SFM
State αS βS αS βS
Alabama 0.2417 0.0120 *** 0.4009 0.0100 ***
Arizona 0.5794 0.0039 ** 0.6659 0.0038 ***
Arkansas 0.3594 0.0022 0.8036 -0.0033
California 0.8397 0.0006 0.8465 0.0012
Colorado 0.5302 0.0011 0.5725 0.0049 ***
Connecticut 0.8152 -0.0031 ** 0.7917 -0.0015
D.C. 0.3074 0.0046 *** 0.3913 0.0098 ***
Delaware 0.4099 0.0049 *** 0.4938 0.0074 ***
Florida 0.6496 0.0058 *** 0.6949 0.0054 ***
Georgia 0.5761 0.0037 * 0.6340 0.0037 **
Hawaii 0.1663 0.0096 *** 0.4662 0.0035
Idaho 0.2552 0.0052 ** 0.3162 0.0144 ***
Illinois 0.8338 0.0011 0.8147 0.0022 ***
Indiana 0.4536 0.0011 0.5241 0.0029
Iowa 0.4250 0.0063 *** 0.4956 0.0054 ***
Kansas 0.4969 -0.0032 0.4942 0.0072 ***
Kentucky 0.4482 0.0039 * 0.5417 0.0038 ***
Louisiana 0.3208 0.0083 *** 0.5036 0.0065 ***
Maine 0.1164 0.0077 *** 0.2831 0.0091 ***
Maryland 0.6353 0.0037 *** 0.6648 0.0049 ***
Massachusetts 0.6393 0.0059 *** 0.6690 0.0059 ***
Michigan 0.7145 -0.0001 0.6957 0.0019
Minnesota 0.6328 0.0040 *** 0.6478 0.0051 ***
Mississippi 0.1671 0.0107 *** 0.4460 0.0066 *
Missouri 0.6875 0.0026 ** 0.7113 0.0033 ***
North Carolina 0.5810 0.0045 *** 0.6291 0.0047 ***
New Hampshire 0.4216 0.0021 0.8565 -0.0060 ***
New Jersey 0.6472 0.0014 0.6274 0.0031 *
New York 0.8609 0.0005 0.8120 0.0020 **
Nebraska 0.4889 -0.0041 0.8410 -0.0114 ***
Nevada 0.3175 0.0057 *** 0.6673 0.0016
Ohio 0.7803 -0.0003 0.7839 0.0013
Oklahoma 0.4566 0.0001 0.5333 0.0046 **
Oregon 0.4253 0.0077 *** 0.7391 -0.0008
Pennsylvania 0.7813 0.0025 *** 0.7759 0.0039 ***
Rhode Island 0.4417 0.0010 0.7234 -0.0035 *
South Carolina 0.3329 0.0101 *** 0.4693 0.0076 ***
Tennessee 0.5595 0.0055 *** 0.6198 0.0059 ***
Texas 0.7481 -0.0003 0.7226 0.0028 *
Utah 0.4326 0.0040 * 0.5220 0.0041 **
Virginia 0.5848 0.0020 0.5881 0.0039 **
West Virginia 0.0459 0.0102 *** 0.7452 -0.0053
Washington 0.3362 0.0080 *** 0.5037 0.0060 ***
Wisconsin 0.5490 0.0068 *** 0.5734 0.0077 ***
Average 0.5021 0.0039 0.6205 0.0036
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There exist some notable differences between the results from the statistical factor
model and those from the Fama-French three-factor model, aside from the number
of states that exhibit a significant time trend of integration. For such large states
as Illinois, New York, and Texas, the time-trend coefficient βS in equation (2) is
not significant when the hypothesized return-generating model is the Fama-French
three-factor model, whereas it is significantly positive when the hypothesized return-
generating model is the statistical factor model. This difference derives from the
difference in the construction of national factors between two models. The national
factors in the statistical factor model are extracted from the covariance matrix of
state portfolio returns, with each state weighted equally in the construction of sta-
tistical factors. In contrast, the market, size, and value factors in the Fama-French
three-factor model are basically value-weighted stock returns, so they are influenced
heavily by states with a larger number of public firms. Thus, when the hypothe-
sized return-generating model is the Fama-French three-factor model, a large state
is likely to exhibit a high level of integration throughout the sample period, so the
intercept αS, measuring the initial level of integration, is likely to be high, and the
time-trend coefficient βS, measuring the speed of integration, is likely to be small
and insignificant. Consistent with this expectation, the five largest states in terms
of market capitalization—New York, California, Texas, New Jersey, and Illinois—
have large intercepts and insignificant time-trend coefficients when the hypothesized
return-generating model is the Fama-French three-factor model. By identifying a
different underlying return generating process and equally weighting the state port-
folio returns, our statistical factor model offers an alternative insight into the level
and trend of market integration across states. The results based on the statistical
factor model show that four out of the five largest states also exhibits a significantly
increasing integration.
Figure 3.2 displays the relation between αS, a measure of initial level of integration,
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Figure 3.2: Relation between the Initial Level of Integration and Speed of
Integration
This figure plots the relation between αSand βS using estimates from the Fama-French three-factor
model reported in Table 3. For each state S and year t, we compute the regression R-square, RSQSt ,
from the regression of weekly state portfolio returns on the weekly Fama-French three factors. Then,
we run the following linear time-trend regression:
RSQSt = α
S + βS(t− t0) + εt.
Here, t0 represents the starting year of the state sample, which equals 1963 for all states except for
Hawaii, Mississippi, and Nebraska. The fitted linear regression model is inserted within the figure.
Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.
and βS, a measure of speed of integration. For the figure, we use estimates from the
Fama-French three-factor model reported in Table 3.3.6 The figure shows that the
speed of integration is inversely related with the initial level of integration, meaning
that a state that was initially less integrated with the national stock markets exhibits
6The results remain qualitatively the same when we use estimates from the statistical factor
model.
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a faster speed of integration over the sample period. The regression results, reported
within the figure, show that the inverse relation is strongly significant. The R-square
from the regression of βS on αS amounts to 44.8 percent.
To summarize, the results based on state portfolios tell us that, for the majority
of our sample states, the R-square, our measure of integration, exhibits a statistically
significant upward trend, implying that U.S. domestic stock markets were not fully
integrated and have been integrating during the sample period. The speed of integra-
tion is faster for smaller states and those states with lower levels of integration at the
beginning of the sample period. When the hypothesized return-generating model is
the statistical factor model, we find a stronger trend of integration for more number
of states, even for several large states.
3.3.2 Evidence from Individual Stock Returns
In the previous subsection, we have examined the domestic market integration at
the state portfolio level. In this subsection, we examine the same issue but at the
individual stock level. If U.S. domestic stock markets were not fully integrated and
have been integrating over time, then we expect that the incremental power of the
state portfolio returns over the national market factors in explaining individual stock
returns exhibits a downward trend over time.
To explain our test procedure, let X be the national stock market factors as in
equation (3.1). For the Fama-French three factor models, for example, X represents
the three-dimensional vector of the market, size, and value factors. For each year t
and state S, we first compute the state portfolio returns orthogonalized with respect
to the national market factors. For this, we run the same regression as equation (3.1),
i.e.,
rSt,w − rft,w = α + β′Xt,w + εt,w, w = 1, ..., 52. (3.3)
The residual from this regression, which we denote by rOSt,w , represents the component
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in the state portfolio returns that is unique to the state and not explained by the na-
tional market factors. Next, for firm j headquartered in state S, we run the following
two regressions
rj,St,w − rft,w = α + β′Xt,w + εt,w, (3.4)
rj,St,w − rft,w = α + β′Xt,w + γrOSt,w + ηt,w. (3.5)
We denote the regression R-square from the first model (the base model) by RSQj,S,BMt
and the regression R-square from the second model (the augmented model) by RSQj,S,AMt .




We refer to RSQj,S,LOCt as the local R-square since it measures the incremental ex-
planatory power of the orthogonalized state portfolio returns over the national market
factors in explaining the stock returns of firm j headquartered in state S. Then, com-
pute the average of RSQj,S,BMt (RSQ
j,S,LOC
t ) across all firms js headquartered in state
S and denote it by RSQS,BMt (RSQ
S,LOC
t ). Finally, to examine the time-varying in-
fluence of the national market factors and orthogonalized state portfolio returns in
explaining individual stock returns, we run the following two linear time-trend regres-
sions:
RSQS,BMt = α
S,BM + βS,BM(t− t0) + εt, t = t0, .., 2008 (3.7)
and
RSQS,LOCt = α
S,LOC + βS,LOC(t− t0) + εt, t = t0, .., 2008. (3.8)
Again, t0 represents the starting year of the state sample, which is 1963 for all states
except for Hawaii, Mississippi, and Nebraska.
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Table 3.4: Market Integration over Time: Evidence from Individual Stock Re-
turns
For each state S, we first regress weekly excess state portfolio returns on the weekly excess national
market factors. We regard the residual from the regression as the component in the state portfolio
returns that is unique to the state and not explained by the national market factors. We call
the residual the orthogonalized state portfolio return. Then, for each firm j within state S, we
compute the regression R-square RSQj,S,BMt from the regression of weekly excess stock returns
on the base model and incremental regression R-square RSQj,S,LOCt resulting from the addition
of the orthogonalized state portfolio returns to the base model. We then compute the average of
RSQj,S,BMt (RSQ
j,S,LOC
t ) across all firms js within state S and denote the average by RSQ
S,BM
t
(RSQS,LOCt ). Finally, we run the following two linear time-trend regressions:
RSQS,BMt = α
S,BM + βS,BM (t− t0) + εt
and
RSQS,LOCt = α
S,LOC + βS,LOC(t− t0) + εt.
Here, t0 represents the starting year of the state sample, which is 1963 for all states except for
Hawaii, Mississippi, and Nebraska. For Hawaii, t0 equals 1965, and for Mississippi and Nebraska it
equals 1970. Estimates of βS,BM and βS,LOC are reported for each state S and for each of two base
models. The star symbols *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
level, respectively. respectively.
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Table 3.4: Market Integration over Time: Evidence from Individual Stock Re-
turns (Continued)
Fama-French Model SFM
State βS,FF βS,LOC βS,SFM βS,LOC
Alabama 0.0004 -0.0041 *** 0.0003 -0.0032 ***
Arizona -0.0014 * -0.0014 *** -0.0013 -0.0011 ***
Arkansas -0.0003 -0.0056 *** -0.0040 *** -0.0011 ***
California -0.0007 0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001
Colorado -0.0006 -0.0011 *** 0.0003 -0.0010 ***
Connecticut -0.0005 -0.0001 * 0.0001 -0.0002 ***
D.C. 0.0026 *** -0.0035 *** 0.0030 *** -0.0032 ***
Delaware 0.0001 -0.0018 *** 0.0012 -0.0015 ***
Florida -0.0006 -0.0004 *** -0.0001 -0.0004 ***
Georgia -0.0005 -0.0006 *** 0.0000 -0.0005 ***
Hawaii 0.0008 -0.0067 *** -0.0011 -0.0039 ***
Idaho 0.0001 -0.0045 *** 0.0009 -0.0045 ***
Illinois -0.0004 0.0000 0.0003 -0.0002 **
Indiana -0.0006 -0.0013 *** 0.0001 -0.0011 ***
Iowa 0.0007 -0.0015 *** 0.0008 -0.0013 ***
Kansas -0.0006 -0.0022 *** -0.0006 -0.0021 ***
Kentucky -0.0002 -0.0017 *** 0.0006 -0.0015 ***
Louisiana 0.0012 -0.0016 *** 0.0019 * -0.0012 ***
Maine 0.0011 -0.0054 *** 0.0004 -0.0040 ***
Maryland 0.0005 -0.0008 *** 0.0009 -0.0008 ***
Massachusetts 0.0008 -0.0003 *** 0.0013 -0.0003 ***
Michigan 0.0002 0.0000 0.0007 -0.0002 **
Minnesota -0.0007 -0.0005 *** -0.0001 -0.0006 ***
Mississippi 0.0024 ** -0.0092 *** -0.0054 * -0.0009 *
Missouri 0.0005 -0.0004 *** 0.0013 -0.0004 ***
North Carolina -0.0004 -0.0009 *** 0.0003 -0.0009 ***
New Hampshire -0.0010 -0.0029 *** -0.0038 *** 0.0000
New Jersey -0.0009 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001
New York -0.0001 0.0001 0.0005 0.0000
Nebraska -0.0017 -0.0032 *** -0.0022 -0.0013 **
Nevada -0.0007 -0.0056 *** -0.0035 *** -0.0023 ***
Ohio 0.0001 0.0000 0.0008 -0.0001
Oklahoma 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0015 -0.0007 ***
Oregon -0.0005 -0.0071 *** -0.0061 *** -0.0008 **
Pennsylvania 0.0002 -0.0001 0.0010 -0.0002 **
Rhode Island -0.0013 -0.0015 *** -0.0019 *** -0.0004
South Carolina 0.0002 -0.0024 *** 0.0003 -0.0018 ***
Tennessee 0.0002 -0.0010 *** 0.0008 -0.0010 ***
Texas -0.0004 0.0006 *** 0.0007 0.0000
Utah -0.0002 -0.0014 *** -0.0005 -0.0014 ***
Virginia -0.0013 -0.0005 *** -0.0008 -0.0005 ***
West Virginia 0.0008 -0.0140 *** -0.0080 *** -0.0050 ***
Washington 0.0005 -0.0019 *** 0.0006 -0.0015 ***
Wisconsin 0.0019 * -0.0010 *** 0.0027 *** -0.0010 ***
Average 0.0000 -0.0022 -0.0004 -0.0012
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Table 3.4 presents the results from the regression equations (3.7) and (3.8). When
the base model is the Fama-French three-factor model, 34 out of the 44 sample states
have a significantly negative slope estimate of βS,LOC at the 1% level and one state
at the 10% level. However, Texas has a significantly positive slope estimate of βS,LOC
at the 1% level. When the base model is our statistical factor model, 36 out of 44
sample states have a significantly negative slope estimate of βS,LOC at the 5% level
and one state at the 10% level. Not a single state has a significantly positive slope
estimate when the base model is our statistical factor model.
The results based on individual stock returns corroborate the earlier results based
on state portfolio returns in Section 3. For the majority of our sample states, once
the influence of national market factors is controlled for, the role of state portfolio
returns in explaining the individual stock returns has declined over time, indicating
an increasing U.S. stock market integration over time.
3.4 Local Economic Fundamentals and Domestic Stock Mar-
ket Integration
The evidence thus far shows that there is a significant trend of greater integration
within the U.S. stock market over the past half century. For the majority of our
sample states, national stock market factors now explain a greater portion of the
state portfolio returns. Over the same time period, state portfolio returns exhibit
a strong downward trend in its ability to explain individual stock returns within
the state, indicating the declining influence of home state factor on individual stock
returns. In this section, we explore possible explanations for the increasing integration
of the U.S. stock market.
Increasing economic linkage across states and changes in state level economic
structure could be the driving force behind the increasing market integration at the
state level. In this section, we first examine whether the increase in market integration
is a result of changing industrial structure at the state level. We then examine whether
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the state level results are largely ‘state’ specific, driven by regulation changes and
policy changes at the state level. To this end, we re-examine the market integration
results at the census regional level. Lastly, we examine whether increase in economic
linkages across the states and between the state and the national market helps to
explain the increase in market integration.
3.4.1 Industrial Structure and Market Integration
Industries tend to cluster geographically, at both state and local levels. The clustering
of industries at the state level could have direct impact on the explanatory power of
the national market index on the state portfolios (Kumar, Page, and Spalt, 2009).
Changes of industrial structure over time at the state level, and to a lesser extent,
at the national level may induce changes in the measured market integration. For
example, increasing industrial diversification at the state level, as measured by both
overall economic activity and the presence of public firms across industries, could
alter the return structure of the state portfolio and its correlation with the national
market portfolio. To examine whether changes in local industry structure helps to
explain the increasing integration of the U.S. stock market during the sample period,
we introduce a measure of industrial concentration at the state level in our analysis
of time trend of market integration.
We use the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) of the market capitalizations of the
public firms in a state as a measure of industry concentration in the state. For industry
classification, we use the 30 industry classification from the Kenneth French’s data
library. We construct the Herfindahl-Hirschman index for each state and each year to
capture changes in industrial concentration at the state level over time. To assess the
impact of industrial structure on the market integration and examine the robustness
of the documented market integration results, we add the Herfindahl-Hirschman index
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to the base model (2):
RSQSt = α
S + βS(t− t0) + γSHHISt + εt. (3.9)
Table 3.5 presents the regression results for the above model. The changes of industry
structure at the state level has a noticeably negative effect on the level of market
integration. In the above regression, HHI is significantly negatively related to the
measured R-squares for many states. The results suggest that for those states that
experience greater industrial diversification (i.e., a declining HHI), the state portfolios
exhibit greater integration with the national market.
Nevertheless, changes of industrial structure are not the driving force behind the
increase in the U.S. stock market integration. We can compare the results here with
the HHI in the regression with the results in Table 3.3. As can be seen readily from
the two tables, the inclusion of the HHI variable in the regression has relatively little
impact on the significance of the time trend variable in the regression. Based on
the Fama and French three-factor model, 27 states show a significantly increasing
market integration without controlling for changes in the industry concentration, and
20 states exhibit a significantly increasing market integration with controlling for the
effect of industry concentration.
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Table 3.5: The Effect of Industrial Structure on Market Integration
Foe each state S and year t, we compute the regression R-square, RSQSt , from the regression of
weekly excess state portfolio returns on the weekly national market factors. Then, we run the
following linear time-trend regression:
RSQSt = α
S + βS(t− t0) + γSHHISt + εt,
where t0 represents the starting year of the state sample, which equals 1963 for all states except for
Hawaii, Mississippi, and Nebraska. For Hawaii, t0 equals 1965, and for Mississippi and Nebraska
it equals 1970. HHISt represents the Herfindahl-Hirschman index of the market capitalizations of
the public firms headquartered in state S as a measure of industry concentration in the state. For
industry classification, we use the 30 industry classification from the Kenneth French’s data library.
Estimates of αS , βS , and γS are reported for each state S. The star symbols *, **, and *** represent
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 3.5: The Effect of Industrial Structure on Market Integration (Continued)
Fama-French Model SFM
State αS βS γS αS βS γS
Alabama 0.4423 0.0093 *** -0.4695 *** 0.4329 0.0096 *** -0.0750
Arizona 0.6382 0.0033 * -0.2375 0.7175 0.0033 ** -0.2084
Arkansas 0.5876 0.0056 *** -0.5308 *** 0.6885 -0.0051 *** 0.2676 *
California 0.8705 0.0005 -0.1745 0.8355 0.0013 0.0624
Colorado 0.8300 -0.0011 -1.1407 *** 0.7142 0.0039 * -0.5393
Connecticut 0.8884 0.0013 -0.5687 *** 0.8821 0.0039 ** -0.7022 ***
D.C. 0.6788 0.0042 *** -0.8904 *** 0.7780 0.0094 *** -0.9270 ***
Delaware 0.3893 0.0051 0.0227 0.2135 0.0103 *** 0.3101
Florida 0.9963 -0.0001 -1.3093 *** 1.0486 -0.0006 -1.3359 ***
Georgia 0.9057 -0.0003 -1.1954 * 0.9736 -0.0003 -1.2316 ***
Hawaii 0.3243 0.0078 *** -0.3215 *** 0.4612 0.0036 0.0102
Idaho 0.5796 0.0046 *** -0.8760 *** 0.3240 0.0144 *** -0.0209
Illinois 0.9672 0.0010 -1.4082 *** 0.9442 0.0021 *** -1.3680 ***
Indiana 0.5829 0.0021 -0.4255 0.5690 0.0033 -0.1480
Iowa 0.5855 0.0046 ** -0.6376 * 0.5975 0.0043 ** -0.4050
Kansas 0.7915 0.0035 * -1.3745 *** 0.5654 0.0088 *** -0.3320
Kentucky 0.7838 0.0005 -0.9874 *** 0.7029 0.0022 -0.4744
Louisiana -0.0946 0.0124 *** 1.1316 ** 0.0940 0.0105 *** 1.1156 *
Maine 0.2117 0.0064 *** -0.1439 0.2313 0.0097 *** 0.0782
Maryland 0.7154 0.0044 *** -0.4674 0.8269 0.0063 *** -0.9454 *
Massachusetts 0.6151 0.0059 *** 0.1244 0.6351 0.0060 *** 0.1743
Michigan 1.0848 -0.0040 -1.4064 * 1.2047 -0.0036 -1.9333 ***
Minnesota 0.8734 0.0002 -0.6082 ** 0.9712 0.0000 -0.8175 ***
Mississippi 0.1413 0.0110 *** 0.0415 -0.1116 0.0146 *** 0.8968 ***
Missouri 0.7782 0.0026 ** -0.8086 0.8852 0.0032 *** -1.5495
North Carolina 0.7060 0.0093 *** -0.9652 *** 0.7230 0.0082 *** -0.7248 ***
New Hampshire 0.3907 0.0020 0.0810 0.7846 -0.0060 *** 0.1886
New Jersey 0.9543 -0.0002 -0.8692 * 0.8987 0.0017 -0.7677 *
New York 0.7718 -0.0002 0.7091 * 0.7620 0.0016 0.3977
Nebraska 0.7534 -0.0070 *** -0.3598 ** 0.9537 -0.0127 *** -0.1534
Nevada 0.6637 0.0046 *** -0.9023 *** 0.5769 0.0019 0.2356
Ohio 0.9549 0.0004 -1.3863 *** 0.9368 0.0019 * -1.2138 ***
Oklahoma 0.4768 -0.0001 -0.0417 0.6851 0.0034 -0.3139
Oregon 0.7054 0.0021 -0.5184 *** 0.5157 0.0037 * 0.4134 ***
Pennsylvania 0.9587 0.0034 *** -1.5081 *** 0.9630 0.0048 *** -1.5909 ***
Rhode Island 0.7162 -0.0019 -0.5735 * 0.6356 -0.0025 0.1832
South Carolina 0.6171 0.0058 *** -0.7506 *** 0.6068 0.0055 *** -0.3631 **
Tennessee 0.8398 0.0007 -0.7150 *** 0.8274 0.0023 -0.5295 ***
Texas 0.7474 -0.0003 0.0027 0.7947 0.0030 *** -0.2770
Utah 0.9314 -0.0001 -1.5511 *** 0.7986 0.0019 -0.8601
Virginia 0.9313 0.0020 -1.2335 *** 0.8689 0.0039 *** -0.9995 ***
West Virginia 0.1722 0.0092 *** -0.1766 1.3313 -0.0098 *** -0.8195 ***
Washington 0.6699 0.0046 *** -0.6590 *** 0.6693 0.0043 ** -0.3269 **
Wisconsin 0.8691 0.0015 -1.2630 *** 0.9257 0.0018 -1.3903 ***
Average 0.6818 0.0029 -0.6214 0.7146 0.0032 -0.4320
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3.4.2 Regional Stock Market Integration
Our evidence of increasing market integration within the U.S. is based on stock returns
at the state level. Since many of the regulations of financial and economic activity
in the U.S. are mandated at the state level (for example, banking regulations and
corporate governance regulations), the increasing stock market integration we observe
could be related to changes of regulation (particularly de-regulation) at the state level
over the sample period. We now examine the time trend in the regional stock market
integration with the national stock market. The regional level results can help to
assess this explanation and further serve as a robustness check for the state level
results.
We divide the U.S. into nine regions based on the U.S. Census region and division
classification. The nine regions and the constituent states of each region are listed in
the Appendix. Each of the regions is not only comprised of geographically proximate
areas or states but also exhibits a high degree of social, cultural, and economic inte-
gration within the region. For the regional analysis, we first construct value-weighted
regional portfolios, and then use the same multi-factor models used in the state level
analysis to obtain the R-square for each region and year. Table 3.6 presents the time
trend results for the nine regions.
As can be seen in Table 3.6, the time trend coefficient is positive for all nine
regions, with three of them significant at the 10% level for the Fama-French three-
factor models. With the statistical factor model, seven regions show significantly
positive time trend at the 10% level. The somewhat weaker results at the regional
level are not unexpected. These regions encompass large socio-economic areas and
are diversified at the stock market level. Evidence at the regional level suggests that
the state level results are robust, and the increasing integration at the state level is
unlikely to be driven by overall changes in state regulations and policies.
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Table 3.6: Market Integration at the Regional Level
This table reports the results of Table 3 by census region. The regional portfolio returns are con-
structed by value-weighting the returns of state portfolios within each region. In our sample, Pacific
region includes CA, HI, OR, and WA; Mountain includes AZ, CO, ID, NV, and UT; West North
Central includes IA, KS, MN, MO, and NE; East North Central includes IN, IL, MI, OH, and WI;
Middle Atlantic includes NJ, NY, and PA; New England includes CT, ME, MA, NH, and RI; South
Atlantic includes DC, DE, FL, GA, MD, NC, SC, VA, and WV; East South Central includes AL,
KY, MS, and TN; and West South Central includes AR, LA, OK, and TX. For the two-letter state
code, please refer to Table 1. For each region Reg and year t, we compute the regression R-square,
RSQRegt , from the regression of weekly national market factors. Then, we run the following linear
time-trend regression:
RSQRegt = α
Reg + βReg(t− t0) + εt.
Here, t0 represents the starting year of the regional sample and equals 1963 for all nine census
regions. Estimates of αRegand βReg are reported for each census region Reg. The star symbols *,
**, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Fama-French Model SFM
Region αReg βReg αReg βReg
Pacific 0.6075 0.0026 0.5846 0.0038 **
Mountain 0.5086 0.0031 * 0.5077 0.0058 ***
West North Central 0.5638 0.0014 0.5488 0.0027
East North Central 0.6070 0.0011 0.5561 0.0032 *
Middle Atlantic 0.5953 0.0023 0.5371 0.0038 *
New England 0.6095 0.0018 0.5886 0.0029
South Atlantic 0.5469 0.0038 ** 0.5360 0.0050 ***
East South Central 0.4863 0.0044 *** 0.4977 0.0052 ***
West South Central 0.5251 0.0020 0.4876 0.0045 ***
3.4.3 Stock Market Integration and Economic Integration
U.S. states have enjoyed a high level of economic integration for a considerable pe-
riod of time. Traditionally, the U.S. states have been subject to few restrictions on
cross-state movements of production, capital, and labor. For example, by the late
1950s, there was no correlation between state investment rates and state saving rates,
indicating free capital flow across state borders (Sinn, 1992). While there was sub-
stantial increasing economic integration and convergence in the early period of the
U.S economic development, there is little evidence suggesting that overall economic
integration at the state level has changed noticeably over the past half century (Barro
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and Sala-i-Martin, 1991, 1992; Kenworthy, 1999).
It is difficult to fully evaluate whether and how much the increasing stock market
integration at the state level could be related to the increasing economic integration in
the overall U.S. economy. The lack of evidence on the changing economic integration
in our sample period and our evidence based on home bias in the next section leads
us to believe that the observed increasing market integration is unlikely to be solely
driven by increasing economic linkage across states within the U.S.
3.5 Local Bias and Domestic Market Integration
Extant studies on local bias provide robust evidence that both institutional investors
and individual investors exhibit such bias: they prefer to invest in stocks that are
located nearby (Coval and Moskowitz, 1999; Ivkovic and Weisbenner, 2005; Zhu,
2002). Recent studies further show that local bias can induce local and regional
differences in the cost of capital of the firms, the comovement of stock prices, and
the risk and return trade-off and that it could also contribute directly to geographical
segmentation within the U.S. market (Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001; Hong, Kubik,
and Stein, 2005, 2008; Pirinsky and Wang, 2006; Korniotis and Kumar, 2008). While
the documented impacts of local bias on the financial markets are far-reaching, there is
little evidence on the cross-state differences in local bias and whether there are changes
in the extent of local bias over time. We now turn to examine whether and how
investor behavior, particularly local bias, contributes to the geographic segmentation
of the U.S. domestic stock market and the increasing integration over time.
To establish a direct link between home bias and market integration, we compute
a measure of home bias at the state level based on the degree of comovement between
the growth of dividends paid by corporations in the state and the growth of dividends
received by residents in the state.7 Mathematically, our measure of home bias at the
7See Agronin (2003) for an earlier application of this method and related discussions. We obtain
the state-level dividend income data from Bureau of Economic Analysis and construct the state-level
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state level is calculated as follows:
HBS =
Cov(∆DRSt −∆DRt, ∆DCSt −∆DCt)
V ar(∆DCSt −∆DCt)
, (3.10)
where DRSt and DC
S
t represent dividends received by residents of state S in year t
and dividends paid by companies headquartered in state S in year t, respectively.
∆DRSt and ∆DC
S
t represent the growth rate of dividends received by residents and
the growth rate of dividends paid by companies headquartered in state S. Note that
HBS measures indirectly the propensity of investors to invest in local companies, i.e.,
the degree of home bias.
As a preliminary analysis, we first examine the bivariate relationship between
∆HBS and ∆RSQS. Here, ∆x represents the change in x values over two sub-
periods: 1963-1985 and 1986-2008. Figure 3.3 shows that ∆HBS and ∆RSQS are
significantly negatively related, suggesting that the decreased home state bias could
be a contributing factor to the increased market integration over the two sub-periods.
The figure also shows that the home state bias proxied by HB decreased for 26 out
of our 44 sample states over two sub-periods and that, in general, states where the
home state bias increased over the two sub-periods do not exhibit market integration,
either.
Next, to examine the effect of home bias on the trend of integration more closely,
we run the following cross-sectional regression




S + ε, (3.11)
where ∆RSQS represents the change in the R-square between two sub-periods from
the regression of state portfolio returns on the Fama-French three-factor model or
our statistical factor model; ∆HBS represents the change in the measured home bias
between two sub-periods; ∆HHIS represents the change in the degree of industry con-
centration measured by Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) between two sub-periods;
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Figure 3.3: Relationship between ∆(Home Bias) and ∆(RSQ)
This figure plots the relation between ∆HBS and ∆RSQS . Here, ∆x represents the change in x
values over two sub-periods: 1963-1985 and 1986-2008. For each sub-period and each state S, we





Here, DRSt and DC
S
t represent dividends that are received by residents of state S in year t and div-
idends that are paid by companies headquartered in state S in year t, respectively. ∆DR and ∆DC
represent the growth rates of dividends received by residents and paid by companies, respectively.
RSQS are estimated by using the Fama-French three-factor model for each sub-period. The fitted
linear regression model is inserted within the figure. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.
∆DIS represents the change in the ratio of dividend income to dividend income plus
interest income between two sub-periods; and ∆PcPIS represents the change in the
ratio of per-capita personal income of state S to national per-capita personal income
between two sub-periods. The two variables, ∆DIS and ∆PcPIS, are included to
control for the effect of economic integration across states (Barro and Sala-i-Martin,
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Table 3.7: Home Bias and Market Integration
We divide our sample period into two sub-periods: 1963-1985 and 1986-2008. For each sub-period





Here, DRSt and DC
S
t represent dividends that are received by residents of state S in year t and div-
idends that are paid by companies headquartered in state S in year t, respectively. ∆DR and ∆DC
represent the growth rate of dividends received by residents and paid by companies, respectively. In
the table, the ‘dividends common’ does not include stock dividends and preferred stock dividends
whereas ‘dividends total’ include all dividends paid. After obtaining the measure of home bias, we
run the following cross-sectional regression:
∆RSQS = a + b1∆HBS + b2∆HHIS + b3∆DIS + b4∆PcPIS + ε,
where ∆RSQS represents the change in R-square between two sub-periods from the regression of
state portfolio returns on the national market factors; ∆HBS represents the change in the mea-
sured home bias between two sub-periods; ∆HHIS represents the change in the degree of industry
concentration measured by Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) of the market capitalizations of the
public firms in state S between two sub-periods; ∆DIS represents the change in the ratio of dividend
income to dividend income plus interest income between two sub-periods; and ∆PcPIS represents
the change in the ratio of per-capita personal income of state S to national per-capita personal
income between two sub-periods. The star symbols *, **, and *** represent statistical significance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Fama-French Model SFM
Variable Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat
Panel A: Dividends= Dividends Total
Intercept 0.01379 0.68 0.03145 1.66
∆HBS -0.56707 -3.01 *** -0.53025 -3.01 ***
∆HHI -0.57214 -3.69 *** -0.58870 -4.07 ***
∆DI -0.14003 -0.44 -0.21489 -0.72
∆PcPI 0.25469 0.99 0.18492 0.77
Panel B: Dividends= Dividends Common
Intercept 0.00706 0.33 0.02509 1.25
∆HBS -0.36911 -2.11 ** -0.35108 -2.15 **
∆HHI -0.56981 -3.50 *** -0.58661 -3.86 ***
∆DI 0.01800 0.05 -0.06786 -0.22
∆PcPI 0.19060 0.70 0.12730 0.51
1991, 1992; Sinn, 1999).
Table 3.7 presents the regression results. It shows that the change in the mea-
sured home bias is significantly negatively related to the change in the regression
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R-square, our measure of integration, regardless of the underlying return-generating
models, even after controlling for the change of industry concentration, the change of
dividend income relative to total investment income (dividend plus interest income),
and the change of personal income. The results indicate that investors’ pursuit of
nation-wide investment opportunities could be a significant driver of domestic finan-
cial integration.
3.6 Summary and Concluding Remarks
We document a significant variation in the level of stock market integration across
U.S. states and trends toward greater integration at the state level during the period of
1963-2008. For the majority of the states, national stock market factors now explain
a much greater portion of the state portfolio returns than they did a half century
ago. Over the same time period, state portfolio returns exhibit a strong downward
trend in its ability to explain individual stock returns within the state. The strong
time trend of greater integration in the U.S. domestic market is surprising in a way
because U.S. economic activities were already well integrated at the national level and
there were few explicit barriers to cross-state economic activities and capital flows at
the beginning of our sample period. Our analyses suggest that changes in the state
economic structure and economic linkage across states are unlikely to explain the time
trend of market integration within the U.S. domestic market.
We argue that investor behavior, and particularly local bias, helps to explain the
cross-state differences in market integration and the time trend of market integration.
We show that changes in home bias measured at the state level are significantly
negatively related to changes in market integration over the sample period. While
it is difficult to attribute the decline in local bias to a single source, the growth
of professional investment industries and the development of information technology
that facilitates trading and information transmission across states and regions are
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likely to be such candidates that can explain both the decline of local bias and the
increase of market integration over time.
Our results on market integration within the U.S. offer insights into important
questions arising from the studies of international market integration. The level of in-
tegration in the U.S. market provides an upper limit to the level of global integration.
Reductions of explicit barriers to cross-border economic activities and international
investment alone are unlikely to lead to full global market integration. The changes of
market integration within the U.S. also suggest that social as well as political integra-
tion across the globe may have contributed substantially to the observed increasing
global integration over the past few decades (Pukthuanthong and Roll, 2009).
We provide new evidence that highlights the importance of investor behavior in
determining the market outcome. The results show that, in the absence of signifi-
cant barriers to economic activities and investments, investors’ portfolio choices could
matter significantly for asset pricing. The evidence of geographical segmentation in
the U.S. stock market implies that investors could benefit considerably by diversify-
ing their portfolios across states and regions. Interestingly, investor local bias, the
tendency to invest in stocks that are located nearby, may have contributed directly
to the geographical segmentation of the U.S. stock market.
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